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**ABSTRACT**

This collection of papers grew out of a response to the need for a more adequate theory of educational equity to guide research and public policy. Section one argues that there is a need to shift the educational policy focus from frequency rates to the conditions of opportunity. In the second section, three theories of distribution of opportunities are addressed. Papers included analyze the structure of the political arguments for equal educational opportunity, the efficiency origins of social equity issues, and a theory of equal educational opportunity based on human diversity with social justice. Section three treats the practical concerns involved in achieving educational equity. Questions examined in the context of state policy at all levels of education include what constitutes the availability of opportunity, sufficient opportunity, and appropriate opportunity. The final section discusses theories of inequity and explores the fundamental causes of inequities within the educational system. The first paper in the last section analyzes educational inequities from the perspective of class conflict theory, while the second paper asserts that the primary sources of inequity rest within the male/female perspectives generated within the family structure.  
(Author/APH)

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THE ITINERARY OF THE CONCEPT "EQUAL  
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY"

by —

Laurence Dean Martel  
Principal Investigator  
Center for a Human Future  
Syracuse, New York

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LDM

## PREFACE

Words travel? They do, indeed. The French Academics, zealous purists and guardians, can testify to that as they protect their language from foreign bastardization. And Americans are notorious for their easy habit of borrowing and incorporating words from other lands.

But words travel semantically, conceptually, and in application, too. And this is what this book is all about, reflections on the intellectual and social itinerary of a concept, equal educational opportunity.

Equality has a long history. Paul's Epistle to the Romans instructs us to love our neighbors as ourselves, and the greatest Teacher of them all gives us the injunction,

Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets.

There is a moral basis to the concepts of equality and equity, whatever their travels in time. As one of the book's authors states, the principle of equal educational opportunity is a principle of distributive justice. We must continually remind ourselves that all moral authority is founded on justice.

Perhaps a greater examination of the moral aspects of educational equity and equality (the two are not necessarily the same) might have rounded out the circle of felicities

contained in this book. There are educational administrators who are guided by a moral sense of correctness in making decisions. An exegetical examination of the Parable of the Talents is an enlightening experience and illuminates the concept of equality. Even in those remote times, it was clear that there was no complete equality among men. Jesus knew and clearly taught that men differ in ability, that there are "diversities of gifts."

America, especially, has from the beginning been concerned with equality. The immortal self-evident claims of the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal and are endowed with unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, although surely imperfect, in historical practice, have nevertheless, formed the basis for the social, political, economic, and educational development of the country.

The American value system, it has been said, is based on a dual set of basic and opposite principles. The first, not always recognized in the confusion of equating equal opportunity with equal status and competence or the provision of equal experience, is the principle of equality--that type of equality of opportunity necessary to keep our dignity and self-respect, to establish parity of esteem before God and the law, to give each citizen the equal right to participate in making decisions about our own affairs and destinies, and to establish the secular intrinsics of the

Judaic-Christian concept of brotherhood.

It is not always popular to discuss the second principle openly among those who have an intoxicated passion for equality and a (leveling) concern for the Common Man, who hold strong beliefs that it is a pre-natal offense to one's fellow man to have been born with any brains, as Toynbee once remarked, and who resent the Jeffersonian notion of excellence and of a natural aristocracy of talent and achievement arising out of a democracy of opportunity. This principle concerns unequal status and talent, and inferior and superior rank. This one is necessary to provide people with motives to excel, to better oneself and one's family and to furnish our nation, communities, and our social, commercial, and political institutions with responsible leadership.

There is thus this curious dualism in our national spirit. As a former Carnegie Corporation report of some years ago put it, "We have believed in the existence of inherent, genetic differences--but we have also believed that hard work plus a little luck could get almost anybody almost anywhere." Our theory of education strongly implies giving everyone a chance to get ahead in order to leave the others behind.

The gifted authors of these essays explore almost every conceivable aspect of equal educational opportunity and the distance and directions that concept has travelled. When reading these chapters, one is frequently

reminded of statements made in the past about equality and education:

- The mission of American education is to take the most furthest and the best highest--Richard deKiewiet, former president of The University of Rochester.

- Democracy stands for giving an equal opportunity to individuals for developing their unequal capacities--Arnold Toynbee.

- A universal system of education is ultimately tested at its margins--Lawrence A. Cremin, President of Teachers College, Columbia University.

Our American theory of education stands or falls to the extent that we succeed or fail in seeing to it that those who are on the fringes, at the periphery outside the so-called normal range of the educational enterprise--those handicapped by poverty, physical and mental handicap, by prejudice, and by other disadvantages not of their own making--are enabled to realize their full potential and are assured of the opportunity to rise to a more equal footing with the more fortunate members of our society.

- The French notion of triage applied to education.

In the economic, social, and political context in which we find ourselves, where the myth of abundance is being replaced by the myth or Age of Scarcity, a new anti-democratic anti-human ideology is emerging under the banner of fiscal soundness. Triage, a metaphor that evokes the new realism, has been described as "a strategy for spending

limited resources on those who can be more productive and for consigning those who can't to various forms of 'benign neglect.' The liberal idealism of the 1960s and early 1970s which helped lift education to a promising new era of opportunity for all is giving way to an ominously conservative trend that threatens to undo the gains that were made in education. There is a sudden defection from the liberal ranks who were none too numerous to begin with.

There are those who do not believe that we can be both equal and excellent. Open admissions to higher education, for instance, called by some the generous democratic doctrine of entitlement to American education without qualifications, is equated with erosion of quality.

- Equality is most in trouble when it drops the "e" and must deal with quality--author unknown.

- Equality is not when a female Einstein gets promoted to assistant professor; equality is when a female schlemiel moves ahead as fast as a male schlemiel.

As a T-shirt has it, God bless Title IX.

The courts are the greatest innovators around. This strong belief in some quarters, stemming as it does from cases involving Brown, Tinker, Serrano, and Rodriguez, as well as from more recent cases involving racial desegregation, equality of the sexes, the invalidity of IQ tests for determining educational categorization of the handicapped, the educational rights of aliens, and bilingual education, has led to widespread circumvention of bureaucratic machinery

in seeking redress of grievances, bypassing the usual loci of power in favor of litigation in the courts. Courts are now viewed by many as more liberal and innovative than the traditional educational sources. We have become a highly litigious society in an Age of the Querulous.

Copious quantities of Federal and state legislation followed legal precedents for equality of educational opportunity and parity in civil status, with provisions for easier and extended access, augmented supporting resources, broadened diversity of opportunity, and, increasingly, in a cash-nexus society, accountability for educational outcomes. Someone has remarked that since there are more educational inputs than outputs, there must be some loose puts around.

At any rate, blacks, Hispanic groups, those of low economic status and poor preparation at lower educational levels, the handicapped, the historically by-passed, those traditionally on the fringe, including women, now have a call on the conscience of us all.

- What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must the community want for all its children. Any other ideal for our schools is narrow and unlovely; acted upon, it will destroy democracy--John Dewey.

- True equality, and, therefore, democracy, consists of treating unequal things unequally--Aristotle.

This book is more than an interesting, scholarly examination of equality in educational opportunity. It is unprecedented, not only in terms of being the first to examine



the concept, but also in terms of its scope of inquiry and the novel idea of an itinerary--marriageable ingredients which make the book provocative. The principal author, Laurence D. Martel, patient in the extreme with the difficult task of managing this ambitious enterprise, deserves the highest praise for originating the concept, conceiving of the book, and seeing it through to completion.

Where will this itinerary lead us next in American education, for all those from pre-kindergarten to the highest levels of scholarship, inquiry, and preparation, for all those from two to toothless, as the Greying of America gives us a new phase in society and the very young are brought to formal educational experiences as their parents work and seek careers simultaneous with parenthood?

The authors suggest new paths and emphases. Scholars, practicing educators from superintendents of schools to state commissioners of education, boards of governance, and legislators need to understand the issues and to reconsider the seminal concept of educational equity and equality of educational opportunity. Both the quality and quantity of American education will benefit precisely because the result will be a clearer philosophical and ethical base for action.

Ewald B. Nyquist  
Vice President, Pace University  
and former Commissioner of  
Education, State of New York

## INTRODUCTION

The Itinerary project was a response to the need for a more adequate theory of educational equity to guide research and public policy. The need arises, according to the National Institute of Education, because "questions of fundamental equity theory have become politicized. Many theories that focus upon the individual student are considered racially, culturally, or sexually biased because they allegedly blame the student for factors or outcomes that are part of a casual sequence in a multi-dimensional environment. Theories that focus upon institutional or systematic causes may be considered attempts to discredit the institution or system. Professional groups often interpret this approach as an attack upon their profession. We need more inclusive and comprehensive equity--related theory to de-politicize basic research so that it may better guide and influence equity--related public policies."<sup>1</sup>

In response to this national concern, the Itinerary project attempts to show that previous theories, many of which conflict or contradict one another, fall in a specific pattern in the evolution of the concept "Equal Educational

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<sup>1</sup>The National Institute of Education, Educational Equity Education Grants Program, Spring 1978, The U.S. Department of Education. A grant memo from the National Institute of Education.

Opportunity." Numerous theories and definitions of educational equity have generally shifted from an emphasis on access to the system, inputs within the system to outcomes of the system. However, despite different shifts and diverse definitions, what has remained consistent is the specific focus on equal access, equal inputs and equal outcomes. However, the undergirding principle used to define previous views and to verify the presence or absence of equity is a theory of frequency. Assuming that educationally relevant attributes are normally distributed throughout the population, frequency rates of participation, advancement and completion have been the yardsticks by which research issues and public policy have been formulated. The Itinerary thesis argues that there is a biography to the life of the concept Equal Educational Opportunity and that there is a progression of Equity Theory from access through inputs to outcomes. This thesis also suggests that the next step in the itinerary will be an emphasis on the concept "opportunity." The focus on "opportunity" shifts our attention from frequency rates to the conditions of opportunity, conditions which might vary frequency rates of participation, resources and results.

In response to this view, several outstanding scholars, representing a wide spectrum of policy perspectives, came together to discuss and prepare written responses to the "Itinerary" thesis. The process through which these scholars developed and refined their reflections and arguments was

dynamic and interactive, with participants having the opportunity to respond to one another, prior to the development of final drafts. Despite expected tension, disagreement and controversy in the range of debate, many dimensions of a greater understanding of equity theory have been suggested in this volume by the project contributors.

In addition to the Itinerary thesis as the initial section, I have organized the subsequent responses into three additional theoretical sections: theory of distribution; theory of making the educational system equitable; and theory of inequities.

The first section deals with the itinerary thesis. The "itinerary" thesis attempts to cut through the definitional debate to shift the policy focus to the conditions of opportunity; to diversity and pluralism, in juxtaposition to a focus on frequency rates. The second section addresses three theories of distribution of opportunities. The first Theory of Distribution is an analysis of the logical structure of arguments for Equal Education Opportunity which is the structure of all political arguments in support of equity in education. Despite the shifting focus or content of arguments, all arguments of educational equity have the same form or structure.

The second Theory of Distribution is an analysis of the efficiency origins of Social Equity issues. An argument is developed to show that equity concerns might develop, not by an internal logic, but rather, in relation to an external

force. In this view, the fundamental content of the concept of educational equity depends upon the shifting features of the social climate--the physical, economic or technological opportunities and constraints confronting the specific society. The central thesis of the "efficiency imperative" view is that the evolution of educational equity is a function of the process of social, technological and economic development which then creates "efficiency imperatives" that are reflected in judgments about the existence of inequity and the prescriptions for the achievement of social equity.

The third Theory of Distribution suggests the inappropriateness of remediation or deficit models which reflect the commitment of Equal Educational Opportunity through the distribution of public funds. Such a limited view according to this theory might not reflect the implicit commitments of a democratic, pluralistic, humane society. If our concern is to make achievement independent of ethnic groups, social class, sex group or language group and less dependent on the functional characteristics of the learner, a concept such as human diversity with social justice may be more adequate.

The second section treats the practical concerns for "making" the system equitable. Questions of what constitutes the availability of opportunity, sufficient opportunity and appropriate opportunity are raised and examined within the context of a scenario for state policy at all levels of the educational system. Four chapters--"Beyond 'Equal' Educational Opportunity," "The Future of Bilingual Education

and Educational Equity," "The Pragmatics of Higher Education Equity," and "An Opinion on Equality of Educational Opportunity"--contain a variety of arguments about the staging or the conditions of opportunity, independent of issues of equality.

The final section is on theories of inequities and treats the fundamental causes of inequities within the educational system. The first treats educational inequities from the view of class conflict theory. An argument is depicted in a scenario which claims that without fundamental reorganization of the capital--class structure, basic inequities will continue. The second theoretical posture critiques previous chapters in this volume, illustrating the view that primary sources of inequity rest within the male-female perspectives generated within the family structure. Both of these views of systemic inequities call for a major revamping of the system, if the range of inequities is to be in any way narrowed.

I believe very strongly that this project, as it currently stands, is at the verge of some rather useful insights into Equity Theory which shifts the emphasis from frequency theory to theory of the distribution of opportunities--a shift which might have vital implications for research, policy and program development and implementation.

Laurence Dean Martel  
Fayetteville, New York

SECTION I

ITINERARY--THEORY OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF OPPORTUNITY

## CHAPTER I

# AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT "EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY"

Laurence D. Martel

### Introduction

Throughout the American experience, educators, policy-makers, and the general public have accepted some notion of equal educational opportunity.

In 1647, for instance, shortly after the Mayflower Compact, the Massachusetts Bay Colonists enacted a law which mandated the first system of public education in America. The Act, "To teach all such children as shall resort him to write and reade. . . ,"<sup>1</sup> provided what the early court believed was minimal protection against the evils of Satan.

Years later in framing a new government, Thomas Jefferson held that "if a nation expects to be both free and ignorant, it expects what never was nor ever shall be." Political freedom was construed as a function of a literate constituency.

In quite a similar vein, Horace Mann argued, not against the evils of Satan or political oppression, but, for universal education as the best protection against the oppression of a social-economic caste structure. "If one class possesses all the wealth and the education, while the residue of society is ignorant and poor, it matters not by what name

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<sup>1</sup>Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American History, vol. 1 (New York: The Meredith Publishing Co., 1962), p. 28.



the relation between them may be called; the latter in fact and in truth, will be the servile dependents and subjects to the former. . . ."<sup>2</sup> Mann concluded that "education, then, beyond all other devises of human origin, is a great equalizer of the conditions of man--the balance wheel of social machinery."<sup>3</sup>

Compulsory education laws surfaced in many states at the turn of the nineteenth century. Children were required by law to attend schools for specified periods of time in order to acquire minimum skills to function in and preserve the qualities of life. In 1902 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld a compulsory education law. In the State vs. Jackson decision, Judge Remick argued that

education of the citizen is essential to the stability of the state is a proposition too plain for discussion. As a mere generalization of our own, it would command immediate and universal assent. But it rests on a firmer foundation. The Constitution (of New Hampshire) declares that knowledge and learning, generally diffused through the community, are essential to the preservation of a free government.<sup>4</sup>

The Plessey vs. Ferguson case established the doctrine of "separate but equal" as consistent with the constitution. Blacks, the largest group of second-class citizens, were construed as "equally protected" by equal standards applied

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>4</sup>"State vs. Jackson, The Atlantic Reporter 53(1975), 1022.

in separate systems of transportation, dining facilities, housing, and, finally, schools.<sup>5</sup>

In his dissent in the Plessey case, Justice Harlan protested that "the Constitution is color blind." All citizens must have equal access as measured by the same standards.<sup>6</sup>

However, not all social theorists believed that the "separate but equal" doctrine was inconsistent with equality. In his book Up From Slavery, Booker T. Washington argued that whites and blacks could be separate but equal, like the fingers on a hand or the keys of a piano; working in harmony. I am not imputing to Mr. Washington the belief that segregation and the development of separate institutions, such as Spelman, Morehouse, Tuskegee, Fisk, and Hampton Institute, was more valuable than integrated education. Such development represented, for Washington, one way of creating educational opportunities for black men, women, and children.

Nevertheless, the doctrine of "separate but equal" began to erode early in the twentieth century. Beginning in 1926, cases were decided by the Supreme Court which began to carve away at the "separate but equal" doctrine which was earlier justified under the Plessey dictum. Advances in housing, salaries, distribution of jobs, membership in labor unions, opportunities in government employment, and

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<sup>5</sup>Alfred Kelly and Winifred Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1963), p. 422.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 926.

participation in the armed forces culminated in a new shift in policy, backed by constitutional interpretation. This shift was to apply the same standards across the board to all citizens regardless of race, creed, or origin.

The ground work was laid for the 1950 Sweatt case and the Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka decision which symbolized that segregation in education is incompatible with constitutional democracy. The doctrine of "separate but equal" was reversed by the Supreme Court. In his presentation of Social Science Data in the Sweatt case, Professor Redfield of the University of Chicago testified, "My opinion is that segregation has effects on the student which are unfavorable to the full realization of the objectives of education."<sup>7</sup> On a similar note in the Brown case, according to Chief Justice Earl Warren, segregation violated the equal protection law of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because school segregation "imposed an inferior status upon Negro children," Warren claimed that "segregation generated a feeling of inferiority . . . as to . . . status in the community; the damage to their minds and hearts might well be so grave that it could never be undone."<sup>8</sup> The purported "equal" standards of segregation were judged unequal--a judgment which was reflected in the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1965.

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<sup>7</sup>Varying degrees on the Judicial use of Social Science Data in the Desegregation Decision of May 7, 1954, Chapter VII in a Law text whose author is presently unknown.

<sup>8</sup>Kelly and Harbison, The American Constitution, p. 933.

Because segregation or any form of discrimination on non-educationally relevant criteria is a form of encouraging deprivation among a group of citizens, the contemporary notion of "equal educational opportunity" has been generally interpreted on the basis of the Constitutional notion of "equal protection."

Clearly, the issue of educational access for the American family has shifted its focus over time; however, there is a pervasive sense of equal educational opportunity as "equal protection," which undergirds the thinking of the early colonists, as well as those who have followed through to the present discussants in the educational opportunity debate.

It has been a long time since 1647; over 330 years. Throughout that time, educational opportunity has been, and continues to be, a value as suggested in the large educational enterprise, consisting of 60 million students attending 120,000 institutions which spend over 85 billion dollars per year.

Despite this large enterprise, it is instructive to note that the national government has no specific authority to establish or maintain a system of public schools. The responsibility of the national government, which is closest to the mission of public education, is in the preamble "to promote the general welfare," in the equal protection clauses, and in the police powers. Although national "involvement in education receives considerable attention,

only about five per cent of the support for schools comes from federal assistance."<sup>9</sup>

Consequently in 1954, when the supreme law of the land appeared clear enough, its application in individual state educational policy was not. Striving to achieve equal educational opportunity took two divergent paths reflecting different views on what Equal Educational Opportunity meant. One path was exemplified in a series of Civil Rights Acts that included an emphasis on the relation of poverty to education, as well as the development of theory and research in education, while the other path was symbolized in the streets by the actions of Martin Luther King, Jr., H. Rapp Brown, Stokely Carmichael, and others. The "street" issues also related education to poverty but in a more active way. Both were intended to reverse the debilitating effects of segregation in education, as well as social, economic, and political life. Adam Clayton Powell once described the Equal Opportunity Movement as consisting of two phases. Phase I he called "middle class matters," such as sitting with whites on a bus or drinking from the same water fountain as whites. The second phase included bread and butter issues, such as the acquisition of jobs and housing. Powell characterized these as the "gut" issues.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>William Cooley and Paul Lohnes, Evaluation Research in Education (New York: Irvington Publications, Inc., 1976), p. 205.

<sup>10</sup>"Beyond Emerging Needs." Proceeding of a Workshop-Oriented Conference on Consolidating a Decade's Gains in Expanding Higher Education Opportunity, sponsored by the New York Education Commission's Statewide Committee on Educational Opportunity, Rochester, N. Y., 1976.

There is little question that the controversial "gut" issue of segregation and intervention in education, as well as the violence that ran from Selma through Harlem to Watts, created a climate of fear, hostility, and confusion that called for new educational policies. New vocabulary represented new polarizations for implementing equal opportunity. "Black Power," "backlash," "war on poverty," "non-violence," "Black revolution," "Panthers," and "sit-ins" became linguistic armor, descriptive of the different aspects of the Civil Rights movement and the different interpretations of Equal Educational Opportunity.

It was not until the large-scale movement for social, racial, and economic reform, during the past three decades, that the need for both a clear definition of Equal Educational Opportunity and guidelines for its implementation were pursued as an issue of public policy.

What is meant by equality in education? What factors contribute to its attainment or non-attainment? What policies ought to be adopted to promote equality in education? These questions have been answered differently with various theories of Equal Educational Opportunity.

Despite the variation in answers, these three questions are essential to the problem of understanding Equal Educational Opportunity. In the remainder of this chapter, we will use these questions as a guide to the literature which describes efforts to resolve the complexity and ambiguity of Equal Educational Opportunity.

### The Problem of Definition

We have already seen that the problems of educational opportunity in the American education system have been explained on the basis of a number of legal and social theories, many of which often conflict with and contradict one another. As a result of the lack of consensus and general ambiguity regarding a definition of Educational Opportunity, the National Institute of Education has adopted the position that

There is a great need for better educational equity theory to guide research and public policies in this area. Questions of fundamental equity theory have become politicized. Many theories that focus upon the individual student are considered racially, culturally, or sexually biased because they allegedly blame the student for factors or outcomes that are part of a causal sequence in a multi-dimensional environment. Theories that focus upon institutional or systemic causes may be considered attempts to discredit the institution or system. Professional groups often interpret this approach as an attack upon their profession. We need more inclusive and comprehensive equity-related theory to de-politicize basic research so that it may better guide and influence equity-related public policies.<sup>11</sup>

Notice that the traditional locution "Equal Educational Opportunity" has been supplanted by the National Institute of Education with "Educational Equity." This represents a shift, itself, in setting the parameters in how to think about and resolve the problem of justice in the distribution of positions and resources within the educational system. This is an important shift in attempting to steer through the dilemmas

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<sup>11</sup> The National Institute of Education, Educational Equity, Education Grants Program, Spring 1978, The U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. A grant announcement from the National Institute of Education, 1978.



raised in the concept "equality" by emphasizing a principle of "fairness."<sup>12</sup> However, for the moment, we will continue to use the phrase Equal Educational Opportunity and Educational Equity interchangeably.

The shift from speaking of Equal Educational Opportunity to speaking of Educational Equity occurred not only because Equal Educational Opportunity has been "politicized," but also because it has been conceptually unmanageable, representing a wide spread in definitions.

The conceptual spread in understanding Equal Educational Opportunity is partly explained by the fact that the concept has been approached from several different perspectives: philosophical, political, programatic, and social scientific. Definitional hats in the "opportunity" ring include such disciplines as economics, psychology, biology, history, sociology, religion, political science, law, and indeed, education. If one thing is clear about "Equal Educational Opportunity" it is that it represents a complex concept that seems to defy universal application or consensus.

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<sup>12</sup>For further explication of the problem of justice and the application of Equity, see Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, London, Routledge and Kegan Press, 1963. Perelman argues that the problems and conflicts of equality often arise as a result of competing rules of justice. He says that "proceeding from this point, we have been able to define the notion of equity which makes it possible to escape the contradictions of justice in which we become involved through desiring to apply several incompatible rules of justice simultaneously." "Equity" functions as an arbitrator in the competition of rules of justice. It enables us, perhaps to steer through dilemmas and competing theories, but it does not resolve the problem of defining Equal Educational Opportunity, itself.



To illustrate the variety of interpretations of Equal Educational Opportunity, refer to Table 1, which contains several common definitions with their problems of application. Additional definitions which have surfaced in the Equal Educational Opportunity literature include:

1. Equal Educational Opportunity is matching length of guaranteed educational experience to the amount of measured intelligence.<sup>13</sup>
2. Equal Educational Opportunity as equal concern and not so much equal education (attainment); that is, an equal distribution of meaningfulness, stimulation, and conditions for learning among all children.<sup>14</sup>
3. Equal Educational Opportunity as full use of the distinctive, individual, pattern of every child's ability.<sup>15</sup>
4. Equal Educational Opportunity as minimum attainment wherein resources are allocated differentially until each student attains a specific level.<sup>16</sup>

Given this plethora of definitions, several valiant attempts have been made to clarify the ambiguity of "Equal Educational Opportunity" by explaining why there are so many different definitions. Most explanations focus on an analysis of "equality."

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<sup>13</sup>S. Macpherson (ed.), "Federal Concern for Equality of Educational Opportunity: Some Historical Indications." Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, January 1974.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Herbert J. Walberg and Mark Barga, "Equality: Operational Definitions and Empirical Tests," in Rethinking Educational Equality, eds. Andrew Kipian and Herbert Walberg (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974), pp. 11-26.

Table 1  
Concepts of Educational Equality<sup>16</sup>

<u>Definition</u>	<u>Problems</u>
1. <u>Negative</u> : quality of education does not depend on individual, social ethnic, or other characteristics of the student or where he happens to receive his education.	What is "educational quality"? What should be equalized; individual, class, school, district, city, or state education?
2. <u>Political</u> : appointed or elected individuals representative of all majorities and minorities have equal control over resources and quality.	A definition of decision making rather than concept. What groups should be represented: social, ethnic, or geographical? What unit should they control: school, district, city, or state?
3. <u>Racial</u> : integrate racial or ethnic groups in unit of geographical area.	Little consistent evidence of racial inequalities in resources within certain geographical areas. Little consistent evidence that racial segregation in schools is harmful by itself. May discourage cultural pluralism. Expense and public resistance to bussing. How define groups and areas?
4. <u>Socioeconomic</u> : integrate socioeconomic groups within unit of geographical area.	Same problems as racial definition except that there is some moderately creditable evidence that socioeconomic integration can help lower socioeconomic groups.
5. <u>Economic</u> :	Assumes expenditures determine educational quality. Economic limitations of society or higher priorities for other social and individual goals.
a. <u>Utopian</u> : continue to allocate additional funds to each student until additional increments produce no gains.	

Table 1--Continued

<u>Definition</u>	<u>Problems</u>
b. Minimum: establish minimum expenditure level; state supplies fund to localities that cannot supply minimum; willing districts can spend more than minimum.	Amount spent still depends on place of residence.
c. Egalitarian: spend more on lower ability students so that all students leave school with an equal chance for success.	How measure ability? May be relatively poor social investment. Is the purpose of the school to compensate for inequalities? Can it? May discourage excellence.
d. Elite: spend more on higher ability students since they may benefit more from scarce resources and later contribute more to social quality and equality.	How measure ability? May further enrich the advantaged.
e. Financial: Spend equal funds on each student.	Costs may vary for different children and in different parts of the state.
f. Maximum Variance: set limit on ratio of expenditures for education in high and low districts, e.g., 1½ to 1.	May curb local initiative.
g. Classification: equal treatment of equals; expenditures assigned to students on the basis of statewide classifications, such as "creative" and "blind."	How classify students?
6. Resource: use any of the economic variants except school resources such as physical plant, teacher qualifications, and library books as the units of allocation or equalization rather than expenditures.	Measurable resources may not determine quality of education.

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For instance, Lawrence Joseph argued, rather unsatisfactorily, that Equal Educational Opportunity and the general notion of "equality" is a "context dependent" principle. As such, there is no single definition that is more appropriate than any other. Whatever meaning can be attributed to Equal Educational Opportunity, according to Joseph, depends upon the context in which it is being used. Insofar as contexts vary, so will the definitions of Equal Educational Opportunity.<sup>18</sup>

Komisar and Coombs went one minor step beyond Joseph by dividing "equality" into two classifications:

1. "Equal as same," which has a single meaning in all contexts of application;
2. "Equal as fitting," which has variable definitions in accordance with both contexts and language users.<sup>19</sup>

Most importantly, according to Komisar and Coombs, the "equality" in Equal Educational Opportunity is the second sense--"equal as fitting." Consequently, it is impossible to give Equal Educational Opportunity a specific definitive interpretation without establishing preconditions for what is "fitting." Komisar and Coombs suggest two rules when applying preconditions in "equality" as "equal as fitting":

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<sup>18</sup> Lawrence B. Joseph, "Normative Assumptions in Educational Policy Research: the Case of Jencks' Inequality," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 434 (1977): 101-113.

<sup>19</sup> E. Paul Komisar and Jerrold R. Coombs, "The Concept of Equality in Education," in Education for Whom? The Question of Equal Educational Opportunity, Charles A. Tesconi, Jr. and Emanuel Hurwitz, Jr. (eds.) (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1974), pp. 68-78.

1. the provisions or practices being judged "equal" must accord with rightful rules, properly applied; and
2. the rules must be employed with reference to appropriate characteristics of the subjects, correctly described.<sup>20</sup>

Specifying the morally rightful rules and the appropriate characteristics of the individuals involved is essentially an ethical issue. On the other hand, properly applying the rules and correctly describing participating individuals or groups are practical and empirical science issues.

Stressing the importance of ethical judgments in specifying the parameters of Equal Educational Opportunity, Komisar and Coombs wrote:

Allegiance to the equality principle as such is an empty gesture. The principle is a secondary one, depending on logically prior moral commitments to make it meaningful. For example, it is meaningless to support the idea that school subsidies should be distributed on an equal basis. It is not until a commitment is made as to what constitutes rightful allocation that assent to the equality principle becomes significant.<sup>21</sup>

Whether the ambiguity of Equal Educational Opportunity is explained in terms of context variation or commitments to moral presuppositions, it is easy to see that in either case, controversy in definition and usage is not dispelled.

Another approach in explaining the dimensions of Equal Educational Opportunity is the analysis of historical events. James Coleman<sup>22</sup> divided the historical development

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>James S. Coleman, "The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity." In Harvard Educational Review (ed.), Equal Educational Opportunity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 9-24.

of the Equal Educational Opportunity concept into five main stages, the first occurring during the Industrial Revolution. Prior to that time, according to Coleman, there had been no need to consider Equal Educational Opportunity since the status of an individual was relatively fixed at birth.<sup>23</sup> Education of the needy was largely determined only by the simple production needs of the family.

The Industrial Revolution, however, brought forth the need for an educated and skilled labor force. To respond to the demands of the Industrial period, tax-supported public education was institutionalized. During this first stage in the historical development of Equal Educational Opportunity, the common school was introduced to provide a common educational experience for all children. In practice, however, the exceptions included the very rich, the very poor, and minority children, whether rich or poor. As mentioned earlier, Horace Mann, the chief exponent of the common school idea, believed that education, as transmitted in the common school, is an instrument of social reform. Levin observed about this first stage:

Of note was the fact that equal educational opportunity was considered to be the antecedent for equal opportunity per se. That is, the goal of the common school was equal opportunity and equal educational opportunity represented the means of achieving the goal. Implicit in this policy was the view that,

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<sup>23</sup> Reference to quotes with respect to birth as a condition the kind of Education to which one has access.

in a just society, the average child from any social origin would begin his adult life with equal chances of success relative to that of a child from another stratum.<sup>24</sup>

The notion of equality during the early stage included four major components. Each component can be referred to as part of an "input" approach to Equal Educational Opportunity:

1. free education to a given level of entry into the labor force;
2. a common curriculum for all children, regardless of background;
3. children from diverse backgrounds attending the same school; and
4. locality-based school equality, given that taxes were major means of school support.<sup>25</sup>

If some children took better advantage of these inputs and achieved more than others, that was due to the efforts of the children and their families; it was not the responsibility of the school system. The intent of Equal Educational Opportunity was only to equalize the life chances of children to foster "the balance wheel of the social machinery."<sup>26</sup>

At the turn of the century, however, as American industrialization demanded more specialized training for a more highly differentiated labor force, the common school principle became outmoded, making it necessary to provide different curricula for different types of students. In this second

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<sup>24</sup> Henry M. Levin, "Equal Educational Opportunity and the Distribution of Educational Expenditures," in Rethinking Educational Equality, Andrew Kopan and Herbert Walberg (eds.) (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1974), pp. 27-48.

<sup>25</sup> Coleman, "The Concept of Equality," pp. 9-24.

<sup>26</sup> Commager, Documents of American History, p. 317.



stage, Equal Educational Opportunity came to mean the provision of different school experiences to different students based on what was considered to be a possible vocational future for each. Although different from the first stage, the second stage is only a variation on the theme of controlling inputs. An underlying principle in the second stage was that since not all children were college-bound, it might be an infringement of equality of educational opportunity to subject some students to a single preparatory curriculum instead of more relevant vocational education. In contrast to the first stage "equal chance" philosophy, there prevailed during the second stage a certain lack of opportunity for social mobility, through "realistic" tracking of curriculum.

The third stage in Coleman's historical account of the Equal Educational Opportunity concept also focused on curriculum and other educational inputs. The shift in this third stage was to secure equality for schools of different racial composition. Attention was given to the characteristics of students, such as racial or ethnic group membership. The question was posed as to whether those characteristics were relevant educational factors. The phrase, "separate but equal," from the 1896 Plessy vs. Ferguson case in the Supreme Court, was the dominant theme of this stage.

The fourth stage, according to Coleman, began with the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas. In this stage, a significant shift in emphasis occurred from a concern for the educational inputs



students were to receive to a concern for the educational results of that schooling.

The Court concluded that racial segregation results in unequal educational opportunity because the effects of such schooling are likely to be both different and unequal for the various racial student groups. Coleman argued<sup>27</sup> that the Court did not go far enough when it focused on results only as a justification for racial integration. (Racial integration was the criterion of Equal Educational Opportunity.) The Court might have used equal results or effects of schooling as the pivotal criterion of Equal Education Opportunity. While the integration mandate might be viewed as another form of concern for inputs, the interest in educational results was initiated and has been further developed in recent years.

Another critical principle that emerged from the 1954 decision was the notion that responsibility for student achievement rests, to a large extent, with the educational system itself. This was true, at least to the extent that schools could not engage in practices that prevented children from maximizing their potential development.<sup>28</sup> Recall that in prior stages, it had been the students and their families who were presumed to have sole responsibility for profitably using the educational resources made available to them.

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<sup>27</sup> Coleman, "The Concept of Equality," pp. 9-24.

<sup>28</sup> Barbara Barnes, "Defining Equality of Educational Opportunity for New Jersey." Report of the New Jersey Education Reform Project, Greater Newark Urban Coalition, 1974.

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Coleman concluded his historical account of the Equal Educational Opportunity concept with a fifth stage. The fifth and final stage represents the full flowering of the principle of measuring equality in terms of the effects of schooling, as opposed to measuring it in terms of some one or more inputs into the educational process. The beginning of this stage is marked by the appearance of the widely discussed and debated Coleman Report.<sup>29</sup> This report was the culmination of a very large-scale, Congressionally-mandated study of educational equality in elementary and secondary education in the United States. In one of the most extensive studies in social science history, Coleman and his associates assessed the state of Equal Educational Opportunity in the United States in the mid-sixties. Coleman emphasized five definitions of the concept:

1. equality of resources, or inputs, brought to the educational process by the administration of the school, for example, faculty, texts, or facilities;
2. equality in terms of inputs brought to the school by students, for example, degree of non-segregation in racial, cultural, and socioeconomic background characteristics;
3. equality with respect to those intangibles that result from interaction of the first two, as, for example, differential teacher attitudes toward students from different backgrounds;
4. equality in terms of the consequences of schooling for children with equal backgrounds and abilities; and

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<sup>29</sup>James S. Coleman, et al. Equality of Educational Opportunity, 2 vol. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966).

5. equality of consequences or results for students of unequal backgrounds and abilities.<sup>30</sup>

Emphasizing the importance of the fourth and fifth definitions of equality, Coleman described the findings of Equality of Educational Opportunity as having

brought into the open what had been underlying all the concepts of equality of educational opportunity but had remained largely hidden: that the concept implied effective equality of opportunity, that is, equality in crucial point is that effects of inputs have come to constitute the basis for assessment of school quality (and thus equality of opportunity) in place of using certain inputs by definition as measures of quality. . . .<sup>31</sup>

Given its political importance and significance for social science research, the Coleman Report launched a mixed reaction from all circles in the Equal Educational Opportunity debate. A few of the more prominent reactions will be detailed later in this chapter. It is clear that Coleman viewed "equality of results" as the fifth, and apparently final, stage in the evolution of the concept. However, as indicated in Table 1, equal results or "outputs" are not the only current conceptions of Equal Educational Opportunity. Even the notion of "equality of results" itself has been given various interpretations. Therefore, we have in view an arsenal of competing definitions of Equal Educational Opportunity. There are many theories which attempt to provide a more satisfactory understanding of Equal Educational Opportunity by explaining

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<sup>30</sup> Coleman, "The Concept of Equality," pp. 9-24.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

why there is ambiguity. Whether one opts for the explanations offered by Joseph, Komisar and Coombs, or Coleman, the question is still open as to a clarification of the meaning of Equality of Education.

### The Conditions of Ambiguity

Perhaps we can move closer to the problem by considering the following question: "Why is it that questions about Equal Educational Opportunity are even raised?" I believe that there are three basic reasons.

First, it is generally presupposed that the personal ingredients (e.g., ability) necessary for success in education (e.g., graduation from high school) are normally or nearly normally distributed throughout the entire population. Second, given this presupposition, the empirical observation that large numbers of identifiable segments of the population do not participate is a prima facie case of injustice. Third and finally, it is a moral imperative to eradicate social or educational injustices--to create and implement policies which reduce the incidence of educational inequity. Taken together, this constitutes a framework in which questions about Educational Opportunity are raised in society. Yet, despite this framework for raising the broad question of Equal Educational Opportunity, the issue has been couched in different definitions (Table 1) and different arguments, stressing various concepts, as in the instance of equal access, standards, treatment, skills, proportional representation, and equal outcomes.

I suggest that it has been these shifts in the way that questions about Equal Educational Opportunity have been raised, together with the primary emphasis on the word "equality," which explains the conceptual confusion. It has also both guided and misguided Equal Educational Opportunity policy arguments, leading to the lack of consensus and general confusion cited by the National Institute of Education. Consider, for example, the following arguments found in the literature which not only presuppose the reasons stated above, but which also stress a different focus in understanding Equal Educational Opportunity.<sup>32</sup>

In one argument, represented in the literature, Equal Educational Opportunity has been understood as the application of equal or uniform standards for access to all as a condition of both entrance and exit at any given level within the educational system. This includes a range of applications from the introduction of common curriculum in the public schools to standardized admission criteria for entrance to private higher education. This might be usefully called the "equal access" argument.

In another argument, Equal Educational Opportunity has been construed as assuring that, within a given level of the system, equal treatment is provided to all who are within that level. This can be understood as providing relatively equal

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<sup>32</sup>I wish to stress that there is no argument I have found in relation to Equal Educational Opportunity which is not concerned with distribution of some kind. Consequently, although the arguments cited here shift in focus on what is distributed, they, nevertheless, are "arguments from distribution."

resources, curriculum, faculty, programs of study, standards of quality of instruction, and so forth. We might call this the "equal standards or input" argument.

A third argument stresses the point that minimum skills are needed in society in order to function with success. Equal Educational Opportunity is understood as the policy to insure that everyone secures certain minimum skills as a result of participating in the educational system. This might be labeled the "minimal needs" argument.<sup>33</sup>

A fourth way of understanding the concept is in terms of a proportional distribution of representatives of the population throughout the levels within the system. This, of course, includes the level of higher and professional education. The assumption of this argument is that Equal Educational Opportunity is not achieved unless a proportional distribution of the pool of potential students is, indeed, enrolled. This can be called the "argument of proportional participation."

Finally, the literature contains variations on the argument that Equal Educational Opportunity is the function of generating equal outputs, distributed proportionally, across

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<sup>33</sup> A useful point has been brought to my attention by Professor Thomas Green. "The minimal needs argument does imply roughly identical time at which the standards (of achievement) are met, but it need not. If this argument implies not merely that everyone will reach a certain level of certain skills, but not necessarily at the same time, then we are involved with problems of basic education. If it implies equal attainment of certain skills at roughly the same age, then an age cohort analysis demonstrating that some have not yet attained those levels will imply also that equal educational opportunity has not been secured."

the potential populations. This can be understood as the "proportional results or outcomes argument."

As noted earlier, each of these arguments stresses quite different aspects of Equal Educational Opportunity. Thus, the results of these arguments might range from the establishment of standard testing measures to the provision of quota systems and the creation of special programs with special supportive services. Furthermore, these arguments also imply different allocational policies with respect to the distribution of resources within the educational system. However, nowhere in the literature is there a clear explication as to how to understand Equal Educational Opportunity, its evaluation, or the concomitant policy implications. In addition, there seems to be no clear guide as to what ought to be stressed and what is the most appropriate focus for public policy as it directly relates to Equal Educational Opportunity.

#### The Itinerary of Equal Educational Opportunity-- an Analogy of the System

Let us retreat for a moment and consider a possible alternative framework for understanding The Itinerary of Equal Educational Opportunity, an alternative that includes, nonetheless, all the definitions and arguments we have thus far reviewed. I am using "itinerary" as a metaphor which indicates a route or path, a schedule of one's journey. It is a conceptual Odyssey. By "itinerary" in this context, I mean to suggest the observable fact that the social meaning of equal educational



opportunity has changed over time. I mean to call attention to the further claim that those transformations have a definite and, perhaps, inevitable sequence. There is both a progression and a structure to that progression. In short, there is a path, a definite route, that the concept has traveled through in its evolution to this point. If we can determine that path in retrospect, then in prospect, it seems appropriate to ask where it will lead next. We might ask, "What is the biography of Equal Educational Opportunity?" What in short is the itinerary of its life?<sup>34</sup>

It might be useful to explore the itinerary first by examining the Equal Educational Opportunity literature which is reviewed in greater detail later in this chapter. As mentioned earlier on page 22, the literature does not have a primary focus, since various arguments seem to shift the focus of theory and research from issues of entrance to the educational system, to issues of advancement within the educational system to finally, issues which deal with the results of the educational system. Consequently those issues which have been identified in the Equal Educational Opportunity literature can

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<sup>34</sup>Again, I wish to extend my gratitude to Professor Thomas F. Green for the suggestion to use the concept "Itinerary" as a tool to describe the phenomenon of the shifting emphasis that has been stressed over time.



be grouped into those

- (1) that affect access to the system as a whole or to one of its parts;
- (2) that affect equality of educational inputs, such as student entry characteristics, quality and quantity of facilities and faculty, expenditures per pupil; and
- (3) those that affect equality of outcomes, in terms of scholastic achievement, student and community satisfaction, number of graduates, income of graduates, and attrition-retention rates.

Implicit in much of the recent efforts to clarify or implement Equal Education Opportunity is the argument that the achievement of equality of educational opportunity will, in turn, lead to equality of economic and social opportunity in society at large. In a more recent application of Horace Mann's argument regarding "war on poverty," the argument has been stated in the following way:

1. Eliminating poverty is largely a matter of helping children born into poverty to rise out of it. Once families escape from poverty, they do not fall back into it. Middle-class children rarely end up poor.

2. The primary reason poor children do not escape from poverty is that they do not acquire basic cognitive skills; they cannot read, write, calculate, or articulate. Lacking these skills, they cannot get or keep a well-paid job.

3. The best mechanism for breaking this vicious circle is educational reform. Since children born into poor homes do not acquire the skills they need from their parents, they must be taught these skills in school. This can be done by making sure that they attend the same schools as middle-class children, by giving them extra compensatory programs in school, by giving their parents a voice in running their schools, or by some combination of all three approaches.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>Cooley and Lohnes, Evaluation Research in Education, p. 135.

This argument, although compelling, can be influenced by many factors outside the educational--factors in the total social system that, in spite of Equal Educational Opportunity, mitigate against the achievement of economic and social equality. Such factors might include minority discrimination in hiring practices, inequality in housing opportunities, and specific certification requirements for employment. Nevertheless, the assumption that Equal Educational Opportunity should contribute to overall equality in life chances is a very important one and linked to all definitions of Equal Educational Opportunity.

When viewing the educational system as a complex of factors which contribute to greater or fewer Equal Educational Opportunities, it is important to recognize that change at any one point in the system can have ramifications for other parts of the system. Increasing or decreasing Equal Educational Opportunity at one point--in the system--through equal access, for example, can have important consequences for other areas within the system, as in the case of instruction. As a result, attention to one part of the system almost inevitably requires attention to the others. It is often the case that changes in only one or a few parts is insufficient to achieve change in the system's overall

functioning. This point is important to remember when considering alternative strategies for increasing Equal Educational Opportunity in a very complex educational system.<sup>36</sup>

This phenomenon is also applied to drug therapy in medical patients. Often a drug induced to relieve hypertension may produce drowsiness or nausea. A recent approach in chemotherapy is to target treatment of a given problem and to avoid consequential effects on other parts of the body. Of course, the point is to understand, as best one can, the consequences of any given targeted treatment on the system as a whole.

If we regard the "Itinerary of the Concept Equal Educational Opportunity" as a shift in "targets" from an emphasis on access to inputs to outcomes, then the spectrum of definitions and arguments appears to assume some order. However, that itinerary need not be unilaterally applied across the levels within the educational system, per se. Indeed, it might be that because of efforts to uniformly apply "equal access, for instance, across all levels, general confusion has been unavoidable. One might, for example, focus on access in higher education and, without contradiction, emphasize issues of outcomes at the primary or secondary

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<sup>36</sup> Consider the recent debate on the relationship between mandatory bussing as a mechanism for desegregation and the phenomena of "White Flight." (The Chronicle of Higher Education, November 6, 1978, vol. xvii, no. 10).

level. Suggesting a progression and structure in the itinerary does not imply that the concept is static. Since the educational system is dynamic, involving many levels and programs of study, the application of the itinerary is also dynamic. For instance, when one emphasizes the issues of access at any given level in the system, there is no logical or practical prohibition from also dealing with issues of input and issues of equal outcomes. For example, the problem of access to higher education might be resolved at the community college with a focus on equal inputs. The problem of access to professional education might, at the same time, remain an open issue. Suppose, however, that the Equal Educational Opportunity definitions which focus on expanding access were predominant throughout the educational system. For the moment, put aside the concept of an "itinerary" which progresses from access to input to outcome. What problems would surface if Equal Educational Opportunity were understood as "access" and access alone?

### Equality of Access

It was during the early stages in the evolution of Equal Educational Opportunity that equal access was a guiding principle, contributing to the demands of the Industrial Revolution and to the development of universal education. The creation of schools, accessible to all people, was a goal of policy in this first period. The fact that school attendance up to a certain age or level is today considered

an individual right--indeed, an obligation--makes "access" inappropriate as an issue for primary and secondary education. By "equal access" I mean only the opportunity for any individual to enter and attend school, not necessarily equal treatment while in school or equal outcomes upon completion. The arguments of equal inputs and outcomes appear to continue to apply at the lower levels of the educational system.

Of course equal access is a vain gesture if what is accessed is of little value or disproportionally unequal. Consequently, the Plessy vs. Ferguson Supreme Court ruling in 1896 and more recent rulings emphasize the quality of education and the equalization of inputs across schools and systems.

Whereas "equality of access," understood in this quite limited sense, is no longer a basic issue at the primary and secondary levels,<sup>37</sup> still, it remains a major concern of the 1970s in higher education. Recently, the Panel on Financing Low-Income and Minority Students in Higher Education reported that as of 1972 it was

apparent that equal opportunity is still an unrealized goal. The poor, even those of highest ability, do not enter higher education at the same rate as the rich. Minority students continue to have far less chance of entering and remaining in college than majority students. Equal opportunity still remains the great unfinished business of the seventies.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> The primary issue of inequality is defined in terms of "inputs" or environments of racial segregation.

<sup>38</sup> Toward Equal Opportunity for Higher Education. Report of the Panel on Financing low-income and minority students in higher education. New York, College Entrance Examination Board, 1973.

In her discussion of equal access as an important concern for post-secondary education, Cross<sup>39</sup> traced three major eras in American thinking about who should have access to higher education; the aristocratic, the meritocratic, and the egalitarian. In the early aristocratic period, the probability of college attendance was predictable from birth. Caucasian males from a relatively high socioeconomic background were almost exclusively the recipients of the benefits of higher education.

As the educational system grew, the aristocratic philosophy, traces of which still remain in some institutions, and professional progress of students gave way to meritocracy, a period during which college education was and still is for the most part considered an achieved right, not an ascribed one. Both ability and willingness to study hard have been the requirements for entry. These conditions of entry have been largely determined through the application of equal standards to all applicants. Standardized entrance examinations and high school grade point averages have been the chief yardsticks assumed to guarantee an equal chance for all aspirants to a college degree. Part of the meritocratic philosophy is what Cross called the "funnel model" of traditional education; students will go as far as they can in school, at which time they will have completed their education.

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<sup>39</sup>K. Patricia Cross, "Equality of Educational Opportunity." Position paper prepared for the Education Task Force of the White House Conference on Youth. Estes Park, Colorado, April 1971.

The task of the system, on such a view, is to funnel the most competent to the top, through to higher education and graduate school.

Although the meritocratic philosophy reached its peak of acceptance in American thinking as early as the 1950s, the meritocratic or equal standards approach has continued to dominate institutional access and retention behavior well into the 1970s. It is important to remember that the meritocratic model is clearly the prevalent model for higher education access in contemporary America.

As mentioned earlier, the social turbulence of the 1960s brought on a third approach to higher educational access, the egalitarian philosophy. The major principle of egalitarian access is that everyone, regardless of race, sex, socioeconomic status, or even measured ability, should have equality of access to post-secondary education. A current example in egalitarian access policy is the introduction of open and free admissions in colleges and universities. The most widely recognized effort at open admissions is found in the City University of New York. A more moderate egalitarian approach is discoverable in the application of equal, but relatively low, standards of admission along the lines of the meritocratic model.<sup>40</sup>

As noted above, equal access per se is no longer regarded as a serious problem in elementary and secondary

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<sup>40</sup> The intent of "lower" standards of selection criteria is to use these measures as predictors of those who will most likely persist to graduation.



education in contemporary America.<sup>41</sup> It remains a complex problem for higher education, partly due to characteristics that distinguish higher education from lower levels in the system. One important feature of higher education that distorts the access issue, in fact the entire question of Equal Educational Opportunity, is the very fact that, whatever the degree of real equality of opportunity, the individual can choose not to take advantage of that opportunity. Equal access becomes problematic, partly because it is difficult to separate non-attendance due to legitimate, well-informed individual veto from non-attendance due to the operation of external factors (for example, inadequate finances or discrimination). However, as long as proportionately large numbers of identifiable groups do not attend, it can only be assumed that non-attendance is a function of some unjust barrier and not a matter of choice.

In the egalitarian case, of course, desire to attend is the only criterion for access, so the "equality of attendance" problem does not exist under that model. In the more popular meritocratic model or the modified egalitarian model, where there is the desire for higher education among groups traditionally excluded from access, where is the line to be drawn between quality education and equality of educational opportunity? Which obstacles to access put "non-traditional" students at unfair disadvantage and, therefore,

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<sup>41</sup>The focus is on quality of inputs and results, vis-à-vis segregation.

deny Equal Educational Opportunity, and which can be retained in order to insure standards of quality in the educational institutions involved?

This problem of an optimal balance between quality and equality appears to be a key issue for Equal Educational Opportunity when "equality" is defined in terms of access, and access alone. In a recent discussion of higher education access policies, Crossland noted that "perhaps the most complex and most misunderstood of all barriers (to access) is reliance upon widely administered, standardized entrance examinations."<sup>42</sup> He went on to discuss the merits and deficiencies of such examinations, which represent a serious element in the Equal Educational Opportunity debate.

A harsh critic of the "access model" in defining Equal Educational Opportunity, Patricia Cross suggested that some who support "quality" standards in college admissions may be doing so out of self-interest more than anything else:

If we blow away the nostalgia that surrounds the pleasant ring of the words "academic excellence," we will discover that unpalatable truth that our identification with academic excellence was more the result of the selection work of the admissions office than the instructional work of the teaching faculty. The lesson we learned during the meritocracy was that if you start with the qualities that you wish to graduate, you will end with those same qualities, if you don't do anything to destroy them. When education moved from

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<sup>42</sup>Fred E. Crossland, "Equality, Equity or Equilibrium: Policy Toward Access to Higher Education." Paper presented at the 18th Annual Conference of the Council on Higher Education in the American Republic, Bela Horizonte, Brazil, March 1976, New York: Institute of International Education, 1976, p. 7.

an emphasis on selection to an emphasis on teaching and learning, it moved to charging the educational process itself with responsibility for the quality of the graduating class.<sup>43</sup>

Finally, Clark questioned the elitist/meritocratic argument that better education results when students are differentially selected on the basis of ability and when they learn with students of similar abilities rather than with those of widely higher and lower abilities. The research is scant and the evidence is even less to support such a position, according to Clark.<sup>44</sup>

A second and related feature of higher education that complicates the concept of Equal Educational Opportunity when based on a principle of equal access is the fact that entry into the system occurs late in life relative to entry into lower levels of education. Given this fact, interventionists have argued that by the time of potential entry into predominantly meritocratic higher education, it is likely that for some groups of individuals, access has been denied by the cultural, economic, and/or educational deficiencies relative to the conditions for success in higher education. In this view, access is not even an issue at the level of graduation from secondary school. It has, in spite of the fairness of equal standards, been predetermined very early in one's educational career. To what extent academic achievement and

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<sup>43</sup>K. Patricia Cross, "Lesson in Ecology, You Can't Change the Student Body Without Changing the System." NASPA Journal, vol. 12, no. 5 (1975): 3.

<sup>44</sup>Shirley M. Clark, "Changing Meaning of Equal Educational Opportunity." Theory Into Practice, vol. 78, no. 1 (1976): 77-84.

potential for achievement, such as intellectual ability, are subject to non-inherited, or environmental, factors has been the subject of intense debate for a long time. This is not the place to consider the geneticist-interventionist debate.<sup>45</sup> The point here is that many have argued that inequality of access under a meritocratic system is a foregone conclusion. Therefore, it is meaningless to focus on equal standards of access at such a late date.

A logical extreme of this environmental deficit argument might go as follows: even under an egalitarian model, where choice is the sole criterion, the educationally disadvantaged may have been "denied" access because their elementary and secondary educational and cultural experience has fostered such attitudes as low self-concept, low expectations for achievement, and inadequate knowledge of the alternatives before them that they do not (cannot) even choose to attend higher education. This might be a problem beyond the scope of the educational system itself. However, there are two other features of the educational system which appear to make "equal access" a less-than-adequate definition of Equal Educational Opportunity:

1. The fact that higher education is a scarce resource, in relation to other levels within the system;

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<sup>45</sup>For a general discussion of this debate, see Husen.

2. higher education comes in a variety of forms and degrees of quality.

Higher education is a scarce resource, the supply of which is unable to meet the apparent demand.<sup>46</sup> Husen, after defining equal education as "equal benefits, rights or treatment according to some kind of principle or rule,"<sup>47</sup> agreed with the following rule offered by Warnock. Everyone

has an equal right to as much education as might enable him to have more if he wants it; and when he has been educated so far, he thereafter has a right to equality of opportunity for more. Whether he actually gets more will depend upon his inclinations, upon the amount of the commodity available, and the kind of competition involved in getting it.<sup>48</sup>

According to Husen,<sup>49</sup> the most critical of the three conditions is the amount of the commodity available because, under conditions of scarcity, no matter how selection to higher education is carried out, it will tend to favor those of favored background. The implication here is that, where even relatively few aspirants to higher education must be screened out, those who have had the least advantaged background--least money, least educational achievement, and least status--will be the first to be denied access. A truly egalitarian concept of equal access, then, requires either some completely unbiased system of selection, such as a

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<sup>46</sup>Scarcity here refers not only to positions, but to pricing or affordability as such,

<sup>47</sup>Torsten Husen. "Problems of Securing Equal Access to Higher Education, the Dilemma Between Equality and Excellence," Higher Education 5 (1976): 407-422.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

lottery perhaps, or an adequate supply of higher education to all who want and choose.

Another important characteristic that distinguishes Equal Educational Opportunity from higher and lower education is the fact that, while public elementary education and even secondary education is dominated by one form of organization for over ninety per cent of the population, higher post-secondary and professional education is very pluralistic and heterogeneous.<sup>50</sup> Including such categories as public, private, vocational and professional, two-year and four-year, college and multiversity, higher education ranges widely in quality and style. When higher education is viewed as a whole system, equal access becomes less meaningful as a guarantee of overall Equal Educational Opportunity within the "system" the more that access to institutions of varying quality and type becomes patterned for social and racial groups of students. For example, in higher education the less advantaged often find themselves in two-year community colleges which usually treat the associate degree as a terminal degree, while the more advantaged find access to prestigious four-year colleges and universities which generally open the path to graduate study or guaranteed high level career entry.

With regard to the last point, the conclusions of the Panel on Financing Low-Income and Minority Students in Higher

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<sup>50</sup>Clark, "Changing Meanings of Equal Educational Opportunity," pp. 77-78.

Education are again appropriate. They recognized the need to define Equal Educational Opportunity not only as equity in the rates and patterns of enrollment (by income, race, timing of enrollment, full- and part-time enrollment status, and extent of retention), but also as equity in the distribution of students among types of institutions. Access, confined to specific segments of post-secondary education--usually public, two-year colleges and vocational schools or other low-cost institutions--is not, according to the Panel, in any real sense access to the higher education system:

Because access to higher economic and social positions is influenced by the kind of institution one attends, opportunities for higher education cannot be equal until the poor and minority students are assured not only equality of access, but also equality of options among programs and institutions.<sup>51</sup>

Alexander Astin reported that the data bear out the Panel's conclusions. Merely gaining "access" to a public institution may not represent an "equal education opportunity" for different student groups. Those students who succeed in gaining admission to the most selective universities are exposed to much richer resources, better facilities and libraries, and a more qualified faculty than those who attend two-year colleges or non-selective four-year colleges. Students who gain access only to the urban two-year colleges are also denied the benefits of residential living and have

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<sup>51</sup>Toward Equal Opportunity for Higher Education. Report of the Panel on Financing Low-income and Minority Students in Higher Education. New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1973.

substantially decreased chances of completing their degrees.<sup>52</sup>

If one accepts equal "access" as the defining characteristic of Equal Educational Opportunity, and if one accepts the Panel's and Astin's suggestions that equal access in a predominantly meritocratic system of higher education is not sufficient to assure real equal access, it becomes clear that either the pluralistic system must be homogenized to ensure that access to different institutions is not significantly unequal education, or else a quota system of proportional admissions to different types of institutions must be established. Homogenizing the system of higher education is pragmatically unacceptable as well as unlikely, and establishing representative equality faces serious legal and practical difficulties as illustrated in the recent Bakke case in the United States Supreme Court.

In a discussion of equal occupational equality, Miller distinguished equality of opportunity from representative equality: in the former the concern is only with the fairness of the chase for favored positions in the selection process, while in the latter the concern is for greater proportionality in the outcomes of that chase.<sup>53</sup> The Bakke case, decided by

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<sup>52</sup>Alexander W. Astin, "The Myth of Equal Access in Public Higher Education." Paper presented at the conference on Equality of Access in Postsecondary Education, Atlanta, Georgia, July, 1975, Atlanta Southern Education Foundation, 1976.

<sup>53</sup>S. M. Miller, "Types of Equality: Sorting, Rewarding, Performing," in Education, Inequality and National Policy, Nelson F. Ashlene, Thomas R. Pezullo and Charles I. Norris (eds.). (Toronto, Lexington Books: 1976), pp. 15-43.



the Supreme Court, suggests that quota systems are in for serious legal questioning in the near future. In addition, drawing boundaries around minorities and assigning proportional access would appear an impossible task, given the difficulty of identifying minority classifications, the probable overlap of minority memberships (disadvantaged Black female, for example), the numerical fluctuations in group size over time, and the difficulties in classifying higher educational institutions.

Assume for the moment that the American higher educational system were a truly egalitarian system in which every student had the opportunity to attend the institution or type of institution of one's choice. Unless other features of the system changed accordingly, equal access would become a wasted effort. For example, in 1969 City University of New York responded to intense political pressures and instituted the practice of open admissions<sup>54</sup>--acceptance of high school graduates into college regardless of academic record, and provision of remedial measures to bring them to college performance level. After five years, Trivett observed that although access for lower income students and racial and ethnic minorities had been increased, there was considerable doubt as to whether these non-traditional students were surviving to degree level.<sup>55</sup> Despite open access, non-productive students

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<sup>54</sup>The previous "cut-off" was a high school average of at least +82. The previous "cut-off" for entrance was, minimally, a high school average of 82.

<sup>55</sup>David A. Trivett, "Open Admissions and the CUNY Experience," ERIC Higher Education Research Currents (Washington, D.C.: ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education, George Washington University, 1976), ED 122 684.

fell through the cracks because the system was not equipped to accommodate students of lower level academic competencies.

It has been suggested that if access policies are changed and if higher educational opportunity is extended to large numbers of people previously excluded from the system, then it may be necessary to change the system in several significant ways, some of which are as follows:

1. to recognize important differences in individual learning styles and encourage many different pedagogical modes;
2. to expand the curriculum to accommodate new career objectives not earlier considered suitable for universal study;
3. to consider the limitations of the academic calendar and provide greater flexibility in the time required to complete a degree; and
4. to make a choice between expanding existing institutions or establishing new ones.<sup>56</sup>

Even if attained in its egalitarian extreme, Equal Educational Opportunity as "Equal Access" alone is simply not sufficient to encompass all of the conceptual entailments, as in the case of issues relating to inputs and outcomes. Many authors argue that access is not enough, but it is clearly a necessary initial part of any complete concept of Equal Educational Opportunity. Indeed, as I have suggested, "access" is a first step in the itinerary of Equal Educational Opportunity. Beyond access, however, are the facets of Equal Inputs and Equal Outcomes. I wish to stress that throughout the literature, the focus in each of these concepts has been on

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<sup>56</sup>Crossland, "Equality, Equity or Equilibrium," p. 7.

equal access, equal inputs and equal outcomes. Again, although shifting from access to inputs and outcomes to more fully comprehend the complexion of Equal Educational Opportunity, confusion and dilemmas persist as a result of the focus on "equality." We will discuss this point, and the importance of departing from an emphasis on "Equality," later in the next chapter.

### Equality of Inputs and Equality of Outputs

Historically, Equal Educational Opportunity was generally understood as all persons having access to similar instructional resources in public schools (elementary and secondary), and also that the schools themselves were to be similar. The emphasis was on equalization of inputs. The traditional input notion of Equal Educational Opportunity then had two major elements:

1. anyone who wishes to be educated should have access; and
2. all schools should have approximately equal resources in terms of materials, teachers, curricula, and so forth.<sup>57</sup>

This traditional view is still widely held, at least with regard to Equal Educational Opportunity at the elementary and secondary levels.<sup>58</sup> A fundamental and impartial

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<sup>57</sup> Charles A. Tesconi, Jr. and Emanuel Hurwitz, Jr., Education for Whom The Question of Equal Educational Opportunity (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1974), p. 77.

<sup>58</sup> Thomas F. Green, "Equal Educational Opportunity, the Durable Injustice," in Education for Whom? The Question of Equal Educational Opportunity (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1974), pp. 78-100.

assumption of this position is that, given equal access and equal educational inputs, it is still the individual student who is responsible for the results at the outcome side of the equation.

As suggested earlier, several of the definitions of Equal Educational Opportunity in Table 1 (page 10) focus on equal inputs into the educational process as the subject of equalization (5e. equal expenditures per student; 5f. a set range to ensure relative equality of expenditures; 5g. equal expenditures for similar types of students; and 6. equal educational resources).

From a legal point of view, Equal Educational Opportunity is currently being defined in terms of this "equal input" concept: the equal treatment of all students in the allocation of educational resources and environments, the exception being the efforts to correct for prior educational disadvantages via compensatory education programs.<sup>59</sup> The most dramatic development in legally defining Equal Educational Opportunity as equal inputs during this century has been the addition of "environments" to the traditional resource notion. By mid-century, the Supreme Court had modified its 1896 definition which allowed for separate, but equal, schools (environments) for students of different racial groups. In 1954, in Brown vs. the Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, however,

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<sup>59</sup> Frank Brown, "Equal Educational Opportunity, the Law, and the Courts," Urban Education, vol. 11, no. 2 (1976): 135-150.

the Court ruled that equal educational resources in racially segregated environments were not conditions of equal education because segregation denied certain environmental advantages to minority students. Among these advantages was the opportunity to learn with and be influenced by students from advantaged backgrounds. The essence of the "friend of the court" brief in the Bakke case was that segregated environments by geography, income, sex, social background, and race were not conducive to the educational excellence at Harvard.<sup>60</sup>

Adding strength to the Supreme Court's 1954 argument, the Coleman Report<sup>61</sup> presented evidence that there were inequalities of traditional educational inputs in American elementary and secondary schools. However, and most importantly, these differences had minor impact on student achievement compared to the strong negative influence of segregating relatively poor children from wealthy children in the educational process. Viewing the backgrounds which children bring to school with them as concrete educational inputs, Coleman and his associates suggested that bussing might be one sound means of ensuring an educationally valuable social mix. After a decade since the Coleman Report, James S. Coleman has reassessed his earlier conclusions and now holds that court-ordered, mandatory bussing for desegregation has more negative effects than

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<sup>60</sup>Lewis Powell, "Regents of the University of California vs. Bakke. The Supreme Court Decision, June 28, 1978," quoted in the New York Times, vol. CXXVII, no. 43, 986 (June 29, 1978), p. A 20.

<sup>61</sup>Coleman et al. Equality of Educational Opportunity.

positive effects.<sup>62</sup> This reversal does not constitute a shift in "equal outcomes," however, as the criterion for Equal Educational Opportunity.

It should be understood that Coleman et al. did not see bussing and other efforts as the achievement of Equal Educational Opportunity. They were concerned merely with the means of achieving equality of educational outcomes or results. And it was equal outcomes that they claimed constituted the verification of achievement of Equal Educational Opportunity. Tesconi and Hurwitz wrote:

The thrust of the Coleman Report, then, is that if equality of educational opportunity is to be measured by those factors that most affect learning, the focus should not be primarily on school inputs, but rather on the equalization of human resources--what children take to school. It suggests that educators should assess equal educational opportunity by the outputs of schooling rather than its inputs.<sup>63</sup>

Although from an educational, social, or research point of view, emphasis on equal educational outcomes may be an appropriate definition of Equal Educational Opportunity, from a legal standpoint it is a difficult one to justify. According to Brown, the courts are almost forced to accept the "equal treatment" or "equal inputs" concept because of several problems; bias and defects in tests of achievement, failure of school data analysis to match inputs with outputs, inadequacies in data analysis techniques, methodological defects

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<sup>62</sup> Lorenzo Middleton, "The Effects of School Desegregation: The Debate Goes On," The Chronicle of Higher Education, vol. XVII, no. 10 (Nov. 6, 1978): 1.

<sup>63</sup> Tesconi and Hurwitz, Education for Whom?

inherent in correlational analysis, and lack of specificity in operational definitions of input and output variables.<sup>64</sup>

However difficult it is to define the concept of Equal Educational Opportunity as essentially equal outputs or results in legal terms, there is a clear trend in the educational and social science literature toward verifying the success of Equal Educational Opportunity in terms of results. Whether or not to include outputs as the principle of verification of equalization appears to be a fundamental question in the current Equal Educational Opportunity debate. However, if one accepts equal access and equal outputs only to constitute the itinerary of Equal Educational Opportunity, then equal inputs (curriculum, teaching effort and methods, etc.) on a student-by-student or group-by-group basis does not appear to be acceptable. (Equal outputs might require differential inputs.) Equal access guarantees that students of varying capability, background, and learning styles will enter the system; equality of outputs aims to ensure that those same students leave the system as educational equals. This position has been modified by some educational theorists to mean a proportional distribution of outcomes across the population of potential entrants. It is obvious that differential inputs and processes (kinds and amounts) will be required to accomplish equal outcomes. If one does not include equal outputs in the itinerary of Equal

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<sup>64</sup>Brown, "Equal Educational Opportunity," pp. 135-150.

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Educational Opportunity, then the choice is open whether to define it as equal access plus equal inputs, or equal access alone.<sup>65</sup>

The Coleman Report, whatever its methodological imperfections and consequent data inaccuracies,<sup>66</sup> promoted the notion that education is not really equal unless the outcomes are equal for different student groups, classified by race, economic status, or some other differentiating characteristic. According to Coleman, full equality of educational opportunity would consist of a convergence, so that even though two groups begin school with different average skill and achievement levels, each group would have, at the end of schooling, approximately the same range of distribution of achievement and a similar distribution within that range. Coleman recognizes the impossibility of expecting equal outcomes on a student-by-student basis, given the normal curve usually found in group measurements; hence, he argued for group-by-group averages as the object for equalization.<sup>67</sup>

In a report to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, Berke and Kelly<sup>68</sup> noted that the

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<sup>65</sup> We have reviewed the problems associated with defining Equal Educational Opportunity strictly in terms of Equal Access.

<sup>66</sup> Coleman et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Joel S. Berke and James A. Kelly, "The Financial Aspects of Equality of Educational Opportunity," Report presented to the Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, United States Senate, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.



dominant definition of Equal Educational Opportunity consists of absolute equality in the level of educational services accorded all children (equal access and equal inputs only).

They argued against this position, claiming that a definition which takes into account only access and inputs is in opposition to what is known about the differential learning aptitudes of children and about the goal of furthering social mobility. Accordingly, a comprehensive theory, or definition, of Equal Educational Opportunity must include two things:

1. the purposes of education; and
2. what little we know about how students from different backgrounds and abilities really learn.

If the concept of Equal Educational Opportunity includes equipping children from any background to compete on equal terms with children from any other level of society and if different students require different learning resources and approaches, it is clear that Equal Educational Opportunity would entail equal educational outcomes. Under this view, it is clear that differential services and resources might be required for those who need them.<sup>69</sup>

Norman Francis summed up the rationale for differential (unequal) inputs and processes with the phrase, "equal treatment of unequal circumstances does not produce equality."<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Norman C. Frances, "Quality Education and Equality of Educational Opportunity, NASSP Bulletin, vol. 61, no. 1 (1977): 16-25.

As for the difficulties implied in "equal as sameness,"<sup>71</sup>

Berke and Kelly commented further:

Neither of the authors of this testimony would minimize the practical difficulties in implementing this view of equal educational opportunity. We are both aware of the questionable results of previous large-scale efforts at compensatory education. . . . We know that educating the children of the poor and of racial minorities is one of the things American schools do worst. We are not unaware either of the evidence of the apparent impotence of schooling in comparison with out-of-school influence on children. And we have both had the opportunity, in previous research, of developing techniques for identifying educational needs--both on the basis of admittedly imperfect achievement tests, and on the basis of social and economic indexes of need. Yet with all the problems associated with it, allocating resources in proportion to educational need seems an indispensable part of a meaningful public policy designed to further equality of educational opportunity.<sup>72</sup>

Also emphasizing the importance of focusing on the objectives of education and the diversity of student needs, Edmund Gordon<sup>73</sup> similarly rejected the notion of Equal Educational Opportunity as simply a combination of access and inputs. He called for a concept of Equal Educational Opportunity that consists of "human diversity with social justice" if we are committed to making educational and other achievements, independent of ethnic group, social class, sex group, religious

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<sup>71</sup>Note that Francis' quote returns us to the earlier discussion of Komisar and Coombs, page 13, about "Equal as sameness." His observation supports Komisar and Coomb's claim that the "Equal" in Equal Educational Opportunity means "Equal as Fitting."

<sup>72</sup>Berke and Kelly, "The Financial Aspects of Equality."

<sup>73</sup>Edmund Gordon, "Education of the Disadvantaged: a Problem of Human Diversity," in Education Inequality, and National Policy, McCann F. Askline, Thomas R. Pezullo and Charles I. Norris (eds.). (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1976), pp. 101-123.

group, and/or geographic origins. A notion of "human diversity," according to Gordon, directs our attention to human differences that have relevance for pedagogical and developmental intervention. The concept of "social justice" moves us beyond a concern for distributive equality to one of distributive sufficiency; that is, at questions of need rather than of sharing. The quality and quantity of educational intervention for each student or student group should be determined by what is necessary for him/her/them to function with adequacy and satisfaction. Impartiality is lost with Gordon's conception of Equal Educational Opportunity. Yet, in his view, real social justice is served: "To honor, then, the implicit commitment to equality of opportunity, we may be required to embrace a new commitment to the nurture of human diversity and the pursuit of social justice."<sup>74</sup>

The notion that Equal Educational Opportunity requires equality of outputs, and therefore differential educational resources applied to students of varying needs has been argued in the case of elementary and secondary education, as well as in higher education. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education advocated not only the idea of open access to higher education, but also the concomitant notion of educational progress. Among the Commission's recommendations was one that every student accepted into a program requiring

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<sup>74</sup>Edmund W. Gordon, "Toward an Understanding of Educational Equity," Equal Opportunity Review, ERIC Clearinghouse on Urban Education, Institute for Urban and Minority Education, August 1976, p. 6.

compensatory education receive the necessary commitment of resources to allow engagement in an appropriate level of course work by ~~the end of two~~ years.<sup>75</sup>

The Carnegie Commission's recommendation suggests another important consideration that must be made when viewing "equal outputs" as the primary focus of Equal Educational Opportunity. How far must we go, or can we go, in equalizing outcomes? Perhaps the "minimum needs" or "sufficiency for life" criterion is one possibility. Under the "minimum-benefits-needed-for-life" notion, Thomas Green argued that the system must distribute its benefits so that a certain share is secured by each person regardless of abilities and other characteristics.<sup>76</sup> Contrast Green's notion with Coleman's which essentially called for equality of maximum benefits--the raising of lower group averages to the level of the highest group average. Of course Coleman's unit of analysis was the group, but the fact remains that his idea of Equal Educational Opportunity would require, at the very least, an ambitious public policy effort.

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<sup>75</sup> Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, A Chance to Learn; An Action Agenda for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970).

It is interesting to note that an initial justification of Federal Student Financial Aid (SFA) was to make access available to the poor, the financially disadvantaged. Currently, the Federal Regulations require higher education institutions to monitor the allocation of SFA to students who are in "good standing"; making satisfactory progress toward a degree.

<sup>76</sup> Green, "Equal Educational Opportunity," pp. 78-100.

Understood in terms of equal educational outcomes, the concept of Equal Educational Opportunity has been critiqued by some writers on at least two accounts: (1) that, in a pluralistic society, as ours is, equality of educational outcomes is not a desirable goal from either an individual or a societal point of view; and (2) that it is unrealistic to expect that our schools can actually effect educational equality and, beyond that, social equality. With regard to the first argument, Patricia Cross has criticized the dominant "access" model of Equal Educational Opportunity in higher education (by her definition: "access" entails a stress on equal outcomes) for assuming that the educational task is to change disadvantaged students to fit the system. She wrote:

The fundamental problem with access models is that they leave unchallenged the notion that there is a single ultimate goal for excellence in students and in institutions. As long as the unidimensional model remains supreme, there will always be marginal students, and there will always be a "lower half" who are below average in their performance of the tasks of education.<sup>77</sup>

As an alternative to the itinerary of Access-Inputs-Outcomes for higher educational Equal Educational Opportunity, Patricia Cross has developed the notion of an "accommodation" model, which suggests that the system can be changed to fit the students. The accommodation model assumes that the "student ability-institutional educational offering" schism will be narrowed by shifting educational policies and methodologies toward student learning needs through either expansion

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<sup>77</sup>Cross, "Equality of Educational Opportunity," p. 8.

of the system or diversification of the system. Under Cross's model, multiple states of excellence are preferred to only one achievement track in the access model. Cross's definition of Equal Educational Opportunity contains two integral elements: equal access (usually only a post-secondary issue) and accommodation of education to fit diverse needs (a concern at all levels of education).

Expanding on her concept of Equal Educational Opportunity, Cross outlined three different types of programs for nontraditional learners, each with a different assumption about the purpose of egalitarian education:

1. The earliest and still prevalent model is the remedial one. It assumes that equality is on remediation until new learners can profit from traditional college education. This model establishes educational ghettos which often include a faculty and mission quite different from that of the parent institution. Attempting to "correct" individual differences at college entry, it works only for borderline individuals, a small percentage of nontraditional students.

2. The educator's model accepts individual differences upon entry as an educational challenge, devising multiple treatments to reduce the differences upon departure from college. However, the emphasis is still upon equal outcome competencies. Differential learning rates and styles are accommodated. This model helps some, but not all non-traditional students.

3. The pluralistic model allows learners to enter with different characteristics and abilities, to proceed in various directions through the system, and to exit with different competencies. In this model, which is preferred by Cross, education maximizes the opportunity for personal life-long development; it is necessarily individualistic in outcomes as well as in processes. This third model would lead, it seems, to more attention to the individual make-up of students, including their peculiar personality traits, attitudes, and values.<sup>78</sup> I believe Cross is hinting the issue of social justice advanced by Gordon.

Even if equal educational outcomes are held as the criterion for Equal Educational Opportunity, the question remains as to what real capability the educational system has to raise significantly the ability and achievement levels of nontraditional students, who may enter at levels far below the average of their traditional student counterparts. This is the question asked by those who doubt the value of defining Equal Educational Opportunity in terms of equal outcomes from a practical standpoint. It is the subject of an intense controversy among educators and social scientists, and it is relevant at levels of the system. For some, it is essentially the nature-nuture debate, pitting hereditarians against environmentalists over whether standard measured intellectual

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<sup>78</sup>Cross, "Lesson in Ecology," p. 3.

ability, which is positively correlated with scholastic achievement, is more or less inherited or learned. A second debatable issue is whether educational deprivation is due more to unalterable inherited traits or to past experiences that might be compensated for through remediation.<sup>79</sup>

For other writers, it is a debate over what the data currently say about schooling and post-schooling outcomes, and whether the former, in competition with negative cultural, social, economic, and ethnic influences, has a significant impact on the latter. A large part of the literature is devoted to this issue: Katz, 1969; Bane and Jencks, 1975; Lesser and Stodolsky, 1969; Thomas, 1972; Sewell, 1973; Gordon, 1975, 1976; Epps, 1974; Joseph, 1977; Gordon and Green, 1974; Carlson, 1972; Green, 1974; and "Jencks' Inequality and Its Critics," 1973.

Both E. Gordon and D. Green have suggested that each of these disputes is too simplistic for attacking the problem of making school achievement independent of ethnic or social class. The problem is a very complex one involving several issues:

1. the problems related to differential patterns of intellectual and social function, as well as varying degrees of readiness in multivariant populations served by schools whose programs are too narrowly conceived and too inflexible to provide the variety of conditions needed;
2. problems related to the conditions of students' bodies and their life conditions that may render

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<sup>79</sup>See Husen, 1976, and Gordon, 1976 for discussions of this controversy.



them incapable of optimal development and that may seriously interfere with adequate function;

3. problems related to ethnic, cultural, and political incongruencies between schools and their staffs, on one hand, and the children and communities served, on the other; and
4. problems related to public schools as social institutions that have never been required to assume responsibility for their failures.<sup>80</sup>

It has been continually suggested that defining Equal Educational Opportunity strictly in terms of either equal inputs or equal outcomes is too simplistic, generally the sorts of problems cited in 1-4 above. Not only are there conceptual and programatic problems in defining Equal Educational Opportunity as Equal Inputs (treatment) or as Equal Outcomes (results), but in either case such a definition is incomplete, disregarding the issues of access, diversity of potential students, and differential criterion of success. In addition, it is also limiting to assume a definition which places the onus of responsibility for educational opportunity totally on the shoulders of either the individual or the system itself.

Although arriving at this conclusion from different positions, many of the authors reviewed above contend that it is no accident that after access, a due consideration of inputs and outcomes is necessary. The entire issue, it appears, turns on a comprehensive view of Equal Educational Opportunity as an

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<sup>80</sup> Edmund W. Gordon and Derek Green, "An Affluent Society's Excuses for Inequality: Developmental, Economic and Education," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, vol. 44, no. 1 (January 1974): 4-18.

itinerary of access to inputs to outcomes. Considered separately, each permits only a partial and often a partisan perspective. In addition, considered separately as equal access, equal inputs, and equal outcomes had its own problems in that the force of the word "equality" restricts attention to access, inputs, and outcomes, per se.

### Conclusion

The three questions--what is meant by equality in education, what factors contribute to its attainment or non-attainment, and what policies ought to be adopted to promote equality in education, take on a new dimension when directed at the comprehensive theory of the Itinerary of Equal Educational Opportunity as a logical progression including access, inputs, and outcomes. Many of the competing partisan theories are allayed when defining Equal Educational Opportunity as neither equal access alone, nor equal inputs alone, nor equal outcomes alone. It is a combination in the steps from access to outcomes that gives direction and structure to the concept.

Precisely how that combination of access-inputs-outcomes is understood is, in my judgment, a key issue. Traditionally, the force of the word "equal" on access-inputs-outcomes has generated, as we have seen, incompatibility and contrasting positions. It is extremely difficult to make any sense of the argument for equal access for students with unequal inputs and equal outcomes. As suggested

earlier, I believe that the focus on "equality" has not only created incompatible positions, but it has also inhibited a comprehensive theory which embodies the tripart concept of access, inputs, and outcomes. What results is a lack of understanding "opportunity," quite independent from the concept "equality."

Largely as a consequence of the lack of a comprehensive theory of "opportunity," the Panel on Financing Low-income and Minority Students in Higher Education gave several reasons for the continuance of unequal opportunity in higher education.

1. a lack of social commitment to the goal of equal opportunity itself;
2. a social unwillingness to reorder priorities and focus scarce resources on programs that could support the access and retention of poor and minority youth in higher education;
3. inadequate schooling for poverty and minority students at the elementary and secondary levels;
4. the paucity of programs at the higher educational level that can remedy earlier educational handicaps; and
5. continuing doubts throughout the educational system about the educability of poor and minority students, resulting in lowered expectations and the erosion of self-concepts among these youth.<sup>81</sup>

The first two reasons relate to moral-political factors, whereas the remaining are management problems. All, however, result from concern for the lack of "opportunity."

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<sup>81</sup>"Toward Equal Opportunity for Higher Education," Report of the Panel on Financing Low-income and Minority Students in Higher Education." New York, College Entrance Examination Board, 1973.

Professor Gordon has shed some light on "opportunity" programs which incorporate a regard for access, differential inputs, and proportional outcomes for non-traditional, disadvantaged students. He concluded that, where programs have been implemented with full systems of student support services, special opportunity students showed equal or higher grade point averages than regular students of comparable ability, equal or higher retention rates than regular students, and increased self-esteem and motivation. Where special opportunity students are selected on the basis of previously demonstrated talent (good but not excellent high school academic records and/or moderately good entrance examination scores), their college completion rates tend to exceed those of traditional college students. Also, grade point averages are comparable to those of traditional college students. Conversely, in programs for "opportunity" students where little systematic student support services are available or utilized, student achievement, retention rates, and graduation rates are low for these students. Among program elements that have been found to be beneficial, Gordon listed the following: financial aid; adjusted curriculum in which special needs of the student are taken into consideration in planning course work; tutorial support; remediation, where necessary; counseling and continuous psychological and social support; protection from the impersonal atmosphere of the university through small group work, faculty-student contact; targetted remediation-development programs based on real needs; programs that give

attention to the socio-political life of the students; behavior modification; course content that complements the nationalistic concerns of students; developmental programs in test-taking and study habits; and programs that prepare adolescents in the transition from high school to college.<sup>82</sup>

Gordon's conclusion presupposes a concept of Equal Educational Opportunity which not only includes consideration to access-inputs-outcomes, but focuses less on "equality" than on "opportunity."

If Gordon's conclusions are accurate, and the evidence suggests that they are,<sup>83</sup> the door is wide open for experimentation with far-reaching educational, psychological, and social approaches to reducing inequality in educational achievement among non-traditional student groups in higher education.

However, this approach to the problem suggests a re-analysis of Equal Educational Opportunity in terms of the concept "opportunity." In order to develop a comprehensive concept of Equal Educational Opportunity as "opportunity," we need to shift from a predominant concern for equality and include access-inputs-outcomes. Perhaps we should rephrase our earlier questions to ask what is meant by "opportunity,"

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<sup>82</sup>Edmund Gordon, "Opportunity Programs for the Disadvantaged in Higher Education," ERIC/Higher Education Research Report No. 6. Washington: ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education, 1975.

<sup>83</sup>Several comparative studies by the New York State Education Department support Professor Gordon's conclusions.

what factors contribute to the achievement/non-achievement of educational opportunities, and what policies ought to be adopted to promote opportunities in education?

This is not a case of changing the language to shift the focus of the Equal Educational Opportunity debate as it has traditionally been raised.<sup>84</sup> Rather, if, as we claimed before, the itinerary of Equal Educational Opportunity has a path or biography from access to inputs to outcomes, then it may be that the next step in its life can be spoken of as its "opportunity" phase. Both the application of and emphasis on the concept "opportunity" to any given level or part of the system might allow us to speak of Equal Educational Opportunity as a concept of diagnosis (differential access), treatment (variable inputs), and verification (diverse outcomes).

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<sup>84</sup> There are many different fallacies which are often employed. The ad hominem argument, for instance, seeks to dismiss discussion by discrediting the individual on the erroneous basis of his special interest or prejudices, rather than his intellect. I would like to introduce a fallacy of a similar nature. I call it the "fallacy of semantic reference." This is an argument which attempts to dismiss discussion by discrediting the issue as a problem of definition. The fallacy is usually expressed as "Let's not get bogged down in semantics" or "That's merely a problem definition." All too often, this fallacy is employed to discredit a genuine problem of meaning as though it, itself, were meaningless.

## CHAPTER II

### AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT

#### "OPPORTUNITY"

Laurence D. Martel

#### Introduction

In Chapter I we discussed the evolution of "equal educational opportunity" as a problem of definition. We set forth the thesis that perhaps equal educational opportunity has a specific itinerary enabling us to explain why a satisfactory account of equal educational opportunity in one period of history is not sufficient in another. In attempting to arrive at a satisfactory understanding of educational opportunity in our present circumstances, it was suggested that we are misdirected if we choose between current competing definitions of educational opportunity. Rather, we should explore, "What is the next step in the itinerary?" By raising this question, it was further suggested that the next step might be a shift from a predominant concern for equality to a consideration of the concept "opportunity." In doing so we would ask, "What is meant by 'opportunity'?" "What factors contribute to the achievement or non-achievement of educational opportunities?" And, "What policies ought to be adopted to promote opportunities in education?"

Our claim was that raising these questions was not a matter of simply changing the words to shift the focus of the educational opportunity debate. However, I believe this claim needs further comment, particularly since the thesis could be dismissed, either as a move to add new and different expressions to speak of enduring equity problems, or for that matter, to lose sight of the problem by getting "bogged down in semantics."

Of course, changing the language to fit the situation is often useful to shift either the focus of attention or attitudes toward a problem of public policy. For example, in a recent article economist William Freund claimed that the negative attitudes toward the word "productivity" were so profound that finding a new word might lead to a change in both attitudes and the economic circumstances.<sup>1</sup> However, in the case of equal educational opportunity, it is not suggested here that shifting the emphasis of equal educational opportunity to the concept "opportunity" is a semantic trick simply to speak about the problem in a different way.<sup>2</sup>

But neither am I recommending a simple semantic shift. The important shift involves a turn to conceptual analysis. John Austin points out, "Words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we

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<sup>1</sup>William Freund, in "Point of View," Newsweek Magazine, April 1979.

<sup>2</sup>Such an objection might be genuine, but it is often a version of the fallacy of semantic reference.



mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us."<sup>3</sup> When we do so, "we are looking not merely at words . . . but also at the realities we use words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena."<sup>4</sup> Finally, toward a theory of definition, Austin argued that when we attempt to determine the meaning of a word or a concept, ". . . it is not enough to show how clever we are by showing how obscure everything is. Clarity, too, I know, has been said to be not enough: but perhaps it will be time to go into that when we are within measurable distance of achieving clarity on some matter."<sup>5</sup> Words examined in their ordinary usage reveal meaning that yields clarity, even though when we are clear on what we mean, we might still be left with other problems of decision making and policy formation. Still, in such a conceptual analysis, we must keep in touch with ordinary usage. This is the approach emphasized by three other educational philosophers who have attempted to clarify the concept "opportunity"-- Paul Komisar, Robert H. Ennis, and D. A. Lloyd Thomas. Each in his own style and arguments appeals to ordinary language to explicate views on the ambiguity of equal educational opportunity.

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<sup>3</sup> John Austin, "How To Do Things with Words," in the William James Lectures delivered in Harvard University in 1955, ed. J. O. Urmson (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

### Three Views of "Opportunity"

Despite the common approach, however, each presents quite different views of the concept "opportunity." For instance, Komisar thinks the issue of equal educational opportunity is an issue of equality, understood as a distinction between "equal treatment" and "equal opportunity." Ennis argues that although many believe that the equal educational opportunity debate is a function of understanding equality, he objects, claiming that the controversy results, in part, from the underlying value judgments contained in the concept "having an opportunity." D. A. Lloyd Thomas maintains the position that the controversy of equal educational opportunity can be largely settled, not by an analysis of equality, nor by an analysis of opportunity-as-value-judgments, but through an analysis of "opportunity" as "ideal," "competitive," and "non-competitive opportunity."

If each were to agree with the claim that there is an itinerary of equal educational opportunity, then their positions do suggest that the next step would include an explication of the concept "opportunity." However, despite the range of conceptions and analyses, it is not clear that the unique analyses of "opportunity" given by these three scholars, taken singly or together, advances our understanding of the problem.

Let us first examine Komisar's attempt to resolve the muddle in the equal educational opportunity debate. Komisar assumes that "the principle of equal opportunity is one of the

more salient principles of educational policy today."<sup>6</sup> His approach is that a resolution of the ambiguity can be achieved by distinguishing between two sorts of equality--equality of "treatment" and equality of "opportunity." Among the many authors discussed in Chapter I, Komisar presses further in examining the problem of equal educational opportunity as an issue of opportunity, but he seems locked into the notion that "opportunity" is a function of "equality." Of the distinction between "treatment" and "opportunity," Komisar claims that "These two notions of equality differ in ways that have a bearing on the paradox of equality in education."<sup>7</sup>

On Komisar's account, it seems, we have not moved much beyond the original assumption that a satisfactory understanding of equal educational opportunity turns on a satisfactory account of "equality." However, what Komisar does say about "opportunity" is informative, at least to the degree of drawing attention to its significance as a central concept. He claims, "Equal opportunity is opportunity to achieve something, to get somewhere. The very term 'opportunity' makes this clear; it is a relational term: to have an opportunity is to be vouchsafed a certain way to reach a designated goal."<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Paul Komisar, "The Paradox of Equality in Schooling," in the Teachers College Record, 1966, p. 25.

I wish to acknowledge Roger B. King of the University of Western Australia. Professor King's unpublished paper entitled "Learning Opportunities" brought several useful references to my attention.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 252.

This assertion states that opportunities are the sorts of things "to do" or "to have" or "to be provided" in relation to some way of achieving a particular goal.

However, Komisar claims that "opportunities" also are "vouchsafed," guaranteed or "promised" in the sense that "a promise of equal opportunity is a general commitment to provide whatever it is that makes the designated achievement possible."<sup>9</sup> Although it is reasonable to speak of opportunities as "being provided" or of "opportunities to have" or "opportunities to do" certain things, it seems strange to refer to opportunities as "vouchsafed" or guaranteed or promised to reach specific goals. Indeed, in his own terms, what Komisar appears to be defining is what we ordinarily refer to as "options." If John has an option to have fish for dinner, what we presuppose is that all of the conditions to have fish for dinner are present (vouchsafed) with the only remaining determinant being John's choice. On the other hand, it is consistent for us to say, "John had the opportunity to have fish for dinner, but because the one he caught got away, he ate griddle cakes." Perhaps what Komisar intended, but neglected to say is that for an opportunity to exist, certain external conditions must be present. The opportunity is not "vouchsafed," but the conditions for an opportunity must be present.

I believe Komisar falls short of the mark when he suggests that equal opportunity is part of the general

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

concept, "equality," and distinct from equal treatment. Frankly, if "opportunities" are the sorts of things which are provided, we might want to know whether the activity of providing some opportunity isn't really some form of treatment. I suspect that a thorough account of the concept "opportunity," particularly with respect to "opportunities provided," will show a logical connection to "treatment," as opposed to a distinction from it. More importantly, Komisar's analysis leads him to a definition that appears more like what we would ordinarily mean by "options" as opposed to "opportunities."

Initially agreeing with Komisar, Robert Ennis believes that most people are in favor of equal educational opportunity, but that there is also controversy about its implementation. Ennis attempts to explain this controversy, also through an analysis of the concept "equal educational opportunity." He concludes that the problem is not located, as Komisar believes, in our concept of "equality." Rather, he claims, it is located in our conception of "education" and of "having an opportunity." Furthermore, what constitutes our conception of "education" and of "having an opportunity" requires value judgments, and "that this is generally so for the conception of 'education' is fairly obvious, but that it is so for a conception 'of having an opportunity' is not so easy to see."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Robert Ennis, "Equality of Educational Opportunity," Educational Theory, vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter 1976), p. 6.

In his analysis, Ennis sets the stage for his thesis that the controversy about the meaning of "opportunity" is not a dispute about facts but is more often "about the buried value judgment(s) that one makes in applying the concept 'to have an opportunity.'" <sup>11</sup> His argument used to support this thesis runs as follows: Roughly speaking, X's having an opportunity <sup>12</sup> to do Z consists of the presence of positive factors combined with the absence of negative factors. However, according to Ennis, only environmental factors, as contrasted with personal factors, are constitutive of "having an opportunity." Ennis' personal factors include motivation, traits, abilities, decisions, ideas, beliefs, and goals of the person involved. Although personal factors are not constitutive of "having an opportunity" or "not having an opportunity," the absence of some personal factor, such as ability might make it pointless to speak of a person's opportunities. Ennis says, "It would be pointless, perhaps even a cruel joke, to say of Clyde (IQ 70) that he had the opportunity to learn engineering." <sup>13</sup>

Therefore, if environmental factors are constitutive of "having an opportunity," one must examine those environmental facilitators that augment, and those environmental

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>12</sup>This view "of having an opportunity" appears similar to Komisar's view of one's "opportunity-to-do" and one's "opportunity-to-have."

<sup>13</sup>Ennis, "Equality of Educational Opportunity," p. 10.

deterrents which diminish, "the amount of opportunity that X has to do Z."<sup>14</sup> Of course, the determination of environmental facilitators and deterrents involves both empirical and value judgments. Consequently, judgments about "having an opportunity" are, in part, value judgments "which are dependent on empirical fact judgments about what environmental changes would have made a difference and what consequences of such changes would have been, and on judgments about the appropriate focus for change. The latter judgments, since they are about appropriateness, incorporate value judgments."<sup>15</sup> I believe that Ennis's conclusion that the conception "having an opportunity" entails value judgments is true. However, his basic argument appears unsound because one of his premises seems false. The result, obviously has an effect on his analysis of "opportunity."

Ennis claims that personal factors are not "constitutive" of one's "having an opportunity." Since he is attempting to spell out the conditions of "having an opportunity," what he states is that personal factors have no bearing on the concept, except incidentally, in instances where the absence of personal factors makes it, in Ennis's terms, pointless or cruel to speak of opportunities. However an appeal to ordinary language suggests the contrary. In his example of Clyde (IQ 70) having an opportunity learn engineering, we do see an oddity (or cruel joke), if we were

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

speaking of specific people we knew, in the statements: "Clyde (IQ 70) has an opportunity to learn engineering," or "Jane, who is blind, has an opportunity to see the sun rise," or "William, a wheelchair invalid, has an opportunity to walk." However, what is odd does not seem to be the pointless reference to opportunities in these cases. These seem odd as opportunity expressions precisely because the personal factors suggest the inappropriate application of the concept "opportunity." Consequently, it is surely appropriate to claim that "Clyde does not have an opportunity to learn engineering, because he has an IQ of 70"; "Jane does not have an opportunity to see a sunrise, because she is blind"; "William has no opportunity to walk, because he is a wheelchair invalid."

Apparently contrary to Ennis's analysis, the absence in these specific cases of personal factors, such as intelligence, sight, and physical powers, are reasons why it is appropriate to claim there is no opportunity to do X, when X is learning, seeing, and walking. Again, it would be a mistake to lose sight of Ennis's claim that the concept "having an opportunity" entails value judgments. But to suggest that only environmental factors are constitutive of "having an opportunity" perhaps entails too restricted a view of the concept "opportunity." I think it is essential to note that "personal factors" vary from such traits as "blue eyes" to "diligence." What happens, I believe, is that personal factors might play a role depending on the end desired.



In the case of Clyde, Ennis is treating IQ as a personal factor, when it functions more like an external condition for the opportunity for successfully pursuing engineering. This is a critical point, because what are ordinarily dismissed as personal traits (diligence) in the ordinary set of things, could become conditions for opportunities in such areas as education.

Finally, Lloyd Thomas argues that if one has an opportunity to do something or to have something, one can do it or have it if one chooses. In other words, one has no opportunity to do X or to have Y, if one cannot do X or have Y when one wishes it. Yet not everything one can do or have, if one chooses, is an opportunity, according to Thomas. If X is an opportunity for someone, it must be seen, to some extent, as good.<sup>16</sup>

Thomas's initial analysis of opportunity turns into an examination of equal opportunity. He asks, "What could people have in mind when they favor equal opportunity?" Here is the rub. Much like Komisar, Thomas's view of the meaning of opportunity is what we ordinarily mean by "option," since the only factor in having or doing X is choice. Indeed, Thomas uses the words opportunity and option synonymously. He writes that "often opportunities are regarded as good by the person who has them and by others. But it can be that

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<sup>16</sup>On Thomas's account, opportunities may be good, wonderful, or not very good, but they cannot be regarded as in no respect good.

A does not see a certain option as in any sense good, and hence does not regard it as an opportunity, while B does regard A's option as good, and thinks of A as having an opportunity."<sup>17</sup> Consequently, Thomas's analysis of opportunity-as-option leads him to consider what possibly could be meant by equal (same) options. He concludes that, "It is necessarily true that it cannot be a matter of the same opportunity (option), for in many cases A having a certain opportunity at a certain time to do something (for example, to marry B), precludes others from having the same opportunity."<sup>18</sup> Clearly, we would say that if A has the option to marry B, then C, D, and E, although they might dearly love B, are precluded from matrimony with B. But there seems to be no "linguistic impropriety" (Thomas's phrase) in speaking of A's having an opportunity to marry B, along with C, D, and E's having an opportunity to marry B. Indeed, we might say, since each has an opportunity to marry B, let the best man win.

Thomas's analysis is based on a restricted view of opportunity-as-option. Consequently, his analysis leads us to consider three forms of equality of opportunity:

1. "Ideal" Equality of Opportunity, which refers to everyone having equally good (though different) sets of opportunities.

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<sup>17</sup> Thomas D. A. Lloyd, "Competitive Equality of Opportunity in Mind," July 1977, p. 388.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 389.

2. "Non-Competitive" Equal Opportunity, which is that, unlike "Ideal" opportunity, everyone need not end up with an equally valuable cluster of opportunities, but that some standard opportunities are present in everyone's cluster. These are "non-competitive" because these opportunities (options) are ones that "ought to be available to anybody if they wish to take them up, not as ones that have to be striven for in competition with others."<sup>19</sup>
3. "Competitive" Equal Opportunity, which means that, whereas under the conception of non-competitive opportunity, "anyone who wished (to) take up the opportunity (had it), . . . under the competitive conception not everyone who likes can have the opportunity. Indeed, there could not be both non-competitive opportunity and competitive opportunity in exactly the same respect, as the former presupposes that the opportunity is available to anyone who wants it, while the latter presupposes that not everyone who wants it can have it. It would seem then, that competitive equality of opportunity has to do with the way in which these competitions are conducted. Perhaps, considering that opportunities are not going to

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 390.

be equal in the end, it would be better to call it 'fair competition for scarce opportunities.' For, strictly speaking, if a person has an opportunity to do something, then he can do it if he chooses."<sup>20</sup>

What Thomas offers is less of an understanding of opportunity and more of an account of the nature of competition for scarce resources. Although focusing on "opportunity," Thomas stresses "equality" in ways which were discussed in Chapter I, namely "equal-as-same," "equal-as-fitting," and equal as "fairness in the chase." These are differences due to scarcity and to the distributive properties of goods.

The upshot of this treatment of Komisar, Ennis, and Thomas is that although each implies that a next step in the resolution of equal educational opportunity is through an explication of the concept "opportunity," nevertheless, the spade work has yet to be done.

#### An Analysis of "Opportunity"

We have seen that the concept "opportunity" is ambiguous. Because it has a variety of different meanings, I shall offer an analysis of "opportunity," which will indicate the contexts in which the language of "opportunity" properly applies, as well as those in which it is inappropriate. In addition, this analysis of "opportunity" will explore contexts in which the concept is appropriately applied, but with

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 393.

different meanings. What we are after is a set of guidelines permitting us to understand what counts as an opportunity as well as those conditions that are necessary for the appropriate or preferred use of "opportunity." Knowing the logical ingredients of the concept will permit us to understand what is necessary for something either to be formally considered as an opportunity or excluded from consideration as an opportunity.

As a general procedure, we will begin with several assertions about the concept "opportunity" which are based on practical examples from our ordinary experience.

1. The concept "opportunity" presupposes alternatives. Therefore, if something is an opportunity, there must be the element of alternatives.

Consider the following case of necessity where there is no alternative, i.e., where choice is absent. Suppose that I recently sold my house on the expectation of moving to Toronto, Canada. Suppose, however, that after selling my house, collecting my money, and transferring the deed, circumstances prohibit me from moving to Toronto. I must move from the house which is no longer mine, but I discover that there is no other place to move to except a one-bedroom apartment with faulty heating and plumbing. There are no alternative quarters for me and my family.

Now it would be odd to say that I have the opportunity to live in a specific flat. I am compelled<sup>21</sup> to move,

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<sup>21</sup>"Compelled" in this case should be understood as having no acceptable options.

but there is only one place to go. However, it does seem appropriate to describe my situation as one of "necessity," in the sense that I am compelled to move and there are no alternatives in which to move. Moving to the only available apartment would ordinarily be spoken of as a necessity, not as an opportunity. It appears not to count as an opportunity because there were no alternatives. By the way, even if the only available apartment were a lush flat in the Plaza Hotel, it would still be a necessity for me to move there, in that I have no other choice. If there is compulsion, there is no opportunity.

Consider another example in which there is no alternative. Because of low production, Clancy was fired from his job in the meat factory. Would it be appropriate to say Clancy had the opportunity to leave his job? Since he was fired, Clancy does not have an alternative; rather he is required to leave. Although he might not wish to leave, it is necessary for Clancy to do so. Indeed, he might protest or appeal to a labor council. But here we would more aptly say that Clancy had the opportunity to protest, although he has no choice in the matter of leaving--there is no alternative.

Another example of the link between "choice" and "opportunity" is evident in the situation of war. It might be that because of war, it was necessary that people at the Battle of Verdun were killed. However, we would not say that the French had the opportunity to kill the Germans.

Killing people is a function of war in which there is no alternative (notwithstanding William James' moral equivalent to war), although we do say of such occurrences that they are "necessary" evils. In the occasion of war, and one of its obvious fears is that, there is no alternative to confronting the enemy, often resulting in death.

Consider another example. In order to legally practice medicine in the United States, a person must be licensed. There is no alternative. In order to be licensed to practice medicine, all applicants must have attended medical school. If an applicant has not attended medical school, it would be strange to say that Elmer had the opportunity to practice medicine. He does not have the opportunity because he does not have the necessary or required credentials or authority. Elmer might pose as a doctor, but we would call this being an imposter, with all of the appropriate legal sanctions being applied to Elmer.

Each of these examples illustrates what seems to be the inappropriate application of the concept "opportunity" in contexts where what is done is based on some necessity or requirement. Each demonstrates that to be compelled, required, or obligated suggests that one has no alternative to do otherwise. In such cases where there is a lack of choice either to do otherwise or to select an alternative, the concept "opportunity" does not appear to have an application.

2. The concept "opportunity" implies "possibility."  
If there is an X, such that X is an opportunity, then

exercising the X (to see) means "Xing" (seeing) must be possible.

With regard to this issue of "possibility," the two statements below are linguistically odd. In the previous cases above, the events might have been otherwise, but in the two instances below, it cannot physically or logically be otherwise.

1. Christians have the opportunity to walk on water.
2. Spinsters have the opportunity to be both married and unmarried simultaneously.

Each statement is strange because it attempts to characterize an impossible situation as an opportunity. The first statement attributes a physical impossibility to Christians, and the second attributes to spinsters a logical impossibility. It appears that because it is physically impossible for Christians, ~~or for that matter any group of people,~~ to walk on water, then walking on water would not be described as an opportunity. If it were to occur, we would invoke the language of either miracles, tricks, or fantasy. Oddly enough, even in fantasy, the princess is always the daughter of the king.

Similarly, because it is logically impossible that a spinster be both married and single at the same time, it would be contradictory to claim that one had the opportunity to be both wed and unwed simultaneously. Obviously, some people who are wed act as though they are not, but we call such cases adultery, not opportunities to be married and



unmarried. Whether it is physical or logical, "possibility" appears to be a necessary condition for the appropriate application of the concept "opportunity."

Let me make this point in another way by considering how we use "opportunity" in other ordinary discourse. Surely in response to "Christians have the opportunity to walk on water," we don't retort, "Christians don't have the opportunity to walk on water!" Rather, in such instances we say, simply, "That is impossible." The same holds for logical impossibility. When there is no possibility of a specific occurrence, then it appears that the language of opportunity does not apply.

3. If circumstances are inevitable, or fated, then the language of opportunity appears inapplicable

Not only is it possible that I shall die, but contrary to my sense of immortality and my insurance agent's hopes, it is inevitable that I die. Could it be said that I have the opportunity to die? Because of the laws of nature with respect to my physical constitution, I have no choice in the matter. Consequently, we generally speak of such things as inevitabilities, not as opportunities, nor even, for that matter, as possibilities. Similarly, because of the constitution of the earth, it is inevitable that animals gravitate. We don't ordinarily say that animals have the opportunity to gravitate, largely because there is no seeming choice in the matter. We simply do gravitate.

When fate plays with the human condition, we generally speak and write stories of events that have very little, if anything, to do with human decisions. Oedipus was "fated" to return to Thebes where he would slay his father and marry his mother. From the perspective of fate, it is linguistically strange to claim that Oedipus had the opportunity to kill his father, or on the other hand, not to kill him. It is also just as inappropriate to say he had the opportunity to marry his mother. Consider these two propositions:

- a. Oedipus had the opportunity to slay his father.
- b. Oedipus had the opportunity to marry his mother.

Our rejoinder might be, "Why, Oedipus had no such opportunity, since he was fated to do these things." As the oracle depicted, Oedipus was slated to do what he did; a cosmic force was at play, and Oedipus, because of fate, would not have done otherwise.

4. If an event is a misfortune, it is not an opportunity.

Although not directly aligned with inevitability and fate, there is the category of "misfortunes" which do not seem to count as opportunities. For example, it appears strange to ask, "Do people who can't read have the opportunity to be poor?" It is both possible, yet not inevitable that people who can't read are poor. However, being poor is generally what we call a misfortune, or liability, not an opportunity. Generally we think of misfortunes as "bad luck," out of the reach of human control. Although

misfortunes occur all the time, they seem to occur without consideration of choice. Given any misfortune, if we could choose otherwise, we generally would. Of course, there are cases of masochism. But these are considered perversions of ordinary behavior where "self-inflicted" abuses are sought or occur.

Throughout this analysis there has been one common theme that undergirds each of the assertions which deal with "necessity," "license," "possibility," "fate," "inevitability," and "misfortune." The lack of choice in each of these cases suggests that "choice," and "possibility," and "good" are necessary conditions in the concept "opportunity." If there are cases where these elements are absent, then we have a problem in our analysis. Are there such counter examples?

Perhaps if we add to each of these cases some kind of good or benefit, then we shall be able to speak of each as presenting an "opportunity."

Consider the assertions and examples we examined earlier which show that the language of opportunity does not appropriately apply. Recall that choice appeared to be a necessary condition for the appropriate use of expressions of "opportunity."

Permit me to summarize the conditions of opportunity. We say that "A has an opportunity to do X" entails that A was not compelled and that there are acceptable options. This applies to being required to leave a job or conscripted

into military warfare. Also, if A has an opportunity to do X, then X must be acceptable to someone. Moreover, should A have the opportunity to do X, X must be, in every sense, possible.

When extending a value or benefit to these cases, we are permitted to speak of them as presenting opportunities. What we can say then is that, when viewed as a benefit, these are "opportunities for." The conception of opportunity is shifted from "opportunity to do" to "opportunity for." Whereas choice is a necessary condition for us to speak of "opportunity to do" X, benefit or value is a necessary condition for us to speak of "opportunity for" X. Benefit might or might not be extended to "opportunity to do" expressions, depending upon the context. For example, one might have an opportunity to do all sorts of unworthy things. Paul, for instance, might have the opportunity to steal or cheat.

Of course a counter argument could be that unworthy pursuits are perceived to be a benefit to someone. Yet, this argument brings us right back to the observation that if "benefit," whether foolishly perceived or generally acknowledged, is added to X, then we can speak of presenting an "opportunity for" X.

Consider another counter argument. It may be objected that adding the condition of benefit does not make it appropriate to speak of these cases as examples of the concept "opportunity." Rather, what counts as an opportunity is not dying (inevitable), but serving one's nation. The

inevitability of dying is not an opportunity. Thus, choice is reintroduced as a condition necessary for one to speak of the opportunity to serve one's country. Yet, construed as a benefit, the fact of dying can be spoken of as an "opportunity for" someone to serve one's nation. Therefore, one has both the opportunity to serve and the opportunity for serving. The "opportunity to" serve involves choice; the "opportunity for" serving involves benefit. Involuntary death, poverty, unemployment, disaster, war, illegal activities can be spoken of as "opportunity" in the sense of "opportunities for" people, when they are seen as benefits or values.

This subtle distinction between "opportunity to do" and "opportunity for" is a distinction which, I believe, is at the heart of the ambiguity of the concept "opportunity." It is, though, quite compatible to say, "I did not have the opportunity to move elsewhere, but that was an opportunity for my family to get to know one another better," or, "I did not have the choice to move elsewhere, but that was a benefit for my family in that we will get to know one another better."

It would seem that what is required as necessary conditions for "opportunity-to-do" statements does not prevent us from saying these are "opportunity-for" statements. "Opportunity to do" requires that there be no necessity, that it be possible, that fate is not at play, that it is not inevitable, that there is no misfortune, and that there is choice. As noted earlier, although value and benefit might

be part of opportunity to "do," value and "benefit" are necessarily a part of expressions of "opportunity for." How we appropriately employ opportunity statements is determined, in part, by what counts as "opportunity for" as opposed to "opportunity to do." Considered as "opportunity to do," a whole set of necessary conditions is raised, whereas, construed as "opportunity for," "benefit" is added as a necessary condition. "Opportunity to do" has more to do with "choice" and related concepts, such as "ability," whereas "opportunity for" is determined by what is established as a value or a benefit.

To illustrate the distinction between expressions of "opportunity-to-do" and "opportunity-for," consider some of our examples.

Suppose, for instance, that since no other alternative was available, I moved to the old flat. But because of the bad conditions and the strain, my family was drawn closer together. We might call this a genuine "opportunity for" my family to get to know one another. By adding a value or benefit, this example can be spoken of as an opportunity.

Also, recall that Clancy was required to leave his job. He was fired. But perhaps losing his job at that time allowed him to find a better job. We would say that the loss of his job can be spoken of as an opportunity for Clancy to find the better one. The addition of a benefit permits us to speak of it as an opportunity.

Recall that the death of enemies, as a necessary part of war, was not an opportunity. However, killing people in the service of some god has historically been viewed as an opportunity. If such an activity can be construed as a benefit in the service of one's god, it also can be construed as an opportunity.

In addition, practicing medicine without a license, without the authority, enabled Elmer to save lives which would not have had access to medical care--truly an opportunity for them to live and for him to serve.

These cases were characterized by the fact that no choice was involved. Yet, despite the lack of choice, by linking these cases to something valued, these examples are converted into opportunities.

This linkage of benefit also seems to apply in cases of impossibility. We agree that it is impossible to walk on water, as it is impossible to be a spinster and be married. However, with the addition of a benefit, physical and even logical impossibilities fall within the language of "opportunity." Suppose that walking on water would count as a way of demonstrating one's loyalty to God. Then walking on water would be thought to be an opportunity for one to make such a demonstration. Again, consider the benefit of being in two places at once. A renowned doctor could perform many operations simultaneously. Such an event, although a logical contradiction, can be spoken of as an opportunity, insofar as it serves mankind.

Linking "benefit" to "fate" also results in the appropriate application of "opportunity." Oedipus was fated to slay his father and marry his mother. He feverishly pursued his enquiry to determine his father's murderer. As a consequence, he was led to self-inflicted blindness. If learning such a lesson can be construed as benefit, what happened to Oedipus can be viewed as an opportunity. In fact, we often say of such fated events that they serve as examples or warnings, lessons from which to learn.

However, the notion of inevitability is not as clear as other cases. Because it is inevitable that I die, I do not have the opportunity to die. Even so, if dying in the service of one's country could be spoken of as a benefit, then presumably we could speak also of an opportunity to die in service of such a cause.

Gravitating is a different story, but different in a telling respect. I cannot choose to gravitate now for some noble purpose, as I can choose to die now for a pointed cause. Gravitating is the kind of inevitability which seems benefit neutral. Not only does it seem unlikely that gravitating can be construed as a benefit, but one can't choose to gravitate in the service of some end. One simply gravitates. A similar case can be made for breathing or digesting.



This is an important observation because it suggests that anything which lacks choice must entail a value or benefit, if it is to be spoken of as an opportunity. Nevertheless, there are some inevitabilities over which we have some control in terms of when they occur, e.g., dying. And if they occur as a result of choice and benefit, the language of "opportunity" appears to be appropriate.

We maintained earlier that to be poor was not an opportunity; it was a misfortune. Again, to be poor in the service of one's God is to consider "being poor" as an opportunity. In this case, being poor is not construed as a misfortune; it is claimed to be a benefit, as illustrated in such instances as "vows of poverty."

What has happened by viewing these as examples of value or benefit? First of all, the examples of necessity, impossibility, fate, inevitability, and misfortune have been reassessed as means toward some beneficial end. Originally the examples were considered as events in themselves, having no direction beyond themselves, as in the case of "being fired," "walking on water," and "being poor."

Consequently, our analysis, in accordance with "benefit" as constitutive of "opportunity" appears to create opportuniti from cases we ordinarily consider cases where "opportunity" does not apply. Initially, this seems an insult to our linguistic sense, because as we have seen, we ordinarily think of opportunity as involving choice, alternatives, or options. And adding the notion of value or

benefit allows cases with no choices to be spoken of as presenting opportunities! This appears to be paradoxical only if one does not draw the distinction between "opportunities for" and "opportunities-to-do."

Extending expressions of value to cases where choice is absent is elliptical for the counter-factual statement, "I would if I could." This enables us to accept the fact that although one can't choose to do otherwise in certain circumstances, nevertheless, if those circumstances lead to valued outcomes, then one can speak of "opportunities for" in the sense that "one would choose, if one could."

The distinction between "opportunity to do" and "opportunity for" is crucial to an adequate view of what constitutes equal educational opportunity. Because this distinction is so important, it might be useful to explore it a bit further. Consider the following ordinary expressions in which "opportunity" statements are made. Note that in each of the following, choice appears to be required in each statement.

- A. Students have the opportunity to strike.
- B. Students have the chance to strike.
- C. Students have the option of striking.
- D. Students have the alternative of striking.
- E. Students have the choice to strike.

Although each of these five statements is a way of expressing "opportunity to do," only A and B are ways of expressing "opportunity for." Let us first examine A-E in terms of "opportunity to do."

The expressions of chance, option, alternative, choice are alike in that they entail individual selection. Although resembling one another, they are not linguistically equivalent. For example, it would be odd to define "opportunity to do" as "option," although it may be perfectly acceptable if it were defined as "chance." Consider the following statements about Alphas (supposing Alphas are a group in American society):

AA. Alphas have the opportunity to win the race.

BB. Alphas have the option to win the race.

Indeed, we generally do not speak of "winning" as the subject of an option. However, both AA and BB express opportunity, and both entail choice. But there is an important distinction in the degree to which choice affects the outcome. For example, regarding AA (opportunity to do), we might say that in virtue of the fact that Alphas are participating, they might win. Also because they are choosing to participate, to run, to struggle to win they could win. BB (option) is of a different nature, because when we say someone or some group has the option to win, the fact of winning depends solely upon the decision to win. In short, choice is a necessary condition for "opportunity to do." But choice is both a necessary and sufficient condition for "option," because all the other conditions are presupposed.

Therefore, we can say that if something is an option for Alphas, it may be an opportunity. But if something is an opportunity, it need not be an option. Similarly,

CC. Alphas have the alternative of winning the race.

DD. Alphas have the choice of winning the race.

function in much the same way as BB'. Winning is contingent upon deciding which option, alternative, or choice one desires. "Option," "alternative," and "choice" statements are "opportunity to do" statements but the context in which they are appropriately applied presupposes that the stage is so set that the only remaining condition is deciding.

If we were to ask, "Can Alphas win the race?" our answer might be different, depending upon whether we consider winning as an "opportunity to" or as an "option to." Viewed as an opportunity to win, we would be correct in saying, "Yes, if Alphas run fast enough." However, considered as an option, alternative, or choice, it would be appropriate to say, "Yes, if Alphas choose to." With reference to BB', CC, and DD, the "can" in "Can they win?" does not ask, "Do Alphas have the means?" "Are Alphas in a position?" "Do Alphas have the authority?" or "Do Alphas have the relevant knowledge?" The word "can" in "They can, if they choose," presupposes all the required means, position, knowledge, and authority. Because these conditions are presupposed in the concepts "option," "alternative," and "choice," the criteria for answering the question turns on whether or not Alphas choose to win.

The "can," as applied to AA, however, may be asking for means, position, knowledge, or authority. In order to understand what is being asked in "opportunity to" statements, one must determine which opportunity expression is being employed.

Yet, if one takes "opportunity to do" to mean "option," then "opportunity" will be defined by terms of the criteria for "option." In this case, for something to count as an opportunity, the stage will be so set (ability, possibility, etc.) that decision is all that remains.

Let me make this point briefly in another way, to show that the word "can" in "Do Alphas have the opportunity to do X, that is, can they do X?" is ambiguous. We might ask the doctor, "Does the patient have the opportunity to walk, that is, can the patient walk?" For this question we could substitute the following:

- F. "Is Matt's leg healed?" (means to walk)
- G. "Has Matt learned to walk yet?" (knowledge of walking)
- H. "Does Matt have the option (doctor's permission) of getting out of bed to walk?" (authority to make a decision)

Depending upon the circumstances, the "can" will require different criteria for answering the question about the patient's opportunity. Each case suggests different conditions which must be met for us to appropriately speak of them as an opportunity. The doctor might reply:

- FF. Matt has the opportunity; he can, if his leg is healed.
- GG. Matt has the opportunity; he can, if he has learned to walk.
- HH. Matt has the opportunity; he can, if he chooses.

FF and GG spell out what is required if the patient is to appropriately be said to have an opportunity. The "if" clause indicates the antecedent condition for us to speak of an opportunity. (Whereas, in HH, the "if" clause does not serve to stipulate a necessary condition for the opportunity of walking. [Matt has the opportunity, whether he chooses or not.]) "If he chooses" serves to indicate that there is a choice, that the patient can choose. FF and GG suggest that if the conditions are not met, Matt will not have the choice of walking.

We see then, that expressions of "opportunity to do" need not be linguistically equivalent to "option," "alternative," and "choice" statements. "Opportunity to do" functions more like "chance," where choice is choosing a means toward some end. For example, in the case of "Alphas have the opportunity to win the race," the object of choice is one of means, e.g., choosing to run, to try hard, to hang in under stiff competition, and so forth.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, when we say Alphas have a chance to win the race, we are expressing the same thing, namely, that if Alphas choose to participate, choose to run well, then they might win. Yet in the case of "Alphas have the option of winning," the judgment involved is simply in choosing the desired result.

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<sup>22</sup> I want to point out the distinction between the existence of an opportunity to do X and the personal activity of selecting, resolving, determining that X is something to, in fact, do. I shall leave this topic for a later discussion.

Still considering "opportunity to do" expressions, another important difference between "opportunity" or "chance" and "option," "alternative," and "choice" is suggested by other statements we might ordinarily make. With regard to "opportunity" or "chance," one can imagine saying, "Since I have the opportunity to win, my goal is to run as best I can, and hope that I win." When applied to "option," "alternative," or "choice," it would be odd to say, "Since I have the option to win, my goal is to run as best I can, and I hope to win." What is odd here is in expressing hopes or wishes about the options, alternatives, or choices which I have. If I have the option to go to Cleveland, I know either that I can go or not, depending upon what I decide. There is no sense in hoping or wishing that I can go to Cleveland, given that I have the option to go. (I may hope I made the right decision, but that is another issue.)

The use of "opportunity" and "chance" suggests a sense of acceptable uncertainty about results, which permits expression of hopes, wishes and aspirations. We have, therefore, degrees of opportunity which appear to separate into two groups:

The first group contains opportunity statements expressed in the form of options, alternatives, and choices. Here the factor determining the outcome is a simple decision about the end desired. There is no probability in being able to choose; one either does or does not. There are no expressions of hope, wishes, or aspirations.

The second group consists of opportunity statements which are expressed in terms of "opportunity" and "chance." The success of outcome in this group is contingent upon other factors than simply choosing the outcome. And the probability of the occurrence of the outcome will turn on all factors involved. Here there are expressions of goals, hopes, wishes and aspirations.

"Opportunity-to-do" Statements

<u>Group 1</u>	<u>Group 2</u>
Options	Chances
Alternatives	Opportunities
Choices	

Although different expressions of opportunity exist, there are common things we say about both groups, including options, alternatives, choices on one side, and chances and opportunities on the other. We say that they:

- |          |                 |                   |                   |
|----------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| a. come  | e. are selected | i. are created    | m. are clear      |
| b. go    | f. are accepted | j. are discovered | n. are unclear    |
| c. pass  | g. are ignored  | k. are recognized | o. are confused   |
| d. exist | h. are rejected | l. are hidden     | p. are considered |

There are two aspects to this list. Some--a, b, m--suggest that there are objective "things" which are called opportunities and have certain attributes. Others pick out ways in which people act toward opportunities. And it seems more in this second sense, the arena of human action, where choice plays its central role.

As suggested, generally options, alternatives, and choices describe availabilities. Also, "chances-to-do" and



"opportunities-to-do" describe certain arrangements of conditions for doing something. It seems, however, that when chances are construed as values or benefits, they are spoken of as "opportunities for." "Opportunities for" or "chances for" come into play as the result of introducing benefit, what is "fitting" or "good." As indicated earlier in this chapter, "opportunity for" is evaluative, and may be used to construe necessities, impossibilities, fate, inevitabilities, and misfortunes as opportunities, since they may be means toward some good.

As an instance, we are often reminded that a whole host of necessities, misfortunes, and inevitabilities occur in the name of education. There are limitations placed on opportunities to do certain things in school. And some of the limitations are backed by law. For example, in most states one must attend school until sixteen years of age. Consequently, going to school is a necessity. One may not like teachers, but when one is in school, one will confront them. There is no choice about going to school or having teachers. Students do not have the opportunity to do otherwise. Although such events are necessities within the context of schooling, when construed as a benefit, they are considered "opportunities for" students to get a formal education. Presumably, going to school and having teachers is a means toward that good. This is not to argue that the means justifies the end. On the contrary, it is the end, construed as a benefit, which enables the means (ordinarily

considered necessities) to be spoken of as "opportunities for."

When benefit is expressed in opportunity statements, it is most commonly couched in terms of "opportunity for" or "chances for."

#### "Opportunity for" Statements

<u>Value Neutral</u>	<u>Express Benefits</u>
option (to)	chance (for)
alternative (to)	opportunity (for)
choice (to)	

By examining the various ways in which opportunity might be expressed, we saw a distinction between "opportunity to do" and "opportunity for." "Opportunity to do," contains a distinction between expressing opportunity as options, choices, or alternatives, and opportunities or chances. When expressed as options, alternatives, or choices, the necessary conditions for opportunity are presupposed, leaving the remaining factor, individual decision. Expressed as opportunities or chances, the necessary conditions are not presupposed. Rather, they must be stipulated in the "if" clause of, "X has the opportunity to Y; that is, X can do Y, if a, b, or c." Regardless of how "opportunity-to-do" statements are expressed in any given context, there are certain necessary conditions. What is claimed to be an opportunity must involve choice, be possible, and not be restricted by fate, inevitability, or misfortune.

However, what might not be "opportunities to do" become "opportunities for" when extended by the condition of benefits or values. Expressing opportunity as benefit takes the locution "opportunity for" or "chance for." With reference to options, alternatives, and choices, they seem to be descriptive and neutral.

Thus far in our analysis, we could be permitted to speak of the concept "opportunity" in "equal educational opportunity" to mean either:

- A. Equal Educational Opportunity For (chances for) certain benefits or values, or
- B. Equal Educational Opportunity to do (chances to do) certain activities, or
- C. Equal Educational Options, Choices, Alternatives.

It seems obvious now that what Komisar, Ennis, and Thomas were after in their analyses of opportunities are, indeed, contained in these three different views of "opportunity" which emanate from the distinction between "opportunity to do" and "opportunity for." What is essential to the issue of educational policy, however, is that if the next step in the Itinerary is a focus on "opportunity," then the question of the distribution of opportunities must be explored within the context of the three different aspects of opportunities, namely, benefits/values, opportunities to do certain activities, and options, choices, and alternatives.

It should be clear from our discussion of the ordinary use of "opportunity" that B and C above involve conditions

which are not required in A. Similarly, A takes account of benefit, whereas B and C need not. Yet, A and B do employ "chance," in the sense that either an opportunity for X or an opportunity to do Z is both a chance for X and a chance to do Z. Because "chance" is also ambiguous, perhaps we might get a clearer picture of what is involved in the concept "opportunity," as expressed in statements A and B.

We might express the ambiguity of "chance" in the following assertion:

"It was by chance that I had a chance to take a chance."

Although awkward, this statement is relatively intelligible, suggesting differences in the use of the word chance. Since "chance" and "opportunity" are often synonymous, let us substitute "opportunity" in the proposition above.

"It was by opportunity that I had the opportunity to take an opportunity."

This statement appears unintelligible, showing that "opportunity" and "chance" are not synonymous in every respect. It seems that the substitution of "opportunity" is senseless, except in one instance, namely, "I had the opportunity. . .". Assuming the same statement, we are left with:

"It was by ---- that I had the opportunity to take a ----."

The first blank might be filled with what we can call the "accident" sense of chance. It makes sense to say, "It was by accident or coincidence that I had the opportunity. . .".

On the other hand, it is equally sensible to claim that an opportunity was a result of some plan, whether human or cosmic. We could say, for example:

## HUMAN DIMENSION

- a. It was by design that
- b. It was by plan that
- c. It was by intent that

## COSMIC DIMENSION

- a. It was by Providence that
- b. It was by Destination that
- c. It was by Fate that

If by accident, fate, or providence I have the opportunity to take a chance, then the "opportunity" is that of "opportunity for," since choice is absent. In such cases, the benefit of having a chance is expressed. However, if it was by design, or if it was by plan that I have an opportunity to take a chance, the "opportunity" can be either "opportunity to do" or "opportunity for," depending upon the presence of "choice," "possibility," etc., on the one side, and "benefit" on the other.


The third blank might be replaced with "gamble," "bet," or "risk." The third sense of "chance" suggests the element of probability--call it the "probability" sense of "chance." Consequently, it makes sense to express the ambiguity of "chance" by:

"It was by accident (or design) that I had the opportunity to take a risk."

As indicated in the "schooling" example, educational institutions are supposed to be designed to minimize choice, as well as risk, with respect to certain options, as in the

option to attend school to a specific age. Schools prohibit certain opportunities to do things, precisely because schools are supposed to be in the business of planning and designing to foster opportunities for students. In fact, a justification for the existence of an educational system is that there is a direct correlation between what institutions do and the distribution of educational opportunities, understood in terms of values/benefits, chances to do, and options, alternatives and choices. Indeed, all three senses of "chance" seem to be captured in expressing each component of the concept "opportunity." The rationale for the educational system is to design, plan, and execute policy which maximizes the probability (minimizes risk) in the equal distribution of educational opportunities.

Consequently, to speak of those who have participated in any level of the educational system as enjoying the benefits of education as a result of accident or fate would be contrary to this justification of the educational system. Yet, that would appear to be the case, as depicted in the diagram below:



The Alphas who enjoy educational benefits may be said to do so on the basis of accident. And the probability of that

accident occurring is minimal, as indicated by the shaded portion of the diagram. That diagram would support the following statement:

Of those Alphas who do, or have, participated in the educational system, and who enjoy educational benefits, it was by accident that they had the opportunity to maximize the probability of sharing the benefits of education.

However, considering "opportunity" as the next step in the Itinerary, regarded as the distribution of opportunities, means a clear articulation of the values to which the system subscribes, by design, and establishes as those "opportunities for" its constituency. It also means the specific establishment of those "opportunities to do" specific things which are to be distributed equally, and the delineation of those options, alternatives, or choices that are to be distributed. What this suggests is the statement:

"Of any group who participate, at any level of the educational system, and who are subject to the distribution of opportunities, it was by design that they had the 'opportunity for' specific X's, as well as the 'opportunity to do' specific Z's, and the options, alternatives, and choices to do (or not to do) specific Q's."

This statement implies an important effect in the following expressions. Again, I want to stress that what is involved in each of the expressions is different in kind and degree.

1. Equal Educational Opportunity for.
2. Equal Educational Opportunity to do.

### 3. Equal Educational options, alternatives, and choices.

The equal distribution of "opportunities for" individuals within the educational system entails the establishment and articulation of values and benefits in education which are held to be equally valuable for all people, regardless of whether they are equally valued by everyone. This is an activity of value theory and policy action which requires major thought, research, and policy implementation. In some respects, this activity is a foundation to the promulgation of values to which the educational system subscribes. Precisely which values those represent is not the issue here. The point of analysis is that that activity is essential to the concept of equal opportunity as "opportunity for."

The importance of this normative activity bears directly on "opportunities to do" (or not to do) and options, alternatives, choices (non-options, alternatives, choices). If we hold, for example, that reading at the eighth-grade level is a value to be distributed equally, and its benefits are viewed as equally valuable, then policies generated to reflect the opportunity to read at the eighth-grade level, and the individual options, alternatives, and choices available or not available with respect to reading at the eighth-grade level will be largely determined by the prior established value.

Indeed, what would it mean for us to claim we subscribed to the "opportunity for" X for people, and yet did



little or nothing to promote the conditions necessary for people to have the "opportunity to do" X? For instance, suppose in 1900 we claimed that leg amputees should have the opportunity for walking. Further suppose that no policy, research, or action was taken to create the technical conditions necessary for leg amputees to walk. This would be strange, because part of maintaining an "opportunity for" X is to behave in such a way as to facilitate the execution of "opportunities to do" X, to so set the conditions (various as they might be for different groups) that we can speak of "X-ing" as an opportunity. Part of what is meant in the value of having children read is the provision or creation of conditions to enable children to read.

Once an educational value or benefit has been determined as "equal educational opportunity for X," then the issue of "equal educational opportunity to do X" suggests policies which not only permit unequal distribution of resources, both in amounts and in kinds, but also permit the potential for outcomes which represent acceptable differences, or levels of inequality. If we are speaking of "opportunities to do," we are speaking of choice. To claim, however, that "X has an opportunity to do Z in some instances," suggests that the stage is so set that one can do Z, if one chooses. Consequently it is quite compatible to say that Alphas have the opportunity for X, that they have the opportunity to do X, but that they elect not to do X. Consequently, although there is equal educational opportunity for X and equal

opportunity to do X, there is not, because of individual choice, an equal proportional representation of people who do X. It is not consistent to say, however, that Alphas have the opportunity for X, that they are required to do X, but that they choose to do otherwise.

Although we might have equal educational opportunity as "opportunity for," and acceptable levels of inequality of outcomes, equal educational opportunity as "opportunity to do" does not entail the equal distribution of resources or equal treatment. If it is established that the opportunity for reading at the eighth-grade level should be distributed equally throughout the population, then if there are relevant educational differences in characteristics (e.g., sight), we might treat people unequally, in that what the conditions of opportunity require for one group might require more or less or different financial and staff resources from another group. With respect to attaining equal educational opportunity for Y, and equal educational opportunity to do X, it might require the unequal allocation of resources to so set the different stages required by the diversity of characteristics which enable Alphas to achieve X, as opposed to non-Alphas.

On the other hand, if one claimed to subscribe to the "opportunity for" X among people, and did nothing to provide the conditions for people to have the "opportunity to do" X, then we would consider the claim odd, in that to value X for individuals is to behave in specific ways to create conditions which enable the opportunity to do X.

And that behavior might vary from group to group with respect to policy, resources, and treatment.

Also, what options are given, and which alternatives are not permitted with respect to the "opportunity for" reading at the eighth-grade level will again be determined by both the specific "opportunity for" and the "opportunity to do." For example, it might be that in order to equally distribute an opportunity for X, the opportunity to do X varies with different sets of conditions between Alphas and non-Alphas. Consequently, the options constituted for Alphas might be unacceptable as options for non-Alphas.

#### Conclusion

Shifting the focus of the Itinerary of equal educational opportunity from access to inputs to outcomes brings us to a conflict between justifying equal educational opportunity in terms of equal access and equal inputs and equal outcomes. Moving to equal opportunity permits us to speak of three classifications of opportunity, each having distinct characteristics and methods for determining the applications of equal educational opportunity. Equal educational opportunity as "opportunity for," requires value judgments and policy implementation which allows differential treatment with respect to setting conditions. Equal educational opportunity as equal "opportunity to do" requires that for something to be an opportunity, the stage and conditions must be provided or set, leaving choice and diligence as the

factors which determine whether a person or group does X. Here we can speak of differential inputs to achieve equal educational "opportunity to do," as well as alternative outcomes.

Finally, with respect to equal educational opportunity as equal educational options, alternatives, and choices, here the conditions for opportunity are presupposed, with personal preference the variable of selection, on which options, alternatives, or choices one selects. (Of course, this applies to the non-options, alternatives, or choices which are prohibited from the area of individual selection.)

The implications for public policy and research with regard to equal educational opportunity are clearly profound, in that a new focus on value judgments within the educational system, with respect to its constituencies, must be made if one focuses on equal educational opportunity as "opportunity for." In addition, the commitment to equal educational opportunity as "opportunity to do" requires the presence of choice and the provision of conditions to allow for us to speak of there being "opportunity to do" X, when X requires different conditions for different people. In addition to differential conditions, this view permits acceptable inequalities in outcomes, provided the necessary conditions are present for the application of "opportunity to do" X.

Finally, understood as options, alternatives, and choices, equal educational opportunity stipulates action to

create the conditions, with respect to specific activities, which require the presence of all the conditions necessary for doing something, except choice. (Again, this applies to options that are unacceptable within the educational system as well.)

SECTION II

THE THEORY OF DISTRIBUTION

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### CHAPTER III

#### STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL ARGUMENTS

Thomas F. Green

The theory of equal educational opportunity or "equity" in education must surely include some treatment of the political arguments that can be offered in support of one or another version of equity. To the extent that such a treatment contributes to theory, it will be less important to forecast the specific content of such arguments than to elucidate their form or structure. That is to say, it is no doubt true that social groups especially concerned to advance the claims of equity in education may change, and the nature of their complaints and their political goals may also change. At one time some may aim at altering patterns of access to education, at other times other groups may seek more equitable distributions of resources, and at still other times others may call for a more equal distribution of educational outcomes. Yet, despite these undoubted alterations in the ways that "equity" is presented, it would be surprising if we did not discover in each version an expression of the same arguments. If political arguments for equity did not have a similar form, or appeal to remarkably similar principles, then we could not recognize, in such variety, different versions of the same issue. What changes through time are the terms, the variables of the argument. What remains unchanged is the form of the argument.

That at least is the presumption with which I begin. The problem then is to make explicit, to display for examination, the common principles and the common form of reasoning that underlie all political arguments in support of equity in education. If that is possible, then it may also be possible to reveal the dialectic that occurs as the formal features of these arguments are given appropriate content in different times and places.

# I

## The Principle of Equal Educational Opportunity

Every argument of educational equity will be aimed either at determining the acceptability of some distribution or determining the means of achieving an acceptable distribution. And this will be true whether the thing to be distributed is access, resources, benefits, or opportunities. In short, if there is anything like a single principle of equal educational opportunity, then it will be a principle of distribution, and if there are multiple principles, they will be multiple principles of distribution.

Ordinarily we do not regard every kind of inequality as unjust. That is to say, we ordinarily admit that there are inequalities in the distribution of things like physical capabilities, temperament, virtues such as courage, and so forth. And though we may regard such unequal distributions as unfortunate for certain purposes, we do not ordinarily regard them as unjust. They just are. Categories of justice and injustice do not apply to such inequalities of distribution.



Nevertheless, when we point to a certain social state of affairs as evidence of inequality in educational opportunity, or when we point to it as an example of such inequality, then we are usually implying that that state of affairs is unjust. Though not every unequal distribution is unjust, we do suppose that every instance of unequal educational opportunity is unjust. Thus, the principle of equal educational opportunity, no matter how formulated, is not only a distributive principle; it is, in addition, a principle of distributive justice.

Now with these two observations in mind, I believe it is possible to formulate a common general principle that is appealed to in all arguments of educational equity. I believe that in this, and in all other cases like this one, to discover that principle, we should proceed by asking first what human interest we seek to express by the principle in question. And then having understood the nature of that human interest, we will be in a position to state the principle quite directly and simply. So what is that underlying human interest? In discussions of equal educational opportunity, I believe, we voice our fundamental interest in reaching a particular social state of affairs, a state of affairs in which it is impossible to predict the placement of any individual in the distribution of educational benefits or in the distribution of associated social benefits, except on the basis of what we commonly acknowledge to be the educationally relevant attributes of that person.

What does this mean? The phrase "educationally relevant attribute" can be defined by the following criterion: If X is

an educationally relevant attribute of persons, then no educational system can be charged with injustice on the grounds that it distributes its benefits to accord with the distribution of X in the population. For example, if persons are of unequal ability we do not ordinarily find any injustice if they receive unequal access, resources, benefits, or opportunities as long as those inequalities can be shown to stand in some clear relation to their unequal possession of ability. If we reason in this fashion, it follows that we are counting ability as an educationally relevant attribute in the sense in which I mean it. We are saying that inequalities of educational benefits resulting from inequalities of ability do not count as unjust. We are asserting that they do not violate the principle of equal educational opportunity.

On the other hand, if we regard inequalities of access, resources, benefits, or chances arising from differences of social class, sex, geography, and so forth as being unjust, then we are saying that attributes of class, sex, geography, and so forth are not educationally relevant attributes. They do not constitute defensible grounds on which to establish an unequal educational distribution.

I admit that social class origin or ethnicity may be relevant attributes to consider in designing a program of instruction. Therefore, in one sense of "relevant," they may be regarded as "educationally relevant." But if it is argued that it is unjust to distribute educational goods on the basis of class or ethnicity, then these features of persons are being

regarded as "educationally irrelevant" in the sense in which I mean it. Thus, by "educationally relevant" I do not mean "relevant to the successful conduct of the educational process." On the contrary, I mean "relevant to the grounds of educational justice." Remember, the principle of equal educational opportunity is a principle of distributive justice. It is not a principle of educational effectiveness.

The human concern that we seek to express through our interest in equal educational opportunity is therefore a concern that educational results and resources should be distributed in a predictable way in relation to some attributes of persons, and in a random way in respect to other attributes. Such goods should be distributed predictably in relation to educationally relevant attributes and randomly in respect to educationally irrelevant attributes. ~~The fact that we can use educationally irrelevant~~ attributes, like social class, to predict the probable placement of an individual in the distribution of results is, therefore, clear evidence of the presence of educational injustice of some kind. We call it unequal educational opportunity. There will be inequality in the distribution of educational results and educational resources. That is probably necessary and inevitable. But, we assume that it is neither necessary nor inevitable that the resulting inequalities must be unjust.

The principle can then be stated explicitly and simply. It is that the benefits of education should be distributed unequally to persons in accordance with the unequal distribution of their educationally relevant attributes. It may seem odd

to offer as the principle of equal educational opportunity a formula that rests so explicitly and visibly upon the notion of inequality. But there is a point to that, even though the principle will read as well with or without the word "unequal." It is included nevertheless in order to stress certain points already made--that inequalities will result, that not all unequal results are unjust, but that inequalities of educational opportunity are always unjust.

But there is a more important reason for formulating the principle in this way. I believe that our moral conscience ordinarily tells us that where equality is achieved--equal treatment, equal station, equal standing before the law--justice is presumed to prevail. No vindication of such a condition is required. What requires defense is the presence of inequality. Inequality needs vindication; equality does not. But I have already argued that some kind of inequality is inevitable in the case of education. Therefore, what is vital to the discussion of educational equity is not what constitutes educational equality, but rather what inequalities are morally and educationally defensible. Thus, if there is such a thing as the principle of equal educational opportunity, it is best stated as a principle directing our attention to specifying what inequalities are justified and what is required to make a fair showing of their justification. That is what the principle I have formulated attempts to do.

I believe that there are no arguments either in actual life or that can be concocted concerning the injustice of

educational distributions except arguments that appeal in one way or another to this principle. Note: I am not saying merely that good arguments about equal educational opportunity always appeal to this principle. I am saying that all arguments--good or bad--rest upon this principle. Therefore, such a principle is necessary in the sense that without it no arguments concerning the issues of equal educational opportunity can be formulated.

The principle is, of course, indeterminate. It is indeterminate in the way that a blank check is indeterminate, which is the kind of indeterminacy shared by all rational principles from logic and morality to political theory and plumbing. In order to get a practical sentence out of the principle we need to fill in values for the variables--"Payable to...."--"In the amount of...." In this case we need to determine in any given case what will constitute educationally relevant attributes of persons. Remember that the principle permits inequality, but not every inequality. It permits only those that arise from the presence of educationally relevant attributes. If we count merit as a relevant attribute, then we will permit inequalities to arise as a consequence of merit. But then we have to determine what kinds of merit count. Will it be mastery of standard English? Will it be some kind of ability? If we permit inequalities to arise from the exercise of choice, then choice is being regarded as a relevant attribute. But then the question arises as to how we can practically determine and create the conditions of free choice. In short, what is at issue in all such arguments is the definition and

practical identification of what we will count as relevant human attributes and, therefore, what we will count as a just, but unequal, result.

In order to grasp the broad applicability of the principle it would be useful to review some practical problems that arise in the effort to fill in the gaps of the principle. For example, I think that in some rough way we do in fact regard inequalities arising from differences of choice as perfectly acceptable. We do not ordinarily consider such inequalities as unjust even though we may regard the choices leading to them as unwise, unfortunate, or imprudent. But the problem is to specify under what conditions we have any assurance that inequalities do arise from the exercise of choice. What do we have to do to guarantee free choice? There are obviously conditions of wealth, physical preparedness, health, habit, and any number of other things that are presupposed in the exercise of choice. But consider a single illustration. Suppose we find that at certain levels of the educational system, we can analyze the enterprise to operate as a system of monopoly rents in its relation to employment--the distribution of such things as licenses, for example. Such an economic analysis would constitute a substantive contribution to the theory of educational equity. But why? For the simple reason that if the conditions of monopoly rents describe the relation between the educational system and career opportunities, then the educational system imposes a constraint upon the exercise of choice. It follows that the inequalities resulting are not

merely the expression of choice. They, therefore, require justification, some foundation in justice. The grounds for this claim clearly rest in the principle of equal educational opportunity. In short, what makes such an analysis relevant to the theory of educational equity is that it appeals to the principle I have just stated.

Or consider another illustration. Just as we do not usually regard inequalities arising from choice to be unjust, neither do we usually regard inequalities arising from differences of ability as being unjust. But here again such an observation is insufficiently specific to be much of a guide to policy. We need to fill in the blanks of the principle more fully. What will we mean by "ability"?

Let us distinguish the claim that different persons have different abilities from the very different claim that persons may have the same abilities but in different degrees. The first affirms that different persons excel in different things. The second assents that persons do not excel equally in the same things. Now, I suppose again that at some rough level of generality we could agree that there is no injustice if education produces inequalities between persons or groups of persons based upon these two different interpretations of ability. Nevertheless, the principle of equal opportunity will produce very different though related practical guides to action depending upon which interpretation is used in "filling in the gaps" of the principle.

The first interpretation when applied will produce most of the arguments that relate pluralism to the theory of educational equity. The principle of equal educational opportunity permits us to say that there is no injustice in encouraging the development of the different abilities possessed by different persons, even though the inevitable consequence is to enlarge the range in the distribution of educational results. The principle is not, by itself, enough to encourage the nurture of such different abilities. All it does is permit us to say that such a course of action would not be unjust. So in order to reach a positive argument in support of pluralism, we need to go beyond the principle of equal educational opportunity and introduce other considerations not essentially rooted in the demands of justice. In short, arguments of educational pluralism of all sorts are related to the theory of equal educational opportunity because they appeal to the principle of equal educational opportunity. But insofar as such arguments actually encourage pluralism, they go beyond that principle and are not therefore strictly arguments of equity at all.

These observations hint that we should be able to observe the principle of equal educational opportunity in action, that is to say in policy debates, and to witness how issues of equity become transformed into other kinds of issues. I have already suggested that what begins as a problem of equal educational opportunity may lead us to the value of pluralism. But I have also suggested that when we reach that point we are no longer concerned with educational equity. A similar kind of



transformation can occur when we begin with the second of our interpretations of "ability." It can happen that the relevant practical question is how we can have any assurance that unequal educational results stem from unequal distributions of ability and are, therefore, perfectly acceptable or whether they stem from unequal distributions of good teaching and are, therefore, unacceptable. Questions of equity in this case are likely to get transformed into questions of effectiveness rather than pluralism. The problem of equity is then turned into a problem of determining the best pedagogy for this or that group, or the best program, or the best kind of school so that unequal results are either reduced or else we are assured that they arise from inequalities in the distribution of educationally relevant attributes.

Such transformations are likely to occur when the details of the presiding principle of equal opportunity are filled in. Filling in those blanks is the practical problem. When it takes the form of determining the best way to remove the operation of monopoly rents, then our concern is with the value of efficiency, not equity. And when we are concerned with implementing certain views of "ability," then the problem becomes one of effectiveness and with other views it becomes a problem of pluralism, rather than equity. Nevertheless, all such transformations in the basic questions of policy are related to the same principle, and that principle is the principle of equal educational opportunity. The transformation of the issues occurs when we attempt to give the formal principle

some cash value for action.' They occur as the inevitable accompaniment of attempting to specify what will count as educationally relevant attributes of the population and what will, therefore, count as morally acceptable inequalities of educational resources, access, or results. So much for the attempt to formulate the principle of equal educational opportunity.

## II

### The Rank Order of Political Arguments and the Shifting Variables of Equal Educational Opportunity

By a political argument I mean an argument aimed at determining what to do politically and expressing an appeal to certain interests. In short, a political argument is a policy argument formulated for appeal to some constituency. Interests are not distributed in the way that social power is distributed. Nevertheless, there is a connection. Even within a single identifiable group or class of society different interests may be expressed, but those interests will not receive equal weight. However, from the fact that some interests are stronger than others, we cannot conclude that certain social groups are stronger than others. Nevertheless, if there is such a thing as the strength of interests and if political arguments are arguments that appeal to various interests, it follows that some kinds of political arguments are stronger than others, not logically stronger, but politically stronger. And these differences of strength have little to do with the distribution of power. We may place the array of possible political

arguments, therefore, in a rank order from the strongest to the weakest. There will be four kinds in such a rank order: (1) arguments of State interests, (2) arguments appealing to the aggregate of individual interests, (3) arguments appealing to the social good, and (4) arguments appealing to the advancement of educational benefits themselves, i.e., such goods as knowledge, taste, skill, and so forth.

Political Arguments of State Interest: It is commonly acknowledged that any arguments in support of education that can subsume the enterprise under the category of national defense, or national security, or the preservation of domestic tranquility, or the reduction of social dependence will receive very strong support. These are essentially arguments that express the State's interests in education. They have little to do with what constitutes a good education; they have much to do with preserving the continuity of the State itself and with preserving the identity of the State from one generation to the next. These are essentially conservative interests in the most literal sense of the word "conservative." They exist in every State no matter what its political or economic organization.

A strong State interest argument is quite enough to lay aside even considerations of efficiency or effectiveness. We don't ask whether we can afford to go to war in the face of threats to national security. The Interstate Highway System in the United States was made politically palatable partly because it was declared by a general and a national hero

(President Eisenhower) to be essential for national defense. (After all, he did learn something from the Germans.) Similarly, in an earlier time, the construction of the railroads was made possible by a similar argument sufficient to lay aside all considerations of reasonable cost or efficiency. A similar thing happened in the case of "The Moon Project." Whenever we can assimilate proposals for the advancement or improvement of education to issues of State interest--as in the case of the National Defense Act--then we have a strong educational argument. It is often strong enough even to prevail over objections based in First Amendment rights. In saying these things I am not trying to describe what is culturally beneficial or what contributes to mental health; I am describing only what is politically probable. The central question then becomes whether there is any State Interest argument for equal educational opportunity. I shall return to give this question a direct and simple answer.

Arguments Aggregating Individual Interests: The pursuit of education is often construed to be beneficial to individuals. To advance educationally is often thought to be in the interest of individuals. When such a belief is widely held, then the aggregation of all those individuals can add up to a sizable constituency. Suppose that such a belief declines, as many think it has in recent years with respect to higher education. If it is widely believed that continuing one's education, say to the B.A. degree, no longer bestows any particular advantage in the contests of life, then we can expect that political

arguments for the support of higher education will be harder to produce. They will be harder to advance in ways that are politically effective, because such arguments will aggregate the interests of fewer persons.

If everyone has a high school diploma, then nobody benefits relative to others by having one. Yet as we approach that point, having one is no big deal to those who have one, but not having one becomes an increasing disaster to those who do not have it. And those who do not have it are increasingly not merely a numerical minority, but a socio-economic minority. The aggregation of individual interests in education becomes more and more difficult because it appeals to fewer and fewer people and further because the pursuit of education is then transformed from the pursuit of a good clearly in one's interest to secure into something that is merely necessary, but not particularly beneficial. The benefits of schooling begin to appear less and less like a reward for courage, tenacity, and intelligence and more like a civil right. At this point what was an argument requiring the aggregation of individual interests begins to look like an argument that is a straightforward claim of civil rights.

This observation points to another. What was at one time a goal for the system becomes transformed into a perceived function of the educational system soon after that goal is attained. We cannot have goals that have already been attained. To suppose otherwise makes no sense at all. So, in any number of cases, it has turned out that what were goals of the American

educational system in the early part of this century have been attained. They now become perceived as the functions of the system. This is an important point because a failure to carry out the functions of the system is much more serious than any failure to achieve its goals. The former presents a crisis in the legitimacy of the whole educational effort, whereas the latter does not at all. The failure to perform the functions of the system invites, therefore, the attention of the State, whereas a mere failure to achieve one's goals does not invite such attention at all.

See the point this way. The "Back to Basics Movement" can be described as the social expression of a single argument. The schools were at one time better than they are now. They have served the purposes of minority groups well. Now they do not. Yet, if the schools were better than they are now, then that is flat-out proof that they can be better than they are. And "better than they are" means "the way they were."

Is there a political argument for equal educational opportunity that rests upon the aggregation of individual interests? Answer: There used to be, but there isn't any longer. Nobody, considered as an individual, has an interest in obtaining an equal education. Neither parents for their children nor young adults for themselves in fact seek an equal education. What they seek is the best for them that is possible, and that usually means an education better than equal and, in fact, usually better than anyone else. The only persons that can probably be mustered as a constituency in favor of equal

educational opportunity consist of those who see themselves as disadvantaged (in which they are probably correct) or those who are so secure in their advantage (in which they also are probably correct) so that they have nothing to lose in the attempt.

This is a constituency that has become increasingly smaller, though admittedly more desperate in the past fifteen years. It is destined to get smaller and smaller to whatever extent the educational enterprise is able to succeed. This represents a dismal prospect for the political possibilities of effectively aggregating individual interests in support of policies directed toward equal educational opportunity. The only recourse is that political arguments aimed at aggregating individual interests give way to political arguments resting upon State interests or social interests. Political arguments of equal educational opportunity will either become transformed into arguments of civil rights or else into arguments of effectiveness and efficiency inviting the intervention of the State. The prospect is that issues of equal educational opportunity will become increasingly isolated as concerns of the State allied with the Courts. They will be increasingly viewed by parents and school leaders as expressed through the imposition of remote power and authority. And when those issues are clearly viewed as imposing a disadvantage on the majority in order to remedy disadvantages suffered by a minority, we can anticipate that political arguments aggregating individual interests will bring a halt to continued efforts to implement

equal educational opportunity. I do not state these things as an expression of what I prefer or think best, but only as a formulation of what I think is likely and what any political leader in education had better take into consideration.

Arguments of Social Benefit: Social goods are those goods whose pursuit is justified to any individual on the grounds that the advancement of such goods is a benefit to everyone and therefore a benefit to each. Social goods then are those goods promoted by a social argument; that is, by an argument appealing to what is good for all. We may then define "social interests" as those interests that are required if such an appeal is to be successful. If I have no concern for, no interest in, the plight of Vietnam veterans, then there is little point in urging me to support measures that would improve their plight. A social argument rests upon the existence of a social interest. It might be argued that improving their condition would be a boon to everyone, and therefore, a benefit to me. And in this way I can avoid reliance on a non-existent social interest by appealing to a remote individual good.

But such a good is indeed remote, especially in the case of education. One might in like manner appeal to publishers to support the cause of education on the grounds that if it succeeds they will have a larger market. But in this, and all cases, the benefits are remote indeed. One speaks of decades and generations, periods of time unlikely to have much political appeal. In this respect we are all like bankers--preferring a certain, but small, short-term gain to an uncertain, but



possibly larger, long-term gain. They call it "discounting," but it expresses a kind of behavior that we all display.

All this bears upon the political weight of any educational argument that rests upon an appeal to social benefit. Not only individuals, but also educational statesmen, would prefer to support the enterprise of education if they could find in it some short-term benefit for their own children. But if they cannot have that, then, and only then, will they turn to a social benefit argument as next best. Thus, when the production of Ph.D's seems to offer no reasonable near benefit to individuals, and therefore their number is likely to fall, then we point to the national disaster incurred by skipping an entire generation of research scholars. In short, if any political argument aggregating the individual interests of people will no longer have appeal, then we will turn to a social benefit argument. And, if at all possible, we will relate the social benefit argument to a State interest to lend it some strength.

It is interesting to note that arguments of social benefit offered in support of the U.S. space program were not seriously advanced until NASA was faced with budgetary cuts, and that arrangements for the continued support of space exploration appealing to our interests in simply knowing more have been unsuccessful except when associated with techniques for surveillance (State interests) or techniques for weather forecasting, mapping, the search for natural resources, and for monitoring crop diseases (both State and individual interests). These events tend to reconfirm the rank order of the political arguments as I have stated them.

Arguments of Educational Benefits: By "educational benefits" I do not mean to refer to such things as certificates, diplomas, measures of educational attainment, and the like. I mean to refer to the real thing--knowledge, taste, skill, wisdom, and other good qualities that are commonly supposed to be what education is really about. No doubt, it is better to be couth and able than to be uncouth and inept. Knowing is worthwhile in itself even if nobody benefits except by knowing. Curiosity is a human capacity, and satisfying it is a joy. The possession of knowledge and good taste is no doubt a source of satisfaction and pleasure to those who know and are tasteful. Educational goods, in short, have increasing marginal utility. The more one has, the more one is likely to value the next increment. All this is no doubt true. But practically none of it represents a source of political power except where "the mob" is ruled by an aristocracy; and even so, the aristocracy, through time, is likely to become both uncouth and inept. So though it may have represented a group whose central interest was the advancement of educational goods, experience tells us that that is not likely to persist. In short, there are no circumstances in which an argument in support of the benefits of educational goods themselves is likely to produce much of a political force.

Question: Is there an effective political argument in support of equal educational opportunity that rests upon the value of educational benefits in themselves? Answer: No. Such an argument is likely to be elitist. In respect to

education, as in so many other matters, "them that has, will get; and them that don't, won't."

### III

#### The Shifting Variables of Equal Educational Opportunity

If there is an "itinerary" of the concept of equal educational opportunity, a definite route through which the idea travels, a path by which it passes from one formulation to another, then those transformations will arise from some modification in the variables of arguments concerning equal educational opportunity. I believe that that route is closely related to the development and expansion of the educational system itself. In a society where the system of formal schooling is only emerging, there may be many children having no school to attend at all. That can be viewed as a problem of equal educational opportunity. It is resolved by providing some school for every child. But then it may be discovered that though there is some school for every child, schools are not equal in their resources, facilities, or curricula. That, in turn, may be viewed as a problem--though a different problem--of equal opportunity. It is resolved by providing equal facilities, resources, and curricula. But having resolved that problem, we may discover that though every child has access to some school, and though that school has resources, facilities, and curricula equal to all others, still those attending some schools do not achieve at the same levels as those in other schools, nor do they go on to successive levels of the system at the same rate.

Thus, as the system expands, the variables introduced into the same argument are transformed, and that transformation progresses roughly from (1) the attainment of equal access to some school, to (2) securing equal resources and curricula, to (3) securing equal educational benefits, either the benefits of knowledge and skill or the benefits of certificates, diplomas, and the like. It is worth noting that these steps, in all probability, do describe a sequence; and that the sequence is irreversible. That is to say, the issues of equal educational opportunity are unlikely to arise in the third of these versions unless we are fairly satisfied that they have been resolved in the first or second versions. When some students do not have any school at all, then we cannot claim that differences in their receipt of educational benefits arise either from different choices or different abilities or different degrees of tenacity and other good virtues. Similarly, when there are significant differences of quality in teaching, curriculum, facilities, or other resources, then we cannot claim that differences in the receipt of educational benefits arise from educationally relevant attributes, although we could claim that those inequalities do not arise from differential access to some school. It seems, therefore, that these formulations do not represent merely different versions of equal opportunity. Rather, they represent different stages in formulating the problem. They represent a sequence.

The sequence is roughly from access to some school, to equality of schools, to approximately equal frequencies of

benefit distribution between different social groups within society; but throughout, the assumption is that we must let the inevitable educational inequalities arise from the exercise of choice, ability, or some other "educationally relevant attributes."

This third version of equal educational opportunity is the more recent one, and, on the whole, it still dominates our thinking about issues of equal educational opportunity. But in this version, which I shall call "the benefit view" of equality, there are two further assumptions that tend to surface with special force. We assume throughout this conceptual "itinerary" that uniformly if persons could choose to get more education than they have, or if they could choose to get a better education than they are getting, then they would do so. But we are assuming further that if such a condition were achieved, then the distribution of both educational attainment levels and educational achievement levels would be random with respect to such educationally irrelevant variables as race, social class, sex, geographical region, and, I suppose, religion. In short, according to the benefit view, when equal educational opportunity is achieved, the distribution of educational benefits and their associated social benefits will be randomly distributed with respect to educationally irrelevant attributes and predictably distributed with respect to educationally relevant attributes.

I see no reason to believe (1) that the assumption is true; some reasons to believe that (2) if it is true, then

its realization would be undesirable; and finally, (3) reason to believe that we are not currently in a position to provide any reasonable empirical test of its truth. The crux of my point can be expressed by the second of these claims. If we were to imagine a society in which equal educational opportunity is achieved, and in which its achievement is construed as requiring a random distribution of educational benefits with respect to all educationally irrelevant attributes, then we would have imagined a society that has paid an enormous cost. The cost would be that we would have wiped out the differential effects of families, regional cultures, and religious traditions. Equal educational opportunity, understood in this way, is a value in direct conflict with the value of pluralism. Different theological traditions do not equally endorse intellectual pursuits. In this respect, there is as much difference between Southern Italian and Western French Catholicism as there is between the most evangelical Southern Baptist and the highest of high Anglicanism. To dispose of these differences in order to achieve equal educational opportunity would be a terrible loss. But, by the same token, one should consider the often terrible personal costs of alienation from family and friends that are often paid by the children of craftsmen, marginal farmers, and laborers by their choice to reach for higher levels of education, through formal schooling and the higher status that is often associated with it. In short, even under conditions of totally free choice, it is by no means obvious that persons would freely choose either more education or better education

irrespective of class, race, sex, region, or religious tradition. And it is a contestable claim that the world would be much improved if they did so.

But not only is such an assumption of doubtful truth and of doubtful social merit, it is also doubtful that there is any reasonable current test of its truth. That the removal of economic and other barriers to the pursuit of further education results in more students is no longer evidence that obstacles to choice are the obstacles to a more equitable distribution of results. Rather, such policies are better understood as an extension of the degree to which more education has been made more compulsory. That more go to school when more obstacles to choice are removed is no longer clear evidence that freedom of choice will lead to a more random distribution of educational results. At some point it becomes simply increasing evidence of the extent to which more education is a social necessity. It is evidence of the extent to which education has become compulsory if one is to enter any kind of decent life. If one were in an accident on the expressway, and all obstacles were removed for entrance into the hospital, then any increased frequency of appearance in the hospital would not constitute evidence that choice had been extended. It would constitute evidence only that obstacles to life itself had been removed. Only a satirist could present such a result as the expression of choice.

As a matter of political choice and public policy, perhaps the time has come when we should consider whether it is easier,

more humane, and more desirable to make the world safe for illiterates than to make the whole world literate. In other words, I have already argued that issues of equal educational opportunity are likely to be transformed into issues of either effectiveness, efficiency, or pluralism. Now I am suggesting that, in the future, issues of equal educational opportunity are likely to be resolved only by reducing the capacity of the educational system itself to determine the future and the value of individuals. What we need, for reasons of justice, is not a system of education that is more equal, but one that is less powerful.



## CHAPTER IV

### EFFICIENCY ORIGINS OF SOCIAL EQUITY ISSUES

Stephen Dresch

Clearly, social and political conceptions of the meaning of social equity and perceptions of the existence of inequity have changed significantly over time. Recognizing the fact of secular change in the connotative definition of equity and in the denotive definition of inequity in the sphere of education, Martel and Green ( ) have suggested the possible usefulness of the concept of an "itinerary of education equity": a process of dynamic development which operates subject to some discoverable system of extrinsic or intrinsic laws. Whether this suggestion truly contributes to our understanding of equity issues or simply alters the semantics of the discussion depends upon the substantive content given to the term "itinerary": What is the nature of the development process, and can its laws be determined?

Three fundamentally different characterizations of the itinerary, or process, can be suggested that would each have profound consequences for the understanding of equity issues.

First, the itinerary can be described as a "random walk," in which potential "inequities" continuously emerge, but only a few, selected on an essentially random basis, survive to become socially or politically potent issues. The closest analogy is fads in music and fashion, where one popular form succeeds another "without rhyme or reason." Implicit in this

characterization is the absence of a substantive logic by which issues of equity develop. To attempt to perceive any meaning other than statistical in the succession of social concerns or to predict the foci of future concern would be futile.

Second, it can be argued that there does exist a structured, substantive dynamic, an evolutionary process of development that follows its own logic, giving rise to a historical sequence of concerns in an ordered, predictable manner. This framework could rest on a perceived cumulative process of moral or ethical development, in the course of which the social and political dictates of morality and ethics become progressively more refined and far-reaching. Fundamental to this characterization is the idea of "progress": a continuing process of moral, ethical, or spiritual enlightenment. Although the rate of progress may be influenced by external developments, the logic of that progress is internal.

Third, social equity concerns might develop not by an internal logic, as in the second characterization, but rather in relationship to some external force. In this view, the substantive content of the concept of equity reflects the circumstances or situation of the society, and the evolutionary process represents an adaptation to changes in the social environment. As one variant of this perspective, fundamental moral or ethical precepts might be unchanging over time. However, the practical political and social implications or imperatives of these moral or ethical principles would depend upon the specific

features of the social setting--the physical, economic, or technological opportunities and constraints confronting the society. Alternatively, the moral or ethical precepts might themselves be functions of the environment, adapting to changes in opportunities and constraints via complex, interactive process of political, economic, and technological evolution.

There are arguments to support each of these radically different interpretations of the evolution of the concept of social equity. The last characterization--in its second, positivistic formulation--would embrace, but not be confined to, a Marxian perspective. The second, embodying the concept of moral or ethical progress, is represented in much liberal and religious thought on the subject, where the evolution of equity concerns is viewed as a process of progressive realization of fundamental human values. The first presents an essentially agnostic position, rejecting both the concept of progress embodied in the second and the concept of an objectively discoverable process underlying the third.<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Efficiency Imperatives: Societal Adaptation to Change

This essay is devoted primarily to developing the third perspective on the evolution of social and political conceptions of equity. The central thesis is that the processes of social

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<sup>1</sup>Proponents of the first position would probably not subscribe to it literally but rather would view it as an acceptable theoretic construct, arguing that developments proceed as if the random walk characterization were operative. Similarly, proponents of the concept of progress might well admit that progress is not continuous or monotonic but would argue that the long-term tendency is toward ever greater realization of fundamental values.

technological, and economic development make possible previously foreclosed opportunities, which then give rise to "efficiency imperatives" that are mirrored in perceptions of the existence of inequity and in prescriptions for the enhancement of social equity.

In this context, an efficiency imperative can be understood to exist in any situation where it is possible to improve the welfare of at least some individuals or groups without necessary reductions in the welfare of other individuals or groups. Thus, the existence of an efficiency imperative indicates the presence of an unexpended social potential. From a positivistic viewpoint, a state of social equilibrium cannot be achieved until that social potential has been realized, or exhausted. Normatively, to fail to realize that potential is to enforce lower levels of welfare on at least some groups in society than could otherwise be achieved.

In general, it can be argued that changes in the distribution of welfare in a society derive primarily from the realization of efficiency imperatives created by changes in the external, technological or economic, environment. In a static environment, where all social potentials, or efficiency imperatives, have been exhausted, a state of social equilibrium exists. Within this equilibrium context, no force operates to alter the distribution of welfare; any force that might have had this effect has been expended. The "pure" equity issue of the philosophical or ethical justification for observed inequality in status or welfare might be raised, but this will constitute primarily an

"intellectual" exercise with no "practical" import. Only in a state of disequilibrium, in which external forces either directly undermine aspects of the existing order or create positive incentives for conscious efforts to establish a new order, will the distribution of welfare be altered.

### 3. Dynamics of the Efficiency Imperative

To isolate the essential elements of the dynamic realization of an efficiency imperative, consider a purely egalitarian society in a stationary state, where all previously existing opportunities have been fully realized. If we assume full equality between all individuals with respect to all endowments, then the distribution of welfare will also exhibit total equality. Different individuals may engage in different activities, but no individual will have an incentive to exchange places with any other individual. Any observed inequality in welfare will be just offset by some other unobserved inequality.

Under these assumptions, it should be noted, the mechanism by which individuals are allocated to activities will be irrelevant, because welfare is, by definition, identical in all activities or social positions. Thus, a caste system, a lottery, and individual freedom of choice would all result in identical outcomes with respect to the distribution of welfare.

In this static social context, imagine that a sudden, "exogenous" change in opportunities and constraints occurs, permitting an unambiguous increase in welfare. This change could take one of several forms.

First, "productivity" (the capacity to produce welfare) could increase equiproportionately in all activities, raising the welfare of all members of society equally. This can be described as a "neutral" change in social potential.

Second, productivity could increase in some activities but remain unchanged in others. In this case, the immediate effect would be to render some activities more desirable than others, although welfare would not be reduced in any activity and might indeed increase in all activities. This can be characterized as a "nonneutral, nondestructive" change.

Finally, the change could make it possible for incumbents in one activity to absorb the functions of another activity, at least in part, thus absolutely reducing the welfare of incumbents in the latter activity while increasing the welfare of those in the first. This change is "nonneutral and destructive," in that the basis for welfare in the second activity is eroded.

In both the second and the third situations, the change would render some activities more desirable than others. Given free, costless movement of individuals between activities, the allocation of individuals to activities would respond instantaneously and continue until welfare was again equal in all activities.

In the case of nonneutral, nondestructive change, however, incumbents in the beneficiary activity would initially experience an increase in welfare and hence would have an incentive to retard the rate of transfer into the newly enhanced activity. Utilizing the welfare surplus generated by the change, incumbents

might well act to prevent entry into their domain, thus sustaining their preferential position.

In the third case of nonneutral, destructive change, the incentive for beneficiaries to preclude a reallocation of individuals over activities in order to sustain their now enhanced positions would be conjoined with the incentive confronting those in immediately damaged positions to retard the rate of exploitation of new opportunities, because an important initial effect of this exploitation would be reduced welfare in the exposed activity.

In all three cases, social welfare would be enhanced by complete adaptation to change. However, in the second and third cases, the incentive would exist for some group or groups to limit the adaptation to or to preclude change.

This highly stylized categorization identifies several critical aspects of the social dynamics of the efficiency imperative. First, the consequences of the emergence of an efficiency imperative will depend critically on the nature of the underlying change in opportunities and constraints. Adaptation to neutral alterations will require no fundamental alterations in existing social relationships and institutions. Nonneutral but nondestructive change will superimpose new institutional arrangements on the existing social order. In contrast, nonneutral destructive change will render prevailing social relationships--relationships that were previously efficient or at least benign--inefficient or dysfunctional, requiring radical change in the existing institutional structure.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, in the context of an advanced, functionally differentiated society, it is virtually impossible to conceive of any change in societal circumstances that would be neutral as defined above. Almost every physical or technological change will impinge differentially on different activities. Thus, the realization of an efficiency imperative will almost inevitably require fundamental change in social institutions, change which will often, perhaps usually, effect at least certain aspects of the existing social order.

Second, aspects of the social order that would be irrelevant in a stationary equilibrium may be extremely important with respect to the dynamic process of realization of an efficiency imperative. Thus while the mechanism by which individuals are assigned to activities may be unimportant in a static context, different mechanisms may have very different implications in a dynamic context. Because full realization of an efficiency imperative will require a reallocation of individuals to activities, a system of social institutions that places few constraints on, or even encourages, individual mobility will make possible a more rapid exploitation of new opportunities than will a highly structured system that minimizes mobility.

Third, the general social context in which change occurs may critically influence the response to potential change. For example, in a situation characterized by a high overall rate of growth, a change in opportunities that requires a reallocation of individuals over activities may be achievable without actually shifting incumbents in declining activities to expanding



activities. Rather, it may be possible to fully exploit newly emerging opportunities simply by channeling increasing proportions of new entrants into the now enhanced activities. Correspondingly, the relative welfare of incumbents in declining activities may deteriorate only marginally, while absolute welfare may even increase. Conversely, if the rate of growth is low or negative, relative welfare in contracting activities may have to decline markedly to force incumbents to shift into newly enhanced activities.

Fourth, the relative human or physical "capital intensity" of both enhanced and threatened activities will affect the rate at which new opportunities are exploited. Greater capital intensity of enhanced activities will reduce their rate of expansion because of the gestation period of the necessary investment. Moreover, control over the rate of investment provides a mechanism by which incumbents in the beneficiary activity can reduce the rate of expansion and thus maintain their preferential position. In the case of a threatened activity, change will imply capital losses which rise with the degree of their capital intensity. Thus, the incentive of disadvantaged parties to act to prevent or retard the rate of exploitation of new opportunities will rise with the degree of intensity of their activities.

Fifth, and finally, although the foregoing stylization implicitly treats the efficiency imperative as emerging exogenously, the question of the origin of new opportunities and constraints necessarily arises. Clearly, an exogenous

origin represents one possibility. Alternatively, the imperative may emerge endogenously, in response to incentives created by characteristics of the existing social order. This alternative is particularly interesting because it involves the possibility of a cumulative, self-reinforcing process of continuing social change. For example, if the fulfillment of an enhancement of opportunities is retarded by either favored or threatened parties, it can result in a search for mechanisms by which to evade these constraints, thus bringing a further extension of societal possibilities and opportunities. In general, any characteristic of the social order that involves a less than complete exploitation of existing opportunities will encourage action either to increase the exploitation of these opportunities or to create new opportunities that render valueless those which were previously unexploited. Similarly, if parties threatened by change are limited in their capacity to preclude or retard the realization of that change, they may respond by searching for new opportunities to offset losses that would otherwise be incurred.

### 3. Conflict and the Efficiency Imperative

Superficially, the realization of efficiency imperatives might not be thought to incorporate any significant element of conflict. If it is possible to improve the situation of some without necessarily adversely affecting others, why should resistance to change be encountered? As suggested above, however, on closer examination, conflict can be seen to be a central facet of the pursuit of efficiency imperatives. The

realization of an efficiency imperative will create a societal "surplus," or a net gain in welfare. The ultimate distribution of this surplus is not uniquely determined by its realization, thus creating a context for conflict. Aggregate welfare is increased, but relative welfare may be altered, even if the absolute welfare of any individual or group is not reduced.

Moreover, although an efficiency imperative requires the possibility of enhancing welfare for some without imposing welfare reductions on others, this does not mean that welfare will actually not be reduced for any party. The realization of a nonneutral, destructive efficiency imperative may indeed reduce the welfare of some social entities while increasing that of others. Although the gains of the beneficiaries may outweigh the losses of the losers, the process by which the efficiency imperative is realized need not result in direct or indirect compensation of those who lose by those who gain.

In general, if the gains to one group exceed the losses to another, the efficiency imperative can be realized by one of two routes: either the gaining party can compensate the losing party, or the gaining party can outbid the losing party for the necessary support of other social groups. In the first case, the losing party will be induced to agree voluntarily to the change in institutional arrangements. In the second, the objections of the losing party will be overruled by a larger social coalition. In either event, the potential gains and losses set limits on the resources that the contending parties will be prepared to devote to the conflict.

With reference to the potential for conflict, however, it is important to distinguish between nondestructive and destructive change--in other words, between situations in which some gain while none lose and situations in which some gain while others lose. In the first case, conflict arises only from implied changes in the relative distribution of welfare. In the absence of absolute losses, those who do not gain have no incentive to invest resources in opposing the change. In the second case, the existence of absolute losses leads either to the development of compensatory arrangements or to conflict, as contending groups attempt to alter the ultimate distribution of the societal surplus.

This picture is complicated by the fact that parties who do not lose compared with the status ex ante may lose compared with possible achievable states ex post. Thus, for example, realization of an efficiency imperative that directly benefits one group could be accompanied by a reduction in other benefits to that group, with consequent beneficial implications for those who provided the second set of benefits. As a result, even here there is a potential for conflict: as a condition of support for the realization of an efficiency imperative, a group not directly affected may require other concomitant actions by which it indirectly obtains part of the benefit. Greater conflict, however, would be expected to be encountered when gains to one party are coupled with direct losses to another.

In short, conflict can be expected to be pervasive in the process by which efficiency imperatives are realized. An important implication of this is that the costs of realizing an efficiency imperative may significantly exceed the benefits, although potential benefits exceed potential costs by definition. This situation can arise because potential beneficiaries will be prepared to devote resources up to the full amount of potential benefits to the conflict required for the realization of these benefits, while potential losers will be similarly prepared to expend up to the full amount of their potential losses to avoid the realization of the imperative.

Consider an extreme case in which initial direct gains to beneficiaries,  $g$ , exceed initial direct losses to others,  $f$ , by a very small amount,  $e$ :  $g = f + e$ . If neither party is certain of the precise magnitude of the potential gains and losses to the other, but believes its own gains or losses to be greater, then each might be prepared to expend up to  $g = f$  to achieve or thwart realization, with the result that the gross social costs of realization may approach in magnitude twice the gross social benefits, simply because of the costs of conflict. Clearly, if the costs of conflict could be avoided, a net social gain would flow from the realization of efficiency imperatives. With conflict, however, these net benefits will be eroded and may even become negative.

Superficially, it would appear that beneficiaries would invariably be able to command sufficient resources to force the realization of an efficiency imperative, regardless of the

magnitude of the net social loss resulting from conflict. This is simply because gross benefits necessarily exceed gross losses, implying that the resources which beneficiaries would be potentially prepared to devote to conflict would exceed those of opponents of change. This conclusion, however, ignores several potentially important considerations.

First, the institutional environment may significantly favor the opposition. To the degree to which beneficiaries are dispersed while opponents are institutionally concentrated, the latter will be able more effectively to marshal and deploy resources in any conflict. Because potential beneficiaries are first created only by a change in opportunities or constraints, while potential losers represent a pre-existing class, this is likely to be the case. Thus, the threatened parties may have an existing institutional base, developed for what were previously socially benign or even beneficial purposes, which can be utilized in opposition to the realization of change. Potential beneficiaries, in contrast, may well enjoy no existing institutional base or identification.

Second, and related to the foregoing, the benefits and costs of change may be dispersed not only over individuals and groups but also over time. Any differential capacity to "capitalize" these potential benefits and costs may result in capacities to marshal resources for conflict which are unrelated to the ultimate balance of benefits and costs. This factor creates a particularly important role for capital markets, since access to perfectly functioning capital markets would

insure that the temporal profile of benefits would have no influence on the command over resources required for their realization. If, however, capital markets are imperfect, then the party or group with greater immediate command over resources will have a differential advantage in any conflict situation.

Such differential advantages are particularly likely if the process of change is indeed endogenous. If new opportunities are created in response to the imposition of controls over the exploitation of previously existing opportunities, thus providing effective monopoly rents to the group in control, then these monopoly rents also provide a resource base for opposition to change.

Ultimately, the most fundamental observation with respect to conflict is that it reflects the existence of institutional barriers to the flow of resources, either over activities or over time. In the absence of these barriers, resource flows would occur which would indeed initially benefit some parties and damage others. Over the long term, however, differential benefits would be dissipated as full adaptation to change was realized. For those initially damaged, these damages would be conceived as the consequence of an inexorable process, unamenable to control. Resistance itself would be viewed as futile.

If the basic source of conflict is institutional, then the process itself is necessarily political, and the outcome may well become indeterminate. That is, conflict may be resolved in such a manner as to diffuse opposition to control.

without realization of change. Most importantly, it is possible that political conflict will focus not on the inefficiencies inherent in the existing order but on their superficial consequences, e.g., the differentially advantageous positions of opponents to change. Under these circumstances, the political issue may well concern the identities of the members of the groups benefiting from the retardation of change rather than the social costs implied by the failure to exploit those opportunities requiring change in the allocation of resources.

Consider a situation in which new opportunities require an increase in the flow of resources to a particular activity, the end result of which will be an unambiguous increase in social welfare. If change can be retarded, however, incumbents will derive substantial benefits. The socially desirable resolution, clearly, is to insure the free flow of resources. Politically, however, the issue may revolve, at least initially, on the identities of those few which existing institutions of control permit to enter the ranks of the incumbents. Thus, the important political question may be the "fairness" of control rather than the desirability of control per se.

#### 4. Mobility, Capital Intensity and the Exploitation of Opportunities

The critical prerequisite for the complete realization of the potential social welfare gains made possible by any change in opportunities and constraints is the free, costless movement of resources, especially human resources, between activities. Any barriers to mobility will act to retard the rate of



exploitation of new opportunities, serving either to sustain the differentially advantageous position of immediate beneficiaries or to defer the adverse impacts on directly threatened parties.

The conflict engendered by the emergence of an efficiency imperative, then, will involve primarily a struggle for control over the degree of resource mobility permitted in the face of unexploited opportunities. The institutional settings for these conflicts will be provided by those institutions which facilitate, constrain, or regulate mobility.

Two critical points of control over the allocation of human resources can be identified. The most direct involves the regulation of access to practice per se. At this level representative controls include restrictions on the number of persons permitted to enter any activity, licensure restrictions, and exclusionary stipulations of arbitrary criteria for entry. The second, more indirect point of control involves restrictions on the ability of individuals to acquire the competencies required for the performance of any function or activity. It is in this second context that education has played a principle role in the exploitation of opportunities and has become a central focus for conflict.

The potential for restrictive control can be increased by the integration of indirect educational constraints and of direct labor market constraints. Thus, the requirement of a specified program of study may be imposed as a condition of licensure, magnifying the control over the mobility of human

resources which could be achieved at either level independently. Not surprisingly, then, a high degree of articulation is commonly found between employment regulation and the educational system.

In the case of both educational and labor market controls, the effectiveness of attempted regulation depends primarily on the degree to which mobility requires the modification or transformation of individual characteristics and capabilities. In the absence of any substantive need to acquire particular skills or competencies, any imposition of control will be clearly arbitrary, designed only to protect incumbents from competition and providing no benefit to users of the particular service. In this context both potential users and providers confront incentives to evade controls, incentives which are offset only by the penalties which can be imposed by the regulatory authority on those found to be in violation of regulatory constraints. In this situation, in which the absence of benefits to groups other than protected incumbents is transparently obvious, the regulatory process will be highly unstable.

The potential for control then will depend heavily on the underlying need for the transformation of human capabilities as a condition for the exploitation of opportunities. And in fact, apart from the physical, geographic mobility of human resources, the most important dimension of human resource mobility does involve the transformation of the qualitative characteristics or capacities, of those resources. Control over these transformations constitutes effective control over the ultimate allocation of human effort.

With reference to the efficiency of the allocation of human resources, control over qualitative characteristics or capacities is probably even more important than control over geographic mobility. As long as the products of human effort can be traded geographically, limitations on individual movement will have relatively minor consequences for efficiency. However, restrictions on the acquisition of capabilities will introduce serious inefficiencies for which compensatory concomitants (e.g., trade) will be unavailable.

The central position of education in the determination of the rate of exploitation of new opportunities derives principally from the fact that the transformation of individual skills, competencies, and capacities is not a costless process. At the least, it involves the investment of individual time and effort in activities which are not directly or immediately "productive," thus rendering the individual dependent, to a greater or lesser degree, on other social entities, e.g., the family, the state, or the financial system. And with dependence comes control: If support, even temporary support, is necessary for the achievement of any transformation, to withhold that support is to prevent or retard the transformation. Moreover, this control is increased if resources other than the individual's own time and effort are necessary for the achievement of the transformation. Thus, regulation of the availability of necessary inputs into the acquisition of capabilities, e.g., of schools and teachers, provides a further mechanism by which to control the flow of efficiency enhancing capabilities.

Ultimately, then, it is the sheer capital intensity of human capabilities, the magnitude of the investment (individual time and effort and other inputs) required to develop these capabilities, which creates a context within which restrictive control over efficiency-enhancing transformations of these capabilities can be imposed. The imposition of control over these transformations, however, may have one of two very different objectives. First, the objective may be to sustain the differentially advantageous position of immediate beneficiaries of change. Thus, for example, the immediate consequence of an increase in the effectiveness of medical intervention into the course of disease, e.g., as a result of scientific advances, will be to increase the demand for medical services and hence the incomes of established providers of these services. If the flow of new entrants into medical practice can be controlled, it may then be possible to sustain the differentially high earnings of these providers.

Second, and conversely, the magnitude of the threat to any group deriving from the emergence of new opportunities will rise with increases in the capital intensity of the threatened activity. In the absence of any specialized investment, incumbents will have little incentive to resist change, since they can cheaply transfer their efforts to any other activity for which no specialized investment is required. However, if the level of required investment is great, then any adverse change will imply possibly substantial capital losses, the threat of which will elicit serious opposition to change. Moreover, the-

resistance of those directly threatened will be augmented and reinforced by the resistance of those who are involved in the production of specialized human capital. Thus, the affected components of the educational system can be expected to act in concert with professional groups to preclude the realization of any efficiency-enhancing change which threatens the capital values of returns to professional training.

If relatively neutral, indirect institutional mechanisms were available by which to transfer control over resources to those desiring to undertake human capital investments (any modification of individual capacities), then education would be very greatly weakened as a locus of control over the adaptation of human capabilities. Only when resources are channeled through the educational system can education itself be exploited as a mechanism by which to control the allocation of human effort.

A second exploration for the role played by education in the control over the rate of exploitation of opportunities relates to the difficulties of certifying and insuring the capabilities of individuals. An important rationale for the imposition of control over entry into practice has been provided by the asserted need to protect society from the unscrupulous and incompetent. The degree to which this argument is politically compelling will depend upon the difficulty confronted by the average individual in assessing competence and upon the seriousness of the consequences of incompetence. But, if competence and integrity are difficult to assess directly, then the political response is likely to involve restrictions on the

characteristics of those admitted to practice rather than direct certification of the adequacy of performance. Here education has an obvious role, as a prescribable process of preparation, and it is this role which underlies the utilization of direct transfers of resources to education in preference to indirect transfers to individuals.

The origination of controls with the object of social protection, however, is not inconsistent with the actual utilization of control to enhance the positions of the ostensibly regulated, especially in a dynamic environment in which opportunities and constraints are undergoing continuous change. Thus, a tendency toward protection of the status quo is inherent in any system of control.

If the status quo results in the progressive enhancement of the positions of incumbents, then severe political pressures may result. The fundamental problem is the restriction on socially desirable reallocations of resources to activities. The only exemplification of that problem, however, may be the increasingly desirable status of incumbents. Naturally, then, political concerns may focus on the identities of the incumbents rather than on the protection of incumbency per se. This transformation of the issue will be facilitated by the incumbents themselves and by those associated with the apparatus of control, both of which will have an incentive to maintain the overall structure of the existing order.

The tendency toward protection of the status quo will have one other important consequence in a dynamic environment: a

progressive deterioration of the degree of articulation between the content of education and the evolving requisites of practice. Thus, a static configuration of system of practice will be conjoined with a static system of preparation and certification, neither of which will be responsive to the continued modification of opportunities and constraints.

It can be argued, then, that the two central issues in contemporary public policy toward education reflect different aspects of a single more fundamental problem. The political concern with "equity" in access to education and with the "effectiveness" of the educational process both arise from the role played by education, in fact if not by intention, in retarding the rate of social adaptation to change and the realization of opportunities to enhance efficiency.

## CHAPTER V

### HUMAN DIVERSITY/SOCIAL JUSTICE

Edmund W. Gordon

#### Introduction

In recent years increased attention has been directed to the problems involved in seeking to provide equal educational opportunity and a higher measure of equality in educational achievement across the very diverse populations of students for whom our schools and colleges share responsibility. These populations can be defined in a number of ways, but those groups most often referred to include blacks, chicanos, native Americans, and Puerto Ricans in the U.S., groups for whom English is not the dominant language, females, and the physically and mentally handicapped. There is a long and uneven history of attention given to the educational problems of these groups. At no point in that history, however, has there been more national attention and direction focused on these problems than during recent years in the U.S.A. Despite this unusual attention and effort there appears to be only modest progress in the achievement of equality of opportunity or outcomes. The implicit social commitment, the relatively large and varied efforts, and the rather modest results have contributed to a decline of interest in such efforts in some circles and to a re-examination of what it is we are about in other circles. It is the latter concern which prompts the writing of this paper.



What is equity in educational opportunity and educational outcomes in a society of diverse populations and pluralistic standards and values? By what criteria can we judge the achievement of either? Our concern for equity has most often been debated in legislative and judicial arenas. We have seen the establishment of constitutional provisions especially as reflected in the Bill of Rights. There are legislative provisions in federal and state laws. We have a long history of court decisions in support of equal justice and equal rights. Most of this concern has had as its focus the assurance of equity in regard to populations defined by ethnicity, sex, language, handicapping conditions, and to a lesser extent as defined by economic status. These legal expressions, however, have asserted the right to equality. The courts have sometimes ventured to specify the conditions of equality specific to a special problem such as in school desegregation. The meaning of equality, and the implications of that meaning for the functioning of the society and its institutions, has not been addressed in the judicial and legislative arenas.

In a very provocative book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls (1971) has sought to develop a conceptual basis for the examination and implementation of a system of justice in which a concern for fairness as an expression of equal treatment is a central feature. His effort (1971) at explicating a theory of justice rests upon two principles of justice. The first is:

Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all (p. 302).

His second principle holds that

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit to the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle (reasonable reserve for future generations), and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

Rawls qualifies these two principles with two priority rules: priority of liberty and priority of justice, over efficiency and welfare. With respect to the priority of liberty, the rule holds that liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty; for example, "a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all"; and a "less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with lesser liberty." With respect to the priority of justice, "the second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle." This rule is illustrated by two cases: 1) "an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with lesser opportunity"; 2) "an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of those bearing this hardship." Rawls summarizes with a general conception.

All social primary goods--liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self respect--are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored.

What we have in the Rawls' arguments is a rational basis for examining the human conditions and social circumstances which provide the data by which specifications for educational

equity can be established and meeting of such specifications can be evaluated. In this paper we examine several ways of looking at the relationship between human conditions, social circumstance, and the achievement of equity and conclude with an operationalized statement of the Rawls' principles as they apply to education.

One of the traditional roles of education in the U.S.A. has been to broaden opportunities for productive, influential, and rewarding participation in the affairs of the society by developing those skills and entry credentials necessary for economic survival and social satisfaction. The idea of education for all grew gradually. In this country we extended this opportunity to more and more of our people, by a steady increase in the quantity of educational experiences available and the quality of the educational product. While the quantity of available educational experiences has grown, there also has been a marked increase in the quality of the skills and competencies demanded of those who would achieve much. Similarly, the individual's goals are higher. He wants to be productive in the sense that the society sees his effort as resulting in a valued product; influential in the sense that her participation is viewed as having some influence on outcomes; and rewarded for her effort opt. materially and psychologically.

Increased perception of this role of education makes us want to equalize access to basic education of high quality. Spurred on by the Civil Rights Movement of 1950s and 1960s, equal opportunity in education has become an issue of crucial

national concern. It is regarded by many as the base for all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of membership in this modern democratic society.

Our country's desire to equalize educational opportunities is in part a product of advances in the organization and development of human societies during the past six centuries. In earlier periods when neither the need nor the resources for wide access to education existed, the ideal of universal equalization of education opportunities also did not exist--certainly not in the public policy sphere. The concept itself and the concern for its implementation could not have emerged as an important issue, even now, if we had not earlier developed an awareness of the universality of educability. Human societies have always considered educable those categories of persons thought to be needed in the maintenance of the social order. Consequently, as the human resource requirements of social orders have changed, concepts of educability have changed. Educability in human subjects has been defined less by the demonstrated potential of persons and more by the level of society's demand for people capable of certain levels of function. In more simplistic and exclusive systems most people were considered uneducable and effort was not "wasted" on their formal training. As long ago as the early Christian period and as recently as the early nineteenth century, it was only the religious and political nobility who were thought to be capable and worthy of academic learning. The social order was maintained by the machinations of these elite groups and the simple and routine

gaming, farming, and crafting skills of illiterate masses. Under the triple pressures of the reformation in religion, mechanization in industry, and institutionalization in commerce, categories of persons thought to be capable of academic learning were greatly expanded. Opportunities for active participation in religious activities and rituals made reading and writing more widely usable and salable skills. Similarly, the emergence of collective machine production in shops and the expansion of commerce and trade through institutions made necessary the broader distribution of these skills. The combined impact was a greatly increased societal need for computational and communicative skills in larger numbers of people. As a corollary, previously illiterate people were drawn into the small body of literates and the mass of "uneducables" was reduced.

In the United States, where religious freedom and diversity became widespread, where democracy in government became the ideal, and where industrialization and economic expansion advanced most rapidly, more and more literate persons were required. In early nineteenth century U.S.A., our society's view of who could be educated quickly expanded to include upper class women and all men in this country except for slaves. The combined efforts of the abolition and women's suffrage movements contributed to the continuing expansion of concepts of educability to include all white women and some blacks. With the end of slavery and the need to incorporate ex-slaves into the industrial labor force, ex-slaves gradually came to be regarded as educable. With brief, limited political power, uneducated

poor whites, blacks, and women literally forced increased access to public education as a vehicle for their own education. It was largely through their efforts during the Reconstruction Period that public schools were established throughout the land. These indigenous poor (black and white) were later joined by waves of immigrants who also saw the public school as their major route to economic and social salvation. In the metropolitan areas at the beginning of the twentieth century the school also became the major vocational training resource that prepared semi-skilled and commercial workers for rapidly expanding industrial and commercial establishments. Although the school did not succeed in educating all of these new candidates, the once narrowly defined concept of educability was now nearly universal in its inclusiveness.

Our conception of education has also changed over the years. In Thomas Jefferson's view the school was expected to provide the technical skills and basic knowledge necessary for work and economic survival. It was from newspapers, journals, and books, and from participation in politics that people were to be really educated. In reviewing Jefferson's position on education, Cremin (1965) has concluded that it never occurred to Jefferson that schooling would become the chief educational influence on the young. However, changes in the number and variety of persons served by the school, changes in the functioning of the society, and changes in the nature of the skills and competencies required by the social order have also changed the nature of education.

By the middle of the nineteenth century in this country, public schools serving the upper classes had developed curriculums basic to a liberal education. In this period the secondary school was quite selective and was designed to prepare relatively few young people for entrance into college where most of them would pursue studies leading to one of the professions. While this trend continued through the latter half of that century, the first half of the twentieth century was marked by a high degree of proliferation in the development of technical and vocational training programs. Preparation in the liberal arts was considered a luxury and was thought by some to be relatively useless. It was the Jeffersonian concept of utilitarian education which prevailed. And it was this utilitarian education which came to be the mode in the growing acceptance of universal educability. "Everyone can and should be taught to do useful work and to hold a job" was the prevalent view.

The wide acceptance of this view contributed to the salvaging of education for blacks following the betrayal of the Reconstruction Period and its leadership. In the great debate symbolized by conflict between Booker T. Washington and William E. B. DuBois, the real struggle was between those who stood for the narrow but practical vocational training of blacks and the poor so that they could work and those represented by DuBois who believed in the broad and somewhat less immediately practical education of the mind through the liberal arts and sciences. Those favoring vocational training won that debate. Educational facilities for blacks and other poor people slowly expanded under

the banner of technical and vocational training. This may have been a victory for expanded access to education, but the neglected concern for the "liberating" study of the arts and sciences made this a victory from which true equality in education has yet to recover.

In this country the major battle for equality of educational opportunity was first waged to establish public responsibility for the education of children in states where public education did not exist. This was followed by the struggle for adequate educational facilities and diverse educational programs. The twentieth century was one third spent before the struggle for equal though separate schools was engaged. By midcentury it was legally determined that in our society separate schools for different ethnic groups are intrinsically unequal. However, even before the 1954 Supreme Court school desegregation decision was promulgated, it was becoming clear that racially mixed school systems do not automatically insure education of high quality. This observation was supported by data on minority-group children from schools in the North where varying degrees and patterns of ethnic mix were extant. Although the performance of minority-group children in some of those schools was superior to that of such children in segregated systems in the South, differences in achievement and in the characteristics of their schools were notable.

The early 1960s brought campaigns to provide education of high quality in ethnically integrated school settings. Some school systems responded with plans for the redistribution of



school populations in efforts to achieve a higher degree of ethnic balance. Some of those, along with other schools, introduced special enrichment and remedial programs intended to compensate for or correct deficiencies in the preparation of the children or the quality of the schools. Neither these efforts at achieving integrated education nor efforts at developing compensatory education resulted in success. Ethnic balance and educational programs of high quality proved impossible to achieve instantaneously. Confronted with the failure to obtain ethnic integration and high quality in education, and given the recalcitrant presence of segregation in schools North, South, and West, the goals for many minority-group parents shifted. In the late 1960s the demand was made for education of high quality, where possible, on an ethnically integrated basis. However, where segregation existed (and it did exist for the ethnic minorities in this country), the demand increased for control of those schools, serving such children, by groups indigenous to the cultures and communities in which they live. Hence the demand for "black schools run by black people."

Alongside this growing acceptance and promotion of ethnic separation, there continued to be concern for ethnic integration in education and compensatory education as complementary strategies in the equalization of educational opportunity. The introduction of the concept "compensatory education" grew out of the recognition that learners who did not begin from the same point may not have comparable opportunities for

achievement when provided with equal and similar educational experiences. To make the opportunity equal, it is argued, it may be necessary to make education something more than equal. It may be necessary to compensate for the handicaps if we are to provide education of equal quality. It may be necessary to change the educational method and create new models in order to meet the learning need and style of the youngster who comes to school out of a different background of experiences.

Out of this concern for equalizing educational opportunity, some thoughtful persons began to think about what the criterion should be. This became a problem of critical importance when Congress placed on the Office of Education the responsibility for determining the status of equal opportunity for education in the U.S.A. James Coleman, the principal investigator for that study, used equality of educational achievement as his criterion. Coleman argued that it is one of the functions of the school to make academic achievement independent of the social background of its pupils. This view holds that the adequate school experience should enable groups of youngsters from different backgrounds to reach the same levels of academic achievement. When the schools do not compensate for the variations in the background experiences of their pupils, they are failing to provide equal educational opportunity. This position assumes general comparability of potential for learning and has not been advanced as applicable in cases of intellectual incompetence.

There have been several attempts to define equality of educational opportunity or to suggest criteria for assessing its degree. Havinghurst (1944) has advanced a position based upon a match between measured intelligence and length of guaranteed educational opportunity if all children and young people exceeding a given level of intellectual ability were enabled to attend schools and colleges up to some specified level. Following this position, if all youth with I.Q.s higher than 100 were assured of a high-school education up to the age of 18 and all young people with I.Q.s over 110 were able to attend college for four years, "we could say that equality of educational opportunity existed to a considerable degree."

Equal education does not mean the same education, according to Tumin (1965), but it does mean equal concern

that each child shall become the most and the best that he can become. . . equal pleasure expressed by the teacher with equal vigor at every child's attempt to become something more than he was, or equal distress expressed with an equal amount of feeling at his being unable to become something more than he was. . . and equal rewards for all children, in terms of time, attention, and any symbol the school hands out which stands for its judgment of worthiness. . . . Equal rewards mean. . . the elimination of competitive grades. . . . One simply takes the child and teaches him for a given period of time what one thinks it is important to teach. When he learns that, he then goes on to the next thing. . . . The maintenance of the high standards in public education is achieved by getting out of children the most that each child has in him. Any other notion of high standards fails to take into account the different capacities for development and growth of large numbers of children. Equality of education. . . is the only device that I know of for the maintenance of high standards, as against the false measure that relies on the achievement of the elite minority of the school.

Tyler (1967) argued that since children come to school with different abilities the criterion should be that the learning process continue even though one child's rate may exceed another's. He feels that children do not have equal educational opportunity until the meaningfulness, the stimulation, and the conditions for learning are equal among the various children in the school. One measure of equality is that every child is learning. Tyler holds the teacher responsible for insuring that some learning takes place as long as the child remains in schools. Negatively, equal educational opportunity is not provided simply by having materials there and time available for learning. Rather, the child himself must perceive the opportunities, feel confident that he can do something with them, and find them within his ability to carry on. Furthermore, according to Tyler, learning should promote a broader range of choice rather than continually narrowing the youngster so that after several years of education he has only one possible direction that he can go.

Lesser and Stodolsky (1967) have advanced a view of the equality of education opportunity which is based in part on Lesser's finding of differential patterns of intellectual function distributed by ethnic group identification. These investigators argue that equal opportunity is provided if the school makes maximum use of the distinctive pattern of ability the child possesses. The school would be held responsible for providing differential education experiences designed to build upon the special abilities the child brings to the learning.

experience. Thus, if adequate achievement is demonstrated in that special abilities area, the school can be judged to have provided an equal opportunity to learn.

Kenneth Clark (1965) has advanced a more simplistic view. He feels that it is possible to identify certain essential features of good education. Education which includes the best expressions of those features should be made available to all children alike. Clark argues that if just that goal were achieved, we would have moved a long way toward providing equal educational opportunity. He rejects as destructive the search for deficiencies and special characteristics in black children. Rather, his focus is on the deficiencies and special negative characteristics in the schools and the teachers who inhabit them. For Clark, equalizing the opportunity involves the removal of the burdens of poor teaching, negative teacher attitudes, and inadequate educational resources from the shoulders of minority-group children.

Gordon (1972) has discussed the strengths and limitations of equity as defined in each of the conceptions above and argues that equality of outcomes in relation to the achievement of specific basic competencies should be our goal. This conception acknowledges that some children will be better at learning some things than at learning others. Differential levels of achievement will certainly result. But these differences in achievement need not be primarily determined by cultural, economic, ethnic, language or sex group status. Rather, variance in achievement should reflect variations in

the quality of function found among individuals within and across these groups. But this variance should not and need not include achievement below the survival level of functional basic competencies. The Gordon conception asserts that equality of educational opportunity would mean the achievement of at least the basic competencies in all pupils save the 3 percent to 5 percent who are truly mentally defective. To make the opportunity equal, the school would have to develop and use whatever methods, materials, or procedures required by the special abilities, style, or special background the child may bring.

Equal educational opportunity in a diverse and pluralistic society demands that although what children bring to the school is diverse and unequal, what the school puts in may have to be distributed unequally and customized in order to insure that what the school produces is at least equal at the basic levels of the achievement of competence. Equalization of educational opportunity in a democracy requires parity in achievement at a baseline corresponding to the level required for social satisfaction and productive democratic participation. It also demands opportunity and freedom to vary with respect to achievement ceilings. It is in the reconciliation of these sometimes conflicting requirements that equality of opportunity is tested. At some points in the development of a society it may be necessary to favor universality to the disadvantage of uniqueness. At other times universality may need to be sacrificed in the interest of unique achievements. If

preferential attention is continuously given to one to the neglect of the other, equality of opportunity is precluded. That the schools may not yet know how to provide this individualized, specialized, and diversified treatment and to creatively respond to the dialectical needs of pupils and society is a central part of the problem. That we pose the issues and actively pursue solutions, which inform policy and practice, may be the purpose that best defines the work of those of us who actively pursue educational equity and social justice.

The Rawls principles of justice and the varied definitional emphases discussed above suggest that there are two over-riding questions or issues with which we must be concerned.

1. Since equity at one level means fairness, we have the problem of how to reduce or eliminate educational neglect of some subgroups in our population and the inequitable distribution of known treatments and available resources across the varied populations served by education. The problem here is primarily that of better enabling our institutions of education to provide equal protection--equal service to all of their clientele. Solutions to this problem are more likely to take the form of changes in law, regulations, policy, budget, management, etc., changes in the organization and structure of educational service delivery systems, and systemic changes in the agencies and institutions of education. The goal is to make available to all the best that the state provides to any particular segment of the population.



2. Since equity at another level means justice or sufficiency of service to achieve some common criterion without limiting the privilege to exceed that standard, we have the problem of correcting inadequately developed treatments and insufficiently allocated resources sufficient to meet the differential requirements essential to the achievement of an agreed upon level of competence. Unlike our first issue, the problem as posed here takes us beyond policy, regulation, management, budget, political, and economic considerations (but includes these) to a concern with the person, environment, situation interactions which determine outcomes. The concern here is with functional aspects of the system and the functional aspects of the characteristics and needs of the human and non-human vectors in that system. The problem involves analysis, design, and continuous involvement in the adjustment of services. The goal is to make available to each that which is essential to the achievement of the criterion.

Issue number one is the problem that the courts have very adequately enunciated: unequal access by subgroups of the population to the public educational resources of the state is unlawful. Educational institutions are thus required to stop the arbitrary segregation of pupils by race or ethnicity; to end their failure to provide appropriate and sufficient instruction to non-English-speaking students; to end their failure to provide educational options and services for females that are as rich as those available to males; and to end their failure to deal adequately with students whom the schools view



as disruptive or incompatible. In correcting conditions like these what we are doing is trying to change the validity of existing predictions by introducing correctives for the failures or errors of the system. The strategy is based on the assumption that much of what we currently deliver or know how to deliver can greatly improve the function of a possible majority of our pupils. What Bloom and Clarke, commenting from different perspectives, have suggested is that we have targeted these efforts on too limited a number of pupils and often on select groups of pupils. Bloom argues that generic interventions directed at correcting schooling errors seem to have the possibility for bringing as many as 80 percent of our pupils to the level of criterion mastery. As described, his corrective intervention involves the policy decision to allocate progressively more instructional time in relation to demonstrated difficulty with criterion mastery. As a starter, this strategy would insure that all pupils have exposure to that which we know how to deliver. This systemic change begins to acquire individual specificity as time of exposure is influenced by pupil need. Those pupils in need of greater exposure would receive greater exposure.

It is the problems posed by differential pupil conditions, needs, and response patterns that led to the recognition of the problem enunciated by Coleman, that of making school achievement independent of the social conditions and prior social status of the pupil. Coleman was sensitive primarily to differences in social class and ethnic caste. In pursuit of solutions to

that problem, we may have focused too sharply on the political dimensions of the problem and insufficiently on the pedagogical dimensions. It may be that as important as are ethnicity, SES, language, sex, even geographic origin as group indicators of the political dimensions of the problem, they are insufficient to inform the pedagogical dimensions. It may be that they are too gross and irrelevant as surrogate indicators for pedagogical need in educational design and planning. Increasingly, the evidence points to dimensions of diversity that appear to have high relevance for pedagogy that vary as much within language, ethnic, and class groups as between them. For example cognitive style, interest, motivation, aspiration, temperament, learning rate--to mention a few--are not class or ethnic group bound variables. Increasingly, even variables related to social practice, such as child rearing practices, support for learning, parents' aspirations for their children, are beginning to be so heterogeneous with respect to the indicator groups as to make ethnicity, SES, and occupational status less useful than they were once thought to be as indicators of the extent to which exposure to such practice is a part of the life experience of the children identified by these group labels.

The evidence increasingly suggests that wide variance exists in the character and quality of the learning behaviors that children bring to and develop in school. It also appears (conceded that it is with less clear evidence) that the conditions under which learning and development occur influence the quality

of achievement as does the character of the learning behavior evidenced. It is possible to conclude that the relationships between character of the learning behavior and character (length, nature, and appropriateness, for example) of the learning conditions may be of crucial importance as determinants of the quality of achievement. If this somewhat

complex statement of a rather simple conception holds, it has critical significance for conceptualizing the central issue involved in planning adequate educational programs for children of diverse human characteristics, and particularly those children who traditionally have been less well served by our educational systems--the poor, those discriminated against, the disadvantaged.

For more than a score of years, the concept "equal educational opportunity" has dominated our thinking. The concept grew out of court litigations around issues related to ethnic segregation in public education and distributive inequality in resource allocation. As a result the nation has affirmed its commitment to equality of educational opportunity for all and has translated this to mean equal access to the educational resources provided through public funds. But equal opportunity may not adequately reflect the implicit commitments of a democratic, diverse, pluralistic, and humane society. If what we are committed to is to make educational and other achievements independent of ethnic group, social class, sex group, or language group and less dependent on the functional characteristics of the learner, a concept such as human diversity with social justice may be more worthy of our traditions.

A commitment to such a concept is not alien to our thinking. Earlier in this century a refugee from Hitler's Germany came to this country and contributed mightily to the theoretical underpinnings of the sciences of behavior. Kurt Lewin, in his concept of field theory, postulated that behavior is a function of the interaction between personalistic characteristics and environmental characteristics-- $B=f(PE)$ . Although there has been no serious challenge to this postulate or its subsequent elaborations, the thinking reflected in this conceptualization has never been adequately represented in education. The formula does, however, provide a basis for the implementation of the Rawls principles of justice through the adaptation of educational treatments to the diversity found in human characteristics and environments, with special attention being given to the needs of those who are most disadvantaged by the organization and functioning of the system.

Human diversity focuses our attention on those aspects of variance in human characteristics which have relevance for pedagogical and developmental intervention. Social justice moves us beyond a concern for distributive equality to a concern for distributive sufficiency. When we speak of distributive sufficiency we are immediately forced to look to questions of need rather than share. The functional educational question becomes, "What do the special characteristics of this person require of the intervening process to enable this person to function with adequacy and satisfaction?" We are forced to ask not only what is essential but also what is sufficient to

enable achievement. The answer to the question dictates the quality and the quantity of the educational intervention.

The intervention indicated may violate our more narrow conceptions of equality (impartiality), but given the compelling facts of human diversity, it may be the only way in which we can approach social justice. To honor, then, the implicit commitment to equality of opportunity we may be required to embrace a new commitment to the nurturance of human diversity in the pursuit of social justice.

SECTION III

THEORY OF MAKING THE SYSTEM EQUITABLE

## CHAPTER VI

### BEYOND "EQUAL" EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Joseph Marr Cronin

State and local school officials have learned to administer more than one kind of equal opportunity. Prior to 1954 and the major desegregation cases, the biggest equity question most local superintendents had to face was how to bring older school buildings up to the same standard of excellence as the latest new building. Equal treatment usually meant applying consistently the local board rule that said that a first grader, no matter how bright, had to be six years old as of a specified month.

Equality more recently has meant an end to racial segregation, sex discrimination, forced retirements of older employees, and very often has meant the use of courts to seek a just system of state financial aid to local schools. Each new definition of equality has disrupted established routines and comfortable procedures. Educators, to satisfy federal officials, now must sign not one, but dozens of assurances saying in effect--yes, we are an equal opportunity employer; no, we will not discriminate in assigning students to class; yes, we will provide instruction to non-English-speaking students in their own language; and no, we will not deny handicapped persons access to our facilities.

The question now for many educators is "what comes next?" What are the frontiers of educational opportunity?

What have educators failed to provide or what services and help will educational consumers want in the years ahead? Can the new demands be justified? What are the grounds for justification? In discussing the future of educational opportunity, what other adjectives besides "equal" seem to fit? Or, while retaining loyalty to the concept of "equality" or "equity," might there be other terms which further define the future expansion of educational opportunities? These questions shape the course of the chapter.

The first line of inquiry is over the availability of opportunity and what constitutes full or sufficient opportunity. The best current example is the education of the handicapped where thoughtful advocates noticed that some students are properly served, others unserved, and others underserved or only partially served. Who else is underserved or unserved? These distinctions prompt a look at the adult population which during the 1980s will catch the attention of educators for at least two reasons:

1. The nation is experiencing a dramatic decline in the number of six-to-seventeen year olds, and educators are beginning to consider new audiences and clientele;
2. Many adults did not complete high school, and even those who have now need additional courses to qualify for a new job, to maintain their license, or to prepare for retirement living.

What is needed is a discussion of "full service" or adequate educational opportunity and how we might proceed to



build meaning into the cliché "life-long learning." The prevailing reaction to demographic trends by educators appears to be one of profound pessimism about shrinking resources and the inevitability of no growth policies; but has sufficient thought been given to the emerging needs of adult professionals and to the even more dramatic increase in the number of older Americans?

A second line of questioning is about what constitutes appropriate educational opportunity for individuals. Most discussions of educational opportunity pursue equality for an entire class of people: blacks, Hispanics, women, elderly, inmates, the handicapped, among others. To what extent does the individual need provision for his or her uniqueness?

Again we are indebted to the present-day architects of handicapped children policy for they have required implementation of what has long been advocated for all children--an individualized education plan. If the severely retarded are to profit from a hand-tailored education prescription, why then can't the very talented child be given an individualized program? This question when pursued by aroused parents will generate a new plea for individual opportunity for education, followed by a call for an extension of such rights to the regular or normal child.

A third tack is that of "diversified educational opportunity," or having a choice among educational options. A few of the earlier advocates for school aid equalization now move on to a more provocative assertion: that parents and not

bureaucracies should decide what kind of an education their children will have. Does equality exist only within the public school? Can a child enroll in more than one school simultaneously to pursue the opportunities that child needs? What else besides schooling constitutes education in these times?

These three inquiries will test further the assertion that educators today can live with multiple definitions of equality. We are poorly served by simple models of equity which linger over Procrustean notions of equal expenditures--equal results or allocations along the lines of "one dollar--one scholar." These are not voting rights or mass transit systems under discussion. We are dealing with the bewildering complexity of human beings and their infinite variety of talents, flaws, needs, and ambitions.

Occasionally one must ponder the education of Winston Churchill who during his youth was expelled from seven different schools. How would he (his mother was an American) have fared in contemporary U.S. schools? Would he have found happiness in a well-financed, large, suburban, racially-integrated, sex equity, handicap-accessed high school? Was this enough opportunity? The very question is sobering. For this reason, and to improve the debate over the future of educational opportunity, it makes sense to search for new meanings and possible applications of new ways to define "opportunity" in and for education.

This chapter does not discuss the contemporary issues of minimal competencies or basic skills for all. The search instead is for the frontiers, the margins of educational

demands that will expand between 1980 and the year 2000. The assumption that resources are growing scarcer is rejected in favor of a competitive assertion that special interest groups including older Americans and employed professionals will create new expectations and demands for expanded educational opportunities. Since the number of children will decrease during the 1980s, one assumes that adult groups may seize the opportunity to advance their claims that certain new improvements and programs can now be made available.

Adequate Opportunity for Education:  
The Unserved and Underserved

The Education of All Handicapped Children Act (94-142) was enacted because Congress was persuaded that millions of children and young adults (ages 3-21) were excluded from education unfairly. The Congress declared its intention that all children be educated to the limits of their ability, and that state and local school officials actively search out, find, and place these children in appropriate programs.

The Council for Exceptional Children, a national lobby, suggested that even though as many as 12 percent of all children have mild or severe handicaps, dozens of states were serving 4 percent or less, with very few states educating as many as 7 or 8 percent. The Congress heard testimony that tens of thousands of children were unserved because schools had no programs or would not accept the children as educable. It was charged that wealthy parents paid for private school education for such children while the poor kept their children at home.

Thousands of others were simply warehoused in the large, impersonal residential facilities for mentally retarded or multiply handicapped children.

The federal law, subsequently enacted, has many flaws. It treats whole states and school systems as sinners and assumes their guilt. It prescribes the remedies in endless bureaucratic detail. It is a classic case of the "Federal Takeover" which critique has already been argued elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> But the law with all the attendant regulations does suggest that eligible students be sorted into three broad categories: those already served, the underserved, and the unserved.

Section 612(3) states that in order for a state to qualify for assistance under Part B (of the law), the State must demonstrate that it "has established priorities for providing a free appropriate public education to all handicapped children, within each disability, with the most severe handicaps who are receiving an inadequate education and have made adequate progress in meeting the timetables set forth in Section 612(2) (b)."<sup>2</sup>

The concept advanced here is a refinement or expansion of the doctrine of equal educational opportunity. Each state is required to pledge full educational opportunity including a description of the public awareness, identification of needs,

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<sup>1</sup>Joseph M. Cronin, "The Federal Takeover: Should the Junior Partner Run the Firm," Phi Delta Kappan 57 No. 8 (April 1976): 499-501.

<sup>2</sup>Public Law 94-142, Section 512 (a) and (b).

program of services, and subsequent evaluation of pupil progress.

Previous civil rights bills stressed equal access, equal resources, equal opportunity to the same services other children enjoyed. Here was a statute that recognized that categories of children--deaf, blind, retarded, or otherwise disabled--need, not similar services, but very special services.

The Congress did not invent this idea. Parents of the handicapped, along with psychologists and special educators, already had persuaded several state legislatures to enact laws requiring all students to be counted and served. Beginning with the "educable" handicapped (only later the "trainable" or much less verbal child) and gradually moving into other categories, states over the years agreed to support financially programs in local schools. For most of this century, public policy was to place the severely handicapped, physically or mentally, in separate residential institutions absolving the local community of any responsibility. As this enforced separation and isolation became discredited, largely through periodic exposés of scandalous neglect, the doctrine of the "least restrictive placement" and preference for local community programs gained in favor.

The assignment of responsibility for providing an opportunity for educating handicapped children changed in several ways:

1. From the parent alone to a new partnership with state and local agencies;

2. From remote institutions to, where feasible, local schools;

3. From a variety of agencies (uncoordinated) to the state education agency, at least for coordination, planning, and supervision;

4. From custodial service to a focus on appropriate education and training for the child;

5. From the usual age 5-17 span to age 3 (or from birth for certain children) to age 21 or until self-sufficient if that be possible.

Most of the above constitutes an expansion of opportunity and an enlargement beyond those services equally available to regular or normal children. Clearly handicapped children need extra help and some need extraordinary services. They require special opportunity, a fuller array of services than usually found in conventional classrooms.

Illinois was among the dozen or so states which already offered a full array of programs. Since 1969 special education by statute was a mandated, not optional, program. By the early 1970s more than 100,000 children were in programs; and according to the federally required "child find" and special education census of 1977, some 220,000 children were receiving handicapped educational services.

The federal government asked what percentage of Illinois handicapped children were receiving "full educational opportunities" during 1977-78. Illinois reported 99 or 100 percent full services for only three of the nine district federal categories:

of disability for ages 3-5 or 6-17. The hard-of-hearing children and the seriously emotionally disturbed children were among those not fully served. Table I documents the expectations that within two years for ages 3-17 and within four years for ages 18-21 "full opportunity" would be realized for all Illinois handicapped. Note that the state agreed to do this even while it was far from certain that sufficient federal dollars would flow to cover the increased costs.

Previously parents dissatisfied with a public school program could opt for a private placement and pay tuition for the special education program. The new law expanded parental opportunity in the form of requiring that "appropriate" placements be free. Furthermore, parents could appeal a local school placement decision, insist on an impartial hearing, call for periodic evaluations of a child's progress and of the "appropriateness" of the program, and in other ways participate in the decision-making about the program. These rights and opportunities are new, sweeping, and rather revolutionary considering the rather passive role usually assigned to pupils and parents by educators around the world.

Other features of the new law will be discussed later, but the "Full Opportunity" concept clearly requires further discussion.

Who else should have full opportunity to education? Who doesn't have it now? Does the concept apply only to children or to adults as well? By education do we mean an opportunity for education through the high school diploma or as much as one

TABLE I. - DETAILED TIMETABLE <sup>3</sup>DATE  
June 15, 1977NAME OF STATE  
Illinois

Show the percent (%) of the State's population of handicapped children expected to be receiving full educational opportunities in each school year. In the appropriate cells, estimate the year you expect all children to be provided full educational opportunities (full service).

HANDICAPPING CONDITIONS	A. AGES 3 THRU 5			B. AGES 6 THRU 17		C. AGES 18 THRU 21					D. AGES 0 THRU 2 ESTIMATE THE YEAR FULL SERVICES ARE EXPECTED TO BE REACHED. SCHOOL YEAR NON-CATEGORIAL
	SCHOOL YEAR 1977-78 (%)	SCHOOL YEAR 1978-79 (%)	ESTIMATE YEAR OF FULL SERVICE	SCHOOL YEAR 1977-78 (%)	SCHOOL YEAR 1978-79 (%)	SCHOOL YEAR 1977-78 (%)	SCHOOL YEAR 1978-79 (%)	SCHOOL YEAR 1979-80 (%)	SCHOOL YEAR 1980-81 (%)	ESTIMATE YEAR OF FULL SERVICE	
a. Mentally Retarded	90	100	1978	90	100	83	90	95	100	1980	1985
b. Hard of Hearing	45	100	1978	45	100	35	45	55	100	1980	
c. Deaf	99	100	1978	99	100	98	99	100	100	1980	
d. Speech Impaired	88	100	1978	88	100	84	88	95	100	1980	
e. Visually Handicapped	88	100	1978	88	100	83	88	95	100	1980	
f. Seriously Emotionally Disturbed	54	100	1978	54	100	38	54	70	100	1980	
g. Orthopedically Impaired	100	100	1978	100	100	100	100	100	100	1980	
h. Health Impaired	100	100	1978	100	100	100	100	100	100	1980	
i. Specific Learning Disability	91	100	1978	91	100	88	91	95	100	1980	

<sup>3</sup> If the requirements are inconsistent with your State law, or practice, estimate the year you expect to reach full services in these areas.

<sup>3</sup> Table I--Illinois State Plan for the Handicapped, 3-17, 18-21, for 1977-78.



needs to get or keep a job? Does it mean an education for an older person facing the special perils of retirement with very modest savings and uncertain health? Who are the unserved and underserved in life who need a "full educational opportunity"? Which are the likely and legitimate claimants, perhaps citing the "All Handicapped Children" Act as precedent and guidepost?

### Adults

The Illinois Constitution in 1970 was changed by popular vote on the recommendation of Constitutional Convention of leading citizens. Removal of the age limit (21) to a free high school education paved the way for expanded programs for underserved adults, who for various reasons missed the chance for at least a high school education. Why has the public attitude begun to shift on adult education?

Adult education for decades carried two images:

1. Citizenship instruction and basic English literacy for immigrants new to our country;
2. Cake-baking, oil painting, or macrame instruction for the sufficiently educated person looking for new ways to use leisure time.

During the 1970s, opportunities for adult education multiplied. The U.S. government will now reimburse states and local education authorities for a substantial portion of costs of educating all citizens up to the level of a high school education. Another federal social services program rewards states for improving the education levels of welfare recipients

so that they can qualify for jobs and become self-sufficient.

State laws generally compel students to stay in school until age sixteen. Most students older than that have in effect chosen the option of staying to complete their education.

A high school diploma has not automatically been as much a right as an opportunity. Usually a diploma was not required except for college or university admissions and the higher learning needed for the professions.

American employers, law enforcement officials, and labor policy managers want an educated youth capable of following directions, reading instructions, filling out forms, beginning and finishing work on time, and understanding enough of science and civics to work in a bureaucracy. At times in the past, educators have been less eager to provide opportunities to finish high school than were social workers, juvenile court judges, rehabilitation workers, and other youth advocates. Academic instructors on occasion long for the reduction or repeal of compulsory attendance age laws, but the pressure is on nowadays to find ways to achieve universal literacy, full employability, and a high school diploma or equivalent for all.

As opportunities to get a job without a high school diploma shrink, the opportunity to complete high school work becomes more important. Generally in America from 75 to 80 percent of all students complete 12 years of school by age nineteen, a magnificent accomplishment when compared to the rest of the world. In Illinois 5 percent of the students drop out each year, a rate fairly constant from 1970-1980. Of the

450,000 students in grades 10-12, approximately 4,000 are expelled from school each year. The Children's Defense Fund and other groups no longer consider this and other exclusion practices tolerable.

Employers no longer accept high school dropouts or under-educated adults as willingly as they did years ago. Many unskilled jobs are now automated. Factory equipment is more expensive and safety instructions require careful reading and comprehension. The military services definitely prefer high school graduates now and usually recommend that younger volunteers secure the diploma prior to enlistment.

The 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention eliminated the age limit in the section asserting that free public education was the right of every person up to age 21. If other states follow, as many as several million citizens in each of the larger states would be eligible for basic literacy education, while now, in most cases, adult citizens are required to pay for the instruction regardless of need.

The larger society is ready to try to hold all students in high school until graduation. City and suburban school boards have begun to develop "alternative high schools" to provide more comfortable or supportive settings for non-conforming students. Separate schools, resource rooms, classes, or centers for "behaviorally disturbed" adolescents try to hold deviant and troublesome pupils in school. Vocational educators invent work-study program opportunities to help entice economically disadvantaged or marginal students to stay enrolled in school.

The federal government wants to reduce teenage unemployment as part of a national manpower policy. The Congress created the Youth Employment Demonstration Program to try to entice employers to hire and help young citizens grow in skill. A variation of the old Youth Conservation Corps was revived to keep outdoors-minded students at work and in training programs.

So also have juvenile correction officials tried to expand educational offerings including basic education and vocational courses even for those detained or sentenced for a few months. Special education courses and bilingual programs more lately have been initiated as a matter of entitlement for inmates who lack education. All of these efforts represent an expansion of opportunity to the underserved younger adult.

States have been reluctant to raise the age of compulsory education. California for many years tried to insist that dropouts enroll in "continuation school" courses at night. Such provisions are difficult to enforce. Dropouts resist returning to a hostile familiar environment, especially if they equate school with a string of failures.

Community colleges in many states want to serve adult learners by offering basic education courses. This they do in cooperation with state education agencies, which guard the right to grant high school diplomas and their general education equivalent, the G.E.D. test, administered under the auspices of the American Council on Education. Continuing educators sense that education to and beyond the high school level is now generally expected, and that both high schools and colleges should actively

seek out and entice students to return to finish high school.

The larger society may press for even more options for the 10 to 20 percent of youth not now fully served by existing high school programs. The large comprehensive high school serves millions of youth well but does not hold the loyalty or attendance of hundreds of thousands of others. "Opportunity" will mean in future years the expansion of alternative schools, special schools and centers, and juvenile correction programs. Youth may be allowed, even encouraged, to intersperse work with study as part of a systematic motivation and career development strategy. Previously when a child left school it was to enter the world forever--no return to school was possible. Now school and manpower officials are asked to find ways to ease the transition from school to work, expand simultaneous work and study options, and pave the way for credit for on-the-job learning and for re-entry to additional education opportunities when needed.<sup>4</sup>

Still another kind of opportunity is for adult professionals to continue their education. Traditionally the chance to take courses has been essential to the nurse who aspired to become a supervisor or to the social worker or teacher who sought to become an administrator. Advancement is no longer the main reason for additional study.

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<sup>4</sup>Willard Wirtz, The Boundless Resource: A Prospectus for an Education-work Policy (New York: E. P. Dutton Co., 1975).

Gradually the concept of continuing education or "lifelong learning" is perceived as an opportunity to grow personally and professionally while a member of any occupation with a technical knowledge base. In fact, some of the professions such as medicine, dentistry, and mental health have begun to consider continuing education not only an opportunity but as an obligation for persons to keep up with scientific and technical advances necessary to serve patients and clients.

The American Nurses' Association, for example, defines continuing education as "planned learning experiences, beyond basic nursing education, designed to develop knowledge, skills and attitudes to improve health care to the public."<sup>5</sup>

One form of experience is the short course or seminar in a specific topic such as "acidosis and alkalosis," clinical electrocardiography, ethics, malpractice, or physical assessment. Colleges and universities, the typical providers of continuing education units (CEUs), now face competition from free-lance, non-profit or proprietary health education groups. Still other courses are offered on a correspondence school or home study basis.

The newest development is the decision by state health agencies or health licensing boards to require continuing education units as a condition for maintaining an up-to-date license. California in 1974 was the first of several states to mandate

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<sup>5</sup>Gloria Hochman, et al., "Continuing Education: How Can You Make the Most of It," Nursing, 8, No. 12 (December 1978): 32.

participation for nurses in in-service education experiences. Other states have already begun to follow suit.

Mandated continuing education remains a controversial issue in most of the health and social service professions. Critics ask whether compulsory study will actually improve practices and standards of care. Does additional classroom work make as much difference as on-the-job learning? Will professionals have the opportunity to choose the courses or workshops related to their own needs?

Legislatures and governmental bodies are now deciding that the clients, patients, and consumers should be assured care from practitioners with current training and techniques. Yesterday's knowledge--the education of several decades ago--is no longer deemed adequate. The issues have changed from ones of voluntary opportunities for advancement to ones of required opportunities to up-date one's skills simply to maintain one's current license and job. Adult professionals will most likely insist that educational opportunities be relevant, useful, and convenient. They will ask for choice in both content and mode--that is, whether the program is at a university or, at the mental hospital where they work, and offered outside of or "on company time." They may ask for a choice as to whether they listen to instruction in a classroom or on an audio cassette in their car, or whether they may take a home study course and subsequently an exam on the content.

Thus the larger society is insisting on better-educated professionals with modern information. The availability of life-long learning multiplies as the option of continuing

education becomes an obligation. Government boards want more adult education in order to guarantee consumer rights to best practices of quality care. Doctors, nurses, lawyers, and teachers at the same time begin to feel they need study seminars on malpractice suits and how to avoid them. This is a new type of opportunity and, even more, a new application of compulsory education for adults.

### Older Americans

Does educational opportunity end with education for or during one's career? Should any further opportunity be extended to adults? What if any special opportunities ought to be available to older Americans?

In 1971 White House Conference on Aging included education as a priority. "Education is a basic right of all persons of all age groups. It is continuous and henceforth one of the ways of enabling older persons to have a full and meaningful life, and as a means of helping them develop their potential as a resource for the betterment of society."<sup>6</sup>

Federal policy-makers have responded positively by approving the Older Americans Act and encouraging the growth of state and local councils on the aging. Education is viewed as an important program priority. As Florida Congressman Claude Pepper, Chairman of the House Special Committee on Aging, said,

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<sup>6</sup>Towards a National Policy on Aging, Proceedings of the 1971 White House Conference on Aging, Washington, D.C., Vol. II, p. 61.



In terms of formal schooling, older people are the most poorly educated segment of the population. Studies reveal, however, that older persons are capable of an educational response far greater than that currently achieved by existing opportunities.<sup>7</sup>

What opportunities do older Americans need? The most common needs include:

1. Preparation for retirement on reduced and sometimes fixed incomes requiring new types of budgeting and financial management, e.g., of purchases and/or investments;

2. Health and physical advice for coping with the special problems of aging, including information on drugs and adequate nutrition;

3. Consumer protection instruction on how to avoid the exploitation schemes.

Other opportunities sought by older Americans include:

1. Study of the humanities and other aesthetic course opportunities deferred during the wage earnings and child rearing years--courses such as a Great Books;

2. The chance to qualify for volunteer work in libraries, small businesses, schools, and counseling centers--all of which need help;

3. Study of genealogy and the opportunity to prepare personal notes or even a biography of the Roots genre, documenting one's heritage for future generations.

The first round of responses to the expressed needs of older Americans in many states was paternalistic--free courses

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<sup>7</sup> Congressional Record, 2124 No. 32, Washington, D.C., March 8, 1978.

were offered in public colleges on a "seats available" basis, a pattern which assumes abject poverty and may assault the self-esteem of recipients. The next and more responsible approach is to survey older citizens concerning their needs and aspirations and devise appropriate educational opportunities.

Demographers suggest that those persons who reach 65 years of age are likely to live another 12 to 20 years, longer for women (the stronger sex). Sunbelt states and other communities with a high retirement age must plan for this phenomenon and the implications for educational opportunity.

The schools also have begun to offer auxiliary services of special values to older Americans:

1. Counseling and conversely the opportunity to counsel a younger generation in the school;
2. Recreation, including access to music, art, and certain other opportunities from shuffleboard and bowling to cycling and jogging tracks.
3. Low cost meals, especially lunch, providing the special caloric requirements for this age group are met by School Food Nutritionists.

Consider the fact that so many of the existing schools and colleges today would be utilized not by an indigent group but by those who through taxes paid for the building. Education cannot afford to ignore this huge and expanding group whose need for service has been underestimated.

The older American is either unserved or underserved largely because of a traditional preoccupation with, and even

prejudice on behalf of, the young. Aging is in fact a parallel process with sometimes painful declines in mental and physical capabilities. Spouses over 60 years of age may need help, training, and counsel. As the number of children in schools diminishes during the 1980s, the numbers of older citizens will increase. The latter will advance civil rights arguments as well as humanistic pleas for continuing education opportunities both prior to and after retirement.

#### Appropriate Opportunity for Individuals

Education rarely lives up to the rhetoric of the last one hundred years--that education is designed for individuals and responds to individual needs and differences. Especially mass education in public schools provides mainly for groups or classes of individuals. Everyone "graduating" knows what class he or she is in, e.g., the Class of 1960. High School counselors prepare what are called "individual schedules" for students, but the schedules usually amount to a collection of group experiences. When too few students request a class or subject, e.g., Latin III or Advanced Calculus, the class is cancelled that year.

The "groupness" tendency in education plays an important role. Life in corporate industrial America is largely organized in groups. Civic order and political stability depend on participation in voluntary associations of various kinds. Farmers organize, businessmen convene group conferences, employees form credit unions, trade unions are often key factors in wage and price settlements. Anthropologists explain how the schools perform the function of socializing or preparing young people

for a life in groups--computing, cooperating, producing, responding, taking orders, and completing assignments--all absolutely essential to the perpetuation of the existing order.

Not all of education is lock-step, of course. Individuals are allowed to express their creativity and brilliance--in plays, in sports contests, in musical performances, in occasional debates, and in the opportunity to lead certain extra-curricular organizations. Individual aptitudes are tested and an effort is made to counsel individual students about their careers, colleges, and other issues.

What is more striking, however, is the emphasis on group achievement, team spirit, and collective discipline in our schools. Other organizations such as the Scouts provide much more in the way of individual recognition--badges and ranks that one can pursue with a great variety of choice and at a pace of one's own choosing. The school offers a minimum program, assumes each child can learn skills in twelve years, and issues periodic report cards of progress in code form (letters or numbers symbolizing a comparison with others in the class or group).

Parents of handicapped children have not been very impressed with group solutions to their individual child's special needs. Some school districts and states have developed an individual prescription for each child diagnosed as possessing a learning handicap or disability. Complicated cases required a very detailed plan of treatment or therapy, education, and related services. For example, a child recovering from a serious accident might require not only a special class placement,

but physical therapy and occupational therapy. Parents typically have appreciated the time and care given to developing a plan for services and resented situations where their child was moved from one setting to another without consultation or explanation.

So it was that the Congress, searching for a model law, also provided for parent involvement in the development of an Individualized Education Plan (I.E.P.) for each handicapped child. This plan would be simple for a child with a minor problem, such as a lisp, to be handled by a speech correctionist. The plan would be more complicated for the mentally retarded child with physical movement problems and a tendency to uncontrollable rages from time to time.

The science of diagnosing handicaps has progressed nicely, even brilliantly, for twenty years. Much is known about prenatal causes, about corrective therapies (even using music and recreation), about behavior modification, and about ways to help children whose predicament a decade ago seemed hopeless.

What is new is the opportunity for parents not only to learn about the diagnosis but to be included in the staff meetings that decide what can or could be done with the child educationally. By law the school psychologist, physician, social worker, principal, or other specialist must inform the parent about the potential of the child and the educational options that would help that individual child.

When the law was passed, many educators worried that the requirement would lead to development of a binding contract

of services and programs, a contract enforceable in a court of law. Panic broke out over whether the states and school systems could deliver on such promises. Therefore the regulations were softened to indicate that although there must be a plan, the parent must be part of the team, periodically the student must be evaluated and the plan updated, and a school system or teacher could not be fined or jailed if the plan was imperfectly implemented.

This feature of the law is a major, even radical, development in the history of "opportunity" in education. Each individual student must have not only a diagnosis of need (an old practice) but a fleshed-out, written, agreed-upon prescription of placement and services. If parents didn't like the plan, they could call for an impartial hearing to review the facts. If the local hearing wasn't satisfactory, then a parent could petition the state to hold a review. Access to the courts as a final recourse remains an available but expensive and time-consuming source of relief even after the enactment of P.L. 94-142. The new law provided for parental participation in the original educational plan, and enabled parents to force a speedy appeal and to insist periodically on an updated plan based on an assessment of educational progress.

This law, implemented in stages beginning in 1976, has already become popular with parents, gradually accepted by local educators, and has provided increased employment for hearing officers in some states. Not everyone likes the conflict that occasionally breaks out during the process of consultation

and appeal, but it is abundantly clear that parents and children have new opportunities under the law.

What additional applications of the concept of individual opportunity and individualized plans loom on the horizon? Presumably certain handicapped children have been deprived of rights to an adequate or appropriate education. Who else has been deprived?

One class of students whose parents may now advance a parallel claim is the gifted or talented child. Once educators thought that a gifted child was talented in all subjects but now they have realized that this is not the case. Students may be gifted in certain academic subjects (e.g., science) or in music or art or in one form of creativity such as poetry writing or play acting. Within the academic realm, a group of students may all be very able but one may be especially excellent in mathematical reasoning and another outstanding in the mastery of foreign languages.

Critics charge that most schools do not respond adequately to the needs of creative and talented children, other than in a few specialties such as athletics. Many children who learn very rapidly are expected to remain all day with their age groups and grade rather than learn at their own pace. Algebra I is defined as what the average child will learn in eight months of study. Rarely will a school allow an able student to take two or one-and-a-half years of mathematics in one year, even though this is possible for some students. The "system" of school course scheduling and Carnegie units tilts toward

the average or only slightly above average student.

There are, of course, exceptions. High schools, at least the larger city and suburban high schools, offer more options to talented students than do most elementary and middle schools. Even so, most of the opportunities are open to all students or, at least, offered in groups or clusters of other presumably similar students. American education, with rare exceptions, offers a limited range of opportunities to gifted students. One exception is the advanced placement program which, through an agreement between colleges and high schools, offers college credit and/or advanced standing for certain high ability students who can pass examinations in a subject field. Large high schools with high percentages of college bound students may provide up to sixteen course options in advanced placement at the junior and senior years. Other students must rely on the good will, talent, and enthusiasm of an able teacher to provide a special opportunity.

The present system offers the greatest opportunity to talented athletes. An outstanding quarterback, high jumper, swimmer, or tennis player may be identified as talented by sophomore year, featured by sportswriters, scouted by college coaches, and showered with scholarship offers. Both individual and team opportunities are available--and always have been to males--through interscholastic athletics. The future journalist, debater, scientist, mathematician, trombonist, sales executive, and farmer in many communities may have to go outside the school to find anywhere near as much support, encouragement, and



individualization of opportunity.

What may happen is that advocates of gifted children, who also belong to the Council for Exceptional Children, may lobby next for a federal law guaranteeing to gifted children (the top 3 to 5 percent) the same rights and opportunities now bestowed upon handicapped children.

What would such an opportunity look like? Why would parents of gifted children want to pursue an individualized program? What changes would this require of a school?

First of all, gifted children often have a difficult time in school. Although some are passive, others rebel at what to them seems a dull and limited curriculum. Thomas Edison was removed from a Michigan grade school for asking too many questions of a poor teacher.<sup>8</sup>

It must also be denied that an education can simply leave a gifted child alone and he or she will prosper. The talented child more than any other needs a role model, a mentor, and special guidance to develop to the fullest. Plato acknowledged the contributions of Socrates. Jimmy Connor learned from Pancho Gonzales. Research indicates that underachievement and dropout problems plague up to 55 percent of the gifted population when such opportunities do not exist. Furthermore, it is inconsistent to believe that the very handicapped are entitled to individual opportunity while expecting the very gifted to excel in an unchallenging group environment.

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<sup>8</sup>Robert Conot, A Streak of Luck: The Life and Legend of Thomas Alva Edison (New York: Seavler Books, 1979).

Public policy now favors smaller classes, instructional aides, and extra help to the handicapped. Why not extend unique and special services to the Einsteins and Bernsteins of the future? Right now less than a dozen states appropriate one million dollars or more to school districts offering special programs for gifted children. Only Pennsylvania as of 1979 required schools to provide IEPs for the talented.

An individual educational plan for the gifted would require fewer participants for planning than a plan for a handicapped child. No therapist or social worker need attend. The psychologist would be helpful as would curriculum specialists in the area of expertise and special talent. The teacher, principal and parent, of course, would be present at the meetings mapping out the next one to five years of a child's development.

Hundreds of elementary schools have adopted some form of individualized instruction that provides for some advanced or unique opportunity for able students. The University of Pittsburgh pioneered an "individually prescribed institution" pattern. The University of Wisconsin developed Individually Guided Education which subsequently attracted the interest of commercial textbook publishers because it was so popular.

These developments pave the way for possible requirements that gifted children have access to some of the special treatment now given to handicapped children. However, several issues must be addressed:

1. The classification of giftedness. Academic or cognitive talent is but one kind of ability, one value in school and by teachers. Creative talent may reflect itself in music, art, poetry, drama, and other modes of expression. Inventive talent is still another form often linked to divergent thinking rather than convergent pedagogical routines. Still other types of talent are leadership, psychomotor, or mechanical skills. Although many people are gifted in more than one category, many persons may be brilliant in only one field and average or below in others.

2. The degree of talent that qualifies for special consideration. Some experts consider the top 2 percent to be truly gifted--others say that from 3 percent to 5 percent of the population is academically talented. Communities and schools may vary in the incidence of giftedness in the population.

3. The age and type of screening. Talent, especially of an intellectual nature, can be identified at an early age--often by age three or four. The question arises whether schools which are now screening very young children for handicaps (mental, visual, etc.) shouldn't also be screening to identify talent. Any system of talent identification must also provide for late-blooming abilities and for newcomers to a school system.

4. The placement of gifted students. Should the gifted be totally segregated or should they attend school with other students for at least a portion of the day? This question has long been debated. Both elementary and secondary school

grouping practices tend to separate able students for at least some of the school day. Is this undemocratic and elitist? Does it deprive other students of stimulation and needed competition? Classes such as music, art, and physical education tend to be for all students--unless in the upper grades an advanced elective course is chosen. Can some of the special opportunities for able students be best provided for after school or in summer programs?

5. Acceleration versus enrichment. Should the genius or near genius student be pushed along at a rapid rate, allowed to skip grades and attend college early? Or should a school provide deeper, richer, and additional work of a challenging nature? For every one exceptionally bright child advanced to college by age 15, another ten are given the chance to work on special service or literary projects, encouraged to compete in various academic contests and fairs. Acceleration is thought to have certain social costs and disadvantages except for the top fraction of one percent.

The new ways of thinking about the gifted student will draw on the experience with individualized learning and with plans for handicapped children. Parents and faculty at the Wild Rose School in St. Charles, Illinois, during 1978 decided that gifted as well as handicapped students would be given individualized education plans. Parents, the principal, and one or more teachers discussed in conference what type of experiences each child would have during the year.

A gifted I.E.P. at St. Charles is simpler than a handicapped child's I.E.P. and less costly in terms of staff preparation. Pupil weaknesses, such as spelling or punctuation, are provided for in special drills. However, the emphasis is usually on offering the gifted child a plan of supplementary readings, trips, and individual work on special topics or projects.

The St. Charles faculty used a small state and federal "gifted education" grant to plan, implement, and evaluate the program. The first year evaluation found that both academic achievement and pupil self-esteem had increased. Alert to the positive "Hawthorne effect" that surrounds any human experiment, the principal proposed a series of additional evaluations over a period of years to assess the consequences. Also, any such project elsewhere should consider other measures and types of growth exhibited such as in the areas of leadership and problem-solving process developed through individualized programs.

Parents are bound to like this program partially because of participatory planning. Most parents feel virtually excluded from important discussions and decisions about their children, especially for those endowed with some talent. Educators will discover that many of these parents are willing to work with the school and want to reinforce and augment what formal education provides.

An appropriate opportunity for a city child gifted in music might involve one or several internships with the city symphony or ballet troupe. The child would make up academic

work much like a Senate page would complete assignments--on off hours and with special tutoring.

A child gifted at public speaking might work with a state legislator or Congressman, studying rhetoric and persuasion with one who lives by the spoken word. An individual course of study might include work reviewing the great orators of all time--Cicero, Bosanquet, Edmund Burke, Daniel Webster, and William Jennings Bryan.

A child gifted in art would of course take work with local art instructors but might also work in a museum or in a studio with a mentor for some portion of the year from age ten or twelve on through graduation. Such work would not be seen as detracting from school but as part of a program of productive growth. Work-study programs grow in popularity for the average and below average child, but such opportunities usually are forbidden to the talented because teachers want those children to stay in school full-time.

An occasional child now secures these special benefits--the U.S. Senate page, the Hollywood child star, the member of the Executive High School Internship program which places thousands of young people in practical apprenticeship positions for a semester each year. However, these rarely are seen as rights or normal opportunities for children. These now are extraordinary and special privileges.

An occasional high school student can study abroad in programs such as American Field Service or Experiments in International Living. Those should serve as precedents for

individualized opportunities for all students, not just the affluent.

Elementary students need more flexibility and opportunity to depart from the normal curriculum. It is rare for a school to offer a gifted program and for a state to offer special dollar grants to encourage a special program. Even then the money, as in the case of Illinois which offers schools forty dollars for each gifted child in a program, may be inadequate to provide more than a part-time experience now and then.

The new frontier of opportunity for gifted children would be to build on the same foundation available to the handicapped--a chance to have one's talents identified, courses of action laid out for review, participation of parents in the discussions, preparation of a written program, and periodic opportunities to review progress granted.

This program will encounter criticism--from the parents of handicapped who fear that funds will be diverted or from those who fear "meritocracy" and warn about elitism in education. This is the type of education traditionally available only to young princes or to true genius. However, it is compatible with the dream that children be educated to the limits of their talent and ability. Any nation needs to develop the gifts and human resources found within the new generation of citizens. This education need not be totally separate from those of average youngsters but supplemental to the usual fare.

Once the opportunities extend to gifted as well as handicapped, a clamor may arise from the parents of the normal

or regular child. Many of these parents will have one child entitled to an individualized plan and one immersed in the usual classroom routine.

Why not an individualized educational program for every child? Doesn't this fulfill the hope of educational philosophers for most of this century? When 15 or 20 percent of the children--and their parents--receive and appreciate these opportunities, the others will call for the extension of these options for the average or normal child. Several of us reached this conclusion in 1978, myself in projecting trends for the 1980s with the American Educational Finance Association in Denver and Professor Martha McCarthy of Indiana University to the National Organization on Legal Problems in Education in New Orleans.<sup>9</sup> McCarthy suggests possible litigation in the future under the banner of the "Equal Protection" clause of the U.S. Constitution and with P.L. 94-142 as the precedent.

The law's requirement that school districts design individualized education programs (IEPs) for handicapped students could prompt other students to demand IEPs for themselves. Under the law, parents must be notified of changes in a child's educational program, whereas nonhandicapped children are tracked and assigned without parental consent. McCarthy foresees litigation by parents of nonhandicapped children demanding notification and due process before placement.

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<sup>9</sup>Joseph M. Cronin speech to the American Educational Finance Association, reprinted in the School Business Affairs Journal, October 1978, pp. 18-20, and Martha McCarthy, presentation to the National Organization on Legal Problems in Education, New Orleans, 1978, mimeographed.



P.L. 94-142 regulations require the availability of an impartial hearing officer to mediate in conflicts arising out of placement or programs for handicapped children. School officials within the school district are not considered eligible mediators. For nonhandicapped students and teachers, however, school board members are considered impartial hearing officers. If handicapped children are entitled to an outside arbitrator, McCarthy asked, why wouldn't nonhandicapped children be (or at least why wouldn't they ask for it)?

Under the law, a handicapped child must receive appropriate education even if it means sending him to a facility out of state that provides a program tailored to his needs. Other children, such as the gifted or normal person, may also claim in court that they are entitled to similar consideration at public expense.

The attractiveness of the expanded opportunity for handicapped or gifted pupils will expand for these reasons:

1. Parents of more than one child will wonder why their handicapped (or gifted) child is favored with an individualized program whereas their other child is simply put into a class where only the teacher knows the plan;
2. The education profession long has paid lip-service to educating each child to the fullest capacity. If handicapped (and gifted) IEPs prove effective, leading educators themselves will propose expansion of such opportunities for individualization;

3. Advocates, such as the Reverend Jesse Jackson of PUSH for Excellence, have proposed that teachers, students, and parents enter into a three-way contract. Parents under such a plan must visit the school, check on pupil progress, pick up the report card, and see that the television set is turned off for several hours in the evening. Children must agree to systematic practice of academic skills outside the classroom and to good behavior in schools. Teachers must agree to work with both parents and students to achieve "excellence" in school subjects. All three parties sign a written agreement to live up to these responsibilities;

4. Legal advocates increasingly urge litigation against a school system if consumers feel a child has not learned what is reasonably expected--basic literacy and computation skills at least. Although such lawsuits to date have not proven successful, once someone wins a case the pressure will be great to document the annual diagnosis of each child's needs, progress, and attainment both on group tests and on individual measures of productivity.

Thus the future of educational opportunity will be one of individualization and of individualized educational programs for all children. The computer will be regarded as a useful tool for record keeping as it is already for student scheduling, test scoring and the computation of grades, rank in class, and other measures. The success of advocates for individualized programs for the handicapped will spread to other categories, first the gifted and then for all children. The projected enrollment

declines at all levels of education means that facilities and faculties will be in ample supply to house and help individual students. Parental pressures will slow down the already visible press for economies and cost savings in schools at all levels. At least some of the savings have been and will be reinvested in individualized education, a more favorable pupil teacher ratio to implement such plans, and a more systematic evaluation of each child's progress against criteria laid out in a plan.

### Diversified Opportunity

Most of the discussion of equal opportunity suggests that students ought to have the same resources or program or success that other students experience. Separate black schools, it was thought, were inherently inferior when less resources, younger teachers, or older than tolerable buildings were used. School finance systems clearly violated the law when taxpayers in one jurisdiction had to tax themselves at substantially higher rates to come close to school expenditures in property-rich areas. Sex-segregated classes tended to deprive women of the equal access to the gymnasium, vocational courses, and the better paid instructors or coaches.

Simultaneously, many scholars have advanced a critique of schooling which asserts that too much emphasis is placed on the school alone as the vehicle for education. Lawrence Cremin of Columbia University has rewritten the history of American education to demonstrate the educational impact of various instruments of the larger culture--the church, the newspapers,

the family, and, more recently, of television. Studies of adolescent growth shows that peers strongly influence the motivation and education of other youngsters. Movies, plays, novels, museums, summer jobs, record albums, television commercials, radio--all of these phenomena educate. The exclusive emphasis on schooling may distract attention from how people learn and also from which forces, such as the incredible amount of hours young children watch television, divert time away from reading.

The other major critique has been on the public school as the exclusive source of both literacy and citizenship values. Nationally one child in seven attends other than a public school. New York State and Illinois enroll almost 20 percent of the children in private or parochial schools. The Chicago Archdiocesan school system, which includes Cook and Lake Counties, ranks as the fourth largest school system in the country. Other major religious groups maintain networks of schools, especially the Lutherans and the Seventh Day Adventists. For many years a significant minority of parents deliberately chose and paid extra tuition for a non-public school.

One of the most rapidly growing systems is the Baptist or Christian school. Their advocates want no public money or regulation and stress the need for a basic curriculum including the study of the Bible, God, and His commandments. Their schools, often very small, try to isolate the child from the drug culture, sex and violence, and other secular influences on children in certain public schools--or at least widely reported in the media.

At times parents want their children to have a choice of schools for varying reasons:

1. To study religion along with other subjects;
2. To have strict discipline and good conduct emphasized (a traditional reason for the popularity of military schools as well as Church schools);
3. To provide additional academic preparation for a certain type of college, especially in the East where private academies still offer special help;
4. To offer a specialty such as music or drama or classical studies (Latin and Greek), the latter still available at Jesuit high schools in most large U.S. cities.

Another reason for placement of children in private schools, the avoidance of racial desegregation, is practiced but generally considered inappropriate behavior. Many private and parochial schools accept and even recruit students of all races. The Congress and Internal Revenue Service will not grant or continue tax-exempt status to the type of school which perpetuates racial isolation.

What is the future of non-public schools? For more than a decade, a few economists and educators argued the need for diversity in our educational institutions for the young. Milton Friedman, a conservative economist, proposed that the government give to parents a "voucher" or coupon to be taken to any school they want for a child.<sup>10</sup> This "Free Market" approach would

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<sup>10</sup> Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

reward the effective schools and presumably eliminate the ineffective schools that would through this mechanism lose students and financial support. The friends of the tax-supported common school found this proposal absolutely repugnant, even if they recognized that some schools performed more effectively than others.

During the 1960s many inner-city or ghetto schools were widely seen as ineffective. A number of "free schools" and store front academies sprung up in Harlem, Roxbury, and elsewhere to offer a more dynamic substitute. How would these schools be financed? Harvard Dean of Education TheodoreSizer and Phillip Whitten proposed "A Poor Children's Bill of Rights" which modified Friedman's proposal to correct for the possible exclusion of minority students in an otherwise favored predominantly white school.<sup>11</sup> Their scheme called for public payments for the exercise of choice by poor families and their children. While rich families would continue to pay the tuition for their own children, government agencies could pay all of the tuition for poor children and progressively less for children of below average and then of average family income.

The Office of Economic Opportunity decided to sponsor a trial of the modified voucher plan and so informed the states. Soon it became clear that state laws concerning public education would need to be changed and that many state constitutions would

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<sup>11</sup>TheodoreSizer, and Phillip Whitten, "A Proposal for a Children's Bill of Rights," Psychology Today 58, No. 5 (1969).

forbid any subsidy to church-related schools. The National Education Association and American Federation of Teachers denounced the plan as divisive and destructive of public schools. It was widely believed as well that such a plan indeed would result in unpopular schools closing down on short notice, thus ending jobs for teachers with tenure, seniority, and at present reasonable job security.

No state was able to pass enabling legislation, but California school officials agreed on a trial of educational alternatives within a public school system, Alum Rock, near San Jose. Federal funds were used for several years to provide choices for parents and children at the elementary school level. No one thought this a true test of vouchers, and substantial sums of money were spent on providing a comparatively modest array of choices with modest results.

Meanwhile a number of large cities undergoing school desegregation used the "Magnet School" concept to persuade students of different races to come together in the same school site for an attractive educational alternative. The Walt Disney Magnet School in Chicago drew applications from thousands of children because of the glamorous link to the world of television and communication. In Boston after a court-ordered desegregation plan, more than a dozen abandoned schools were taken over by nearby universities and by major business corporations. Other cities, such as Milwaukee and St. Louis, adopted the Magnet School format as part of a voluntary approach to desegregation. Thus the path of "choices for students" moved from Friedman to

Sizer to O.E.O., from an approach which in pure form might have perpetuated racial isolation to a modified form used to bring the several races together.

Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin each provided public funds for minority students in cities who wanted the opportunity to go to school in a nearby suburb. By 1980 approximately 6,000 students a year will exercise this choice. As in the case of Magnet Schools, educators and teacher unions agreed to these policies once certain safeguards to employment were understood to remain in place. In effect this was an adaptation of the voucher plans of new choices for students.

During the late 1970s public interest in private choices and alternative schools took new forms. Public confidence in the schools, Dr. George Gallup's annual polls revealed, was in decline.<sup>12</sup> A November 1978 amendment to the Michigan state constitution calling for vouchers to replace the existing system of school finance attracted a one-third positive vote. John Coons and Steven Sugarman wrote a book entitled "Education by Choice: The Case for Family Control" which asserts a philosophical, moral, legal, and education case for modified vouchers.<sup>13</sup> Racial minorities would be given preference in bidding for vacant seats, especially in popular schools that wanted state financial aid. Coons is advising a citizens' group that intends

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<sup>12</sup>George Gallup Education Polls, 1968-1978.

<sup>13</sup>John Coons, and Stephen Sugarman, Education by Choice: The Case for Family Control (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1979).



to place this issue on the California ballot as a binding constitutional referendum.

Sizer, who became headmaster of Phillip Andover Academy, wrote his own book on education for choice. He advances the notion that each child should be able to enroll in two or three schools--one for fundamental skills needed by all children (the three Rs and basic citizenship education) and one to pursue special interests and aptitudes. Such a policy would encourage museum schools, zoological societies, planetariums, service institutes, and other "educative" groups. Sizer agrees with Cremin that much education is and will be provided outside of the formal school and that we can now move education beyond the narrow constraint of memberships in simply one place called a school.

Many parents instantly recognize the merits of this conceptualization since they presently enlist their child in music or art lessons outside the regular school. Students are often enrolled in dancing school, riding schools, drama schools, and academic summer camps to augment the regular school fare. Orthodox Jews send their children to Hebrew School as a matter of course. The courts have upheld the concept of "dual enrollment" for children who attend a parochial or private high school but want to attend a public high school or area vocational center for career courses several hours a day. Multiple enrollments are in these instances both legal and practical.

Traditionally the common school has been viewed as the instrument which, by its curriculum, perpetuates the republic

and inculcates the skills needed to maintain a democracy.' It was once argued that nations or states which support private religious schools lack unity and may divide that loyalty due to the state. Why then do several European nations and Canadian provinces with dual schools regularly turn out higher percentages of voters at elections than in the United States where public schools serve as the engine of democracy? This is not the type of question most of us in public education are prepared to answer.

Immigrants and foreign nationals have through the Lau decision won the argument that languages and cultures other than English (or Anglo-Saxon) should be preserved and taught in schools. Our schools thus will and are diversifying. No longer will schools through "Americanization" programs homogenize the newcomer into a common mold. Diversity is in vogue. Ethnicity has become respectable where once it was a source of embarrassment. The United States is the fourth largest Spanish-speaking nation in the world, and other national groups want the chance to preserve their language, heritage, and culture.<sup>14</sup>

Coons and Sugarman rebut critics who say their ideas will lead to the ruin of the public school system. On the contrary, they assert, "our proposal will save the public school" albeit in a changed format. Their scheme would allow groups to have the option of using their own funds to keep or open a totally private school as at present. But schools with a special purpose or emphasis or unique character could qualify

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<sup>14</sup>Michael Novak, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics (New York: Macmillan, 1972).

for public funds essentially by complying with health and safety standards and by accepting a reasonable share of minority students. Popular schools would use a lottery to decide which students would attend. Some students inevitably would be accepted in their second choice or third choice schools. If enough parents were unhappy about this, they could form a new school which would also qualify for tuition subsidy.

The future of opportunity as an education concept might follow these paths:

1. Enrollment in a special or unique school conducted under private auspice but eligible for public money;
2. Multiple enrollment in two or more educational settings, possibly a racially integrated "common school" for a portion of the day for basic skills and in a more specialized place at other times.

Instead of "equal educational opportunity," the concept becomes "diversified educational opportunity" with equal access both to the most appropriate and most desired educational option. Education is defined more broadly than school, and attendance is redefined to include the possibility of multiple enrollment at both conventional and unconventional types of schools. It is never assumed that the outcomes would be "equal" or similar, for human talents are diverse. Some settings might cost very little, some substantially more than the norm. The guarantee of equal opportunity under this approach means that no one would be denied the chance to become unique or special. Education would be an instrument to impart basic skills and national

loyalty, yes, but would allow talent development or the pursuit of happiness depending on the needs and interests of the individual.

Some may argue that these proposals are costly and therefore Utopian. I agree only that the various groups must compete politically for attention, legitimacy, and resources. The nation is unlikely to adopt all of these definitions by 1985. Instead, certain movements such as that of older Americans and emerging professionals (nurses, engineers) will prevail earlier than others because of force of numbers and the lack of organized opposition. Other concepts such as the various voucher schemes of multiple school enrollments may face sustained opposition from teacher organizations if the future employment security of members should be perceived as being in jeopardy.

At the same time several of the notions of "full service"--for example, for gifted children--may be presented to the courts for adjudication. How do we justify individualization for the handicapped without a comparable, if less complex, opportunity for talented and "normal" pupils? Even while this paper was in preparation, the parents of a gifted child in McHenry, Illinois, filed suit over the lack of adequate provision for their 172 I.Q. child in local public schools. The remedy sought was one million dollars in damages.

Of course, the expansion of opportunities will face political obstacles, financial problems, legislative debates, and uneven results according to the intensity of support mounted

behind each of the initiatives discussed. Each proposal will in fact compete with competitive schemes to subsidize other social services, such as health, or to reduce taxes. Such choices always confront advocates of educational programs and of any expansion of definitions of new opportunities. Some of the options discussed may not come to pass at all, largely because of controversies over costs and jobs at stake.

The foregoing discussions of educational opportunity could by 1990 be viewed not as radical but as a matter of fact explanation of some strong currents already visible to state and national officials. What is vital is for analysts of educational opportunity to appreciate the multiplicity of adjectives--full, appropriate, individualized, diversified--that modify "Educational Opportunity" and lead us to consider not only equality but liberty and the pursuit of happiness, the other much less often discussed revolutionary ideals.

Education also must be seen as broader than schooling or enrollment in a single school for 900 hours a year. Compulsory education by 1990 will be viewed not only as for regular children six to sixteen, handicapped persons three to twenty-one, but for a large number of adults seeking the renewal of their credentials or professional license. Governments may also require individualized education for gifted students, regular pupils, and offer services to those who have or are about to retire. These definitions of educational opportunity broaden the debate and extend options previously viewed as unrealistic or unlikely. However, the seeds have already been planted. The harvest awaits only vigorous public debate followed by court decisions or legislative consensus.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE PRAGMATICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION EQUITY

Stephen H. Adolphus

For those of us working in equity-related programs, the race toward a social vision has often outstripped any coherent vision of our goal. When something is as painfully askew as American higher education was a short time ago regarding lack of opportunity for certain groups, pragmatists among us seek to put in place whatever can help get things started. Now, after more than a decade of higher education opportunity programs, is none too soon to consider the ethical foundations and historical setting for what is, in New York, a sizable public investment in equity, however defined.

The brief comments which follow, then, are more concerned with equity in postsecondary education (especially at the undergraduate level) than at other educational levels. They are set against a background in the northeastern United States and the experience of certain demographic groups therein, but applicability is intended to all who, for whatever externally imposed reason, cannot yet take full advantage of the higher education experience.

# I. Recent Trends in Higher Education Access

Erratic democratization has characterized American postsecondary education nearly since its inception.<sup>1</sup> By the time of the Civil War, postsecondary education had moved from serving the well-born, and especially those in training for the ministry, to the creation of diverse, often publicly sponsored institutions. Most of these were founded or reinvigorated by the Morrill Land Grant Act in 1862. Others, such as Oberlin College (1862) and the City College of New York (1849 as the Free Academy), stemmed from religious or local impetuses.

Still, students in postsecondary education were largely from middle and upper-middle class families until the last year of World War II. The Servicemen's Readjustment Act (GI Bill), enacted at that time, was responsible for what was then a massive influx of new students--nearly three million in all. And the benefits available to veterans under that act ensured a much broader socioeconomic spectrum in the new freshman classes from 1946 on. Indeed, a number of colleges around the country owe their establishment to this phenomenon.<sup>2</sup> It is a tribute to the permanent nature of the change brought about by the veterans that these institutions still exist, more often than not with a focus of broad admissions to lower-middle and working class students.

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<sup>1</sup>New York State Education Department, The Effectiveness of Postsecondary Opportunity: A Study of the Disadvantaged (Albany, New York, 1975), pp. 2-3. (Passage written by the author.)

<sup>2</sup>In New York State, for instance, Dowling College, Utica College, Elmira College, and Harpur (now State University at Binghamton) are a few of the institutions created in response to the G.I. Bill.

But the history of the last two decades has been different in and for higher education from anything which came before. With all of the opening up of collegiate opportunity which had come before, racial and ethnic quotas, covert and overt, were the norm at very many institutions through the 1940s and into the '50s. (I remember my own astonishment on reading, early in my career, the following notation by an admissions officer on a prospective applicant's file: "Nice boy. Doesn't look Jewish.") In addition, the very poor, of whatever group, were seldom present except for the occasional athlete or gifted student. But beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, in 1954, the poor and the discriminated against began to be yielded some place in higher education.

A major change, little heralded at the time, was the beginning of financial aid "entitlement" programs on a broad scale. The National Defense Education Act, enacted in response to the "Sputnik climate," marked a shift in financial aid philosophy from special awards for the talented few to general awards, in grants and loans, based at least in part on need. Nothing has more greatly contributed to the democratization of postsecondary education in this country than the adoption of a need-based public financial aid system on a scale undreamed of twenty years ago. The vision driving the policy--that financial circumstance should not bar any person from postsecondary education--has in fact been realized for a great many people. Certain groups still remain underserved in this regard--the very poor, older, and part-time students--but even here current rhetoric



and trends indicate ultimate inclusion in the financial aid system.

Problems associated with poverty, however, are not solved simply by paying college bills.

Chapter IV will address certain social realities for the poor who seek to attend college. Additionally, the inclusion of nontraditional students in postsecondary education in the last two decades has brought about a second profound change--a questioning of the practices, goals, measures, and self-image of the postsecondary academic enterprise. Powell comments eloquently on the "standards" debate in this regard. As students whose academic preparation and level of performance are well below those "expected" by the faculty continue to pervade the system, we see (1) the development of "extra" inputs in the form of remedial education and special programs to enable them to negotiate, at least minimally, the system; and (2) subtle and overt changes in the process to accommodate them.

Persons from nonwhite groups merit a special note in any historical overview. For example, while national undergraduate enrollment grew from 232,000 in 1899 to 1,396,000 in 1939, the number of blacks receiving bachelor's degrees in the same period went from approximately 1,200 to 9,005: from half of one percent to six-tenths of one percent.<sup>3</sup>

More recently, as late as 1970, fewer than 350,000, or five percent, of the nation's seven million undergraduates

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<sup>3</sup>New York State Education Department, Effectiveness, p. 2.

were black.<sup>4</sup> In New York State in that year, blacks in the 18-24 age group were 14.6 percent of the general population, but only 5.9 percent of students enrolled in college. That percentage has steadily increased, to 8.5 percent of the undergraduate population in 1972-73 and 10.4 percent in 1976-77.<sup>5</sup>

## II. Why?

Why is there a seemingly inexorable movement of minorities and other historically unrepresented persons into higher education? Surely there is a confluence of reasons culminating in such powerful social change in such a historically conservative institution as the university.

In terms of economics, we have seen the immense surplus wealth of the nation--the greatest in the history of man--allowing the postponement of work-force entry for the majority of our youth, progressively to ages 14, 16, 18, and 21 (and rising). Along with this has come sizable investment in the growth of higher education, very largely through public resources--through the training, hiring, and tenuring of faculty, and the construction of a physical plant nationwide suddenly, paradoxically, about to be too large for its mission but mortgaged until the twenty-first century.

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<sup>4</sup>Regents of the University of the State of New York, Minority Access to and Participation in Postsecondary Education (Albany, New York: May 1972), p. 5.

<sup>5</sup>"Enrollment Compliance Reports," Bureau of Statistical Services, New York State Education Department.

There are also the escalation of credentials and the increased need for tertiary training: two very different phenomena, but both results of an increasingly technological society.

Set alongside these economic forces are powerful perceptions of the life impact higher education might have. As real incomes rise, higher education more than anything else symbolizes the gateway to the life the parents never had, but see within their reach to purchase for the child. Here is the real beginning of our exploration of educational equity's itinerary.

Belief in the redemptive or succoring power of all education, but of higher education in particular, has been and remains exceptionally strong:

. . . let me remind you that education--and especially higher education--is the surest means our society offers for achieving what sociologists call "upward social mobility." Put in simple language, it means that education is the only way that a child born into a functionally illiterate welfare family, or simply a very poor family, can escape the poverty, the squalor, the frustration, the hopelessness, and the dehumanization that characterize his conditions of life. With a college education that leads to some socially useful career, this child cannot only escape but will serve as an emulative example for others, similarly-situated. And it goes without saying that his own progeny will begin life as middle class children, destined to carry on like other middle class children.<sup>6</sup>

Faith in the power of higher education to raise one's socioeconomic level--to break open a caste system once based in

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<sup>6</sup>Stephen J. Wright, "The Bottom Line of Equal Opportunity Programs," in The Statewide Committee on Educational Opportunity, Beyond Emerging Needs: Proceedings of a Workshop-Oriented Conference on Consolidating a Decade's Gains in Expanding Higher Education Opportunity (Albany, New York, 1977), p. 133.

large part upon higher education--to bring about what would essentially be a radical redistribution of wealth--is not totally unjustified, especially among the most disadvantaged. It is a questionable practice indeed to counsel your persons about to be newly enfranchised in higher education, in the fashionably disaffected tone of the times, about the shortage of "decent" opportunities for new graduates, the "oversupply" of highly educated persons, the not so apocryphal stories of Ph.D.s driving taxicabs. For there is substance behind the myth.

For minorities especially, added years of education do translate into lifetime earnings increases, and almost assuredly will for a generation to come. Even in first job placements, considerably greater numbers of first-generation graduates find employment than do their peers who do not achieve degrees, and those placements are significantly greater in white-collar and managerial positions.<sup>7</sup>

### III. The Fundamental Vision

Statements of public policy regarding education are groping toward visions of equity, but the bases are often at best insufficiently clear:

Our society must provide "equality of educational opportunity" which means that access to educational resources shall be rendered as nearly equal as possible to all, regardless of race, religion or national origin, regardless too of low economic

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<sup>7</sup>Judith G. Wolf, The Impact of Higher Education Opportunity Programs-Post College Experience of Disadvantaged Students: A Follow-up of HEOP Graduates and Dropouts (Albany, New York: New York State Education Department, 1976), pp. 119-120.

status and poor educational preparation at earlier levels not within the control of the individual. . . . We assume that persons of the various ethnic and racial groups in our society aspire to and are capable of obtaining all the various levels of educational achievement in approximately the same proportions.<sup>8</sup>

Herein is a definition of equality of opportunity, defined as equal access as measured by proportional representation at the various educational levels. The words feel "right," and the ultimate goal is, in their case, measurable. This is not to deny that the approach has a certain naivete if reduced ad absurdum. Certainly geographic origins and ethnic traditions and customs will and should suggest something less than an absolutely even distribution of all people in all categories. There are problems, too, inherent in the classification of people into groups that the proportional representation approach entails; this will be discussed separately.

But unexplicated is the fundamental vision, deeper than a better income or bringing one's children into the middle class. It has to do with political liberal (in the classic sense) theories underlying Western cultures of the last three centuries--a concept of justice which provides for all people to have an equal opportunity to achieve a maximum amount of self-autonomy compatible with the opportunities of all others.

Hand in hand with this theory is an assumption that education is the sine qua non for the realization of maximum self autonomy. As D.A.J. Richards has stated,

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<sup>8</sup> Regents of the University of the State of New York, Minority Access, p. 5.

. . . the liberal theory of education is marked not only by its concern with the basic education of all persons, but by the features that the education must include, namely, the development of general capacities which any person would want in order to determine self-critically and rationally his or her vision of the good life; the development of the emotional and other capacities required for autonomous self-determination; and the development of the capacity to live independently with servile and non-consensual dependence reduced to the necessary and tolerable minimum.

Thus, education in liberal theory eschews indoctrination in rigid sectarian ideology and is marked by its cultivation of general self-critical capacities of precise expression, logic, various forms of analysis, sensitivity to and rational weighing of evidence, and a general cultivation in students of open and unbounded curiosity and the capacity to be ready to take the risks of the experimental attitude.<sup>9</sup>

This catalog of virtues coincides exactly with goals set for higher education by most of those who would speak for it today. Thus, postsecondary education is not simply for a change in one's income level or social status. It is a self-fulfilling and emancipating instrument, and for those in the great traditions and mores of this culture at this time, equal access to it needs no further justification.

This is why the power of the idea is so strong: why parents have impoverished themselves for their children; why people have devoted inordinate amounts of after-work time in evening classes to win through to a degree; and why, although they might have expressed it differently, the intent young black people, whose Newsweek cover pictures we remember in a blur with the rest of the late sixties, carried rifles as they

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<sup>9</sup>David A. J. Richards, "Autonomy, the Right to Education, and Minimum Standards," New York University Education Quarterly (Spring 1979): 5.

came out of Cornell's Willard Straight Hall.

If the end is compelling, the way is difficult.

#### IV. Barriers

A working definition of access might be the ability of each one to enter into higher education at a level commensurate with one's abilities and desires; and to take from the experience to the limits of one's own ability, reasonably freed from constraints from external sources. I want to address two such constraints which are especially compelling in the struggle fully to enfranchise contemporary students: poverty and academic underpreparedness.

Of the two, poverty is the more intractable, as its effects are so difficult to eradicate, cutting as they do across psychological, familial, and economic lines. The cases below happened in the last few years.

##### A. The Innocent Not Abroad

A historically poor family encourages high aspirations in its children. One through dint of hard work in the public schools is accepted at a prestigious institution with a national reputation in the design arts. The very high tuition costs are covered by a combination of institutional and public financial aid, and other costs through the student's summer and term-time earnings, small family contributions, and loans.

The student, a fashion design major, has been told, and at first believes, that he has the same opportunity to benefit from college as all the rest of the students. But

two things work to change this perception. First, supplies constitute a major expense item for all students in the major. And there is a good deal of discretion in what supplies can be purchased. There is a minimum necessary to "make do," but additional cash outlays will bring in fancier or more diverse materials, more likely to catch the eye of the instructor or easier to work with. Already on a subsistence budget, the student scrapes by with the minimum supplies required to complete assignments. In some, but not all classes, the student receives lower grades than students with more resources for materials.

The institution sponsors a study-abroad semester for fashion design majors in the sophomore or junior year. In term of financial aid, it is considered an add-on, not part of the regular curriculum, to be financed by the student. Most students elect to go. For the student in question, the added expense can only be met through an additional loan, and with an already heavy cumulative loan obligation and family apprehension about debts of this order of magnitude, the student does not go abroad. While not easily measurable, the effects of the abroad experience are noticeable in returning students in the form of a greater degree of confidence and increased sophistication. These attributes in turn have a subtle effect on raising these students' grades with some teachers and enhancing their attractiveness on job interviews. Finally, most of the student's classmates are placed with major fashion houses or open ateliers of their own. The student ends up as a high school teacher.



Now assuredly it can be argued that becoming a teacher, for a first generation college student, is a major step up the socioeconomic scale. There are rewards in terms of security, intellectual benefits, status, hours, and freedom from manual labor. Nevertheless the outcome is not the same as for the others, and may not be a good measure of the student's real potential.

No one can say that the economic factors cited above determined this outcome. But clearly all opportunities were not equal. The postsecondary experience is still one in which the availability of extra cash can expand immeasurably the quality of the learning environment--even after what appear to be the basic needs are satisfied. Study abroad, widely acknowledged to be a beneficial experience for nearly any college student, is a good case in point. It is still very largely closed to students from very poor families.

#### B. The Road Not Offered

Case A speaks about an option not chosen, with money the determining factor. B is a young person with the same talents and aspirations as A, but in the world of music. He is from an equally poor background. He too has applied to a nationally prestigious and selective institution. He has, however been denied admission on the basis of an audition given every student.

If we examine the backgrounds of those admitted we find that everyone has had private tutoring with expensive

instructors from an early age. Most have attended a specialty secondary school in the performing arts and/or summer camps with the same theme. These are, generally speaking, options available to the wealthy or near-wealthy. The student in question lives in a school district which subsidizes virtually no music instruction. Although he has obvious talent, his family has not been able to afford more than the most rudimentary instruction.

This student attends a public postsecondary institution where his musical ability and interest find expression in extracurricular activities. He chooses as a major a subject in which he has less interest and graduates to a lackluster livelihood. Those admitted to the prestigious institution will become teachers, composers, ensemble performers, and concert virtuosi.

This is not an isolated example: it can be repeated over and over--engineering denial because a school system did not offer the mathematics prerequisites; fine arts denied because of an inadequate portfolio (because of little or no intensive instruction).

### C. Rich Little Poor Girl

The story of C seems to be the fulfillment of the democratic vision. Born on an Indian reservation of a mixed ethnic background, she had borne two children and was living in public housing and receiving public assistance, when she came late to higher education through one of the State's special programs. Of obviously high ability, she went quickly

through a precollege bridge program and entered a competitive university. There she completed a bachelor's and master's degree.

But the way was immensely hard. Nonwhite and with two children, she never was without severe money problems. Any medical difficulty was a major crisis. Finding housing was always an impediment; one landlord refused first to believe she was a student, then refused to rent to her unless someone more "solid" would cosign a lease. The needs of her children for attention competed with the demands of college.

Emotionally exhausted and in debt when she entered the job market, she has passed from position to position and is currently unemployed.

Thus, aside from problems directly related to academic performance, a whole complex of factors operates to keep poor people from full educational opportunity. Directly attributable to financial status are such categories of problems as lack of adequate support for dependents; problems with the welfare bureaucracies; instability of supplemental employment; and lack of any cushion for temporary economic adversity.<sup>10</sup>

Students in poverty are more at the mercy of health problems than others. First, their general condition may be not good. They may suffer from a number of undiagnosed ailments, including poor vision or hearing. With the extended

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<sup>10</sup>Susan Golden, "Opportunity--toward an expanded definition. . .," Journal of Remedial and Developmental Education, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 24-26.

family the only form of social insurance available, students often must leave studies unexpectedly when a relative requires nursing care.

Such students are also involved in legal actions far more than their more advantaged counterparts. Domestic litigation, involving custody cases, paternity suits, and the like are not uncommon. Criminal litigation, too often involving cases which have dragged on for years, drains a student's time, money, and psychic energies.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, there is of course the matter of the students whose educational preparation has been sufficiently different from, and of a lower quality than, that of other students that they are unable ever to take from the postsecondary experience as much as could have been possible given the student's talents and motivation. In spite of remediation techniques, which may be able to help a student achieve the skills to negotiate some curriculum and graduate from college, such a student these days in many instances will not have had the same opportunity as the one who arrived at college with a full head of steam, entered immediately into substantive coursework and extra curricular activities, and never looked back.

I have just detailed a depressingly lengthy catalog of some of the hindrances to equity for one class of college students. For them, equity would alleviate all of those conditions sufficiently for them to be able to proceed to maximum

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 26.

self-fulfillment in the college environment. Theirs should be the ability to develop and strengthen their autonomy freed of special inputs (remediation however defined). An equitable educational system would have no students requiring "remediation" in any form at the postsecondary level.

It might be argued that some of the poverty-related syndromes alluded to above run so deep that they are beyond short-term, educationally-based solutions. Richards believes that a generally applicable principle of the right to minimally adequate education is in the process of evolution, and furthermore that it should be within the power of schooling to ameliorate those syndromes and thus to achieve equity.<sup>12</sup> As he says

Even if one concedes the fundamental importance of extra-school factors in determining the capacity to learn, these judicial decisions seem incorrect in not putting a higher burden of proof on the schools for why special programs and the like could not reverse the effects of these background factors. It is difficult to believe that any student with the timely availability of special programs attuned to his individual needs, could not significantly profit from such programs. The courts have erred in educational malpractice cases in setting a legal standard which acquiesces to extra-school factors rather than combatting them in the way equal opportunity clearly requires. A much higher burden of proof of educational impotence should, accordingly, be placed on the schools. If, indeed, the schools could meet the burden of proving they could not overcome the effects of background, which I doubt, then the basic rationale for compulsory education would be in question. If schools cannot educate certain classes of students, they have no moral right and should have no legal right to constrain students to attend schools from which they cannot profit; schools which claim incapacity to educate can have no legitimate title to compel attendance.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Richards, "Autonomy, the Right to Education, and Human Standards," p. 3.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

Programs of academic remediation can be made to work. Ideally they should be applied as early as possible. If they are necessary in the college environment, they should be planned to be intensive early and phase out quickly, so the student can proceed, freed of restraints, as soon as possible. But an ideal system would have them phased out much earlier. Indeed, with overwhelming evidence of the impact on subsequent development of the years before any formal schooling begins, much is to be said for a public program of parent education far beyond anything our society has attempted.

The model of education as rectifier of imbalances so that equity in education can be possible has some flaws. Despite Richards' claims, it may be that some social phenomena are so powerful (such as multigenerational poverty) that their effects cannot be neutralized for all people by the education system alone.<sup>14</sup> Political-social change and wealth redistribution are beyond the scope of this essay. Racism as a potent force in American society cannot be ignored, and it seemingly cannot yet be eradicated; but until it is, equity will stay at arms' length no matter what palliatives are attempted. Also, the concept of individually-diagnosed and prescribed education, an attractive notion with many adherents, in some ways is difficult to bring into discussions of equity like this one where the focus is on groups sharing common characteristics

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<sup>14</sup>David Lavin, et al., "Open Admissions and Equal Access: A Study of Ethnic Groups in the City University of New York," Harvard Educational Review 49, No. 1 (February 1979): 58-59.

(poverty, educational underpreparation) and on master strategies for speaking to their needs. Still, Powell's objections to classifying people on the basis of "ethnicity or gender or some other irrelevancy" must be regarded as more ingenuous than the times allow. Not only will real-life political processes legislate against his aim, but so long as very strong correlations between race, poverty, and schooling achievement exist and large-scale remedies must be applied quickly, convenient groupings provide the only means for delivery of needed services to most of those who need help. And to expect, as Powell apparently does, appreciation or gratitude from those so served begs the question. His predictions of extreme institutional hatred and self-loathing under these conditions have not been borne out in the postsecondary community's operating programs, and do not take into account the important factor of group identification and pride now firmly in place for increasing numbers of persons from disadvantaged backgrounds.

#### V. The Next Decades

Postsecondary education has passed through a turbulent time between Brown and Bakke. With twenty-five years of debate and experience, however, it has yet to establish either a firm philosophical underpinning for its obligation to its various new clienteles or programmatic techniques for providing them all that they need. (The latter is in better shape, however; the growth, for instance, of sophistication in the assessment and delivery of financial aid, and in developmental/remedial

education state of the art, is remarkable.)<sup>15</sup> Unfortunately, we are not entering on a breathing space where these problems can be pondered at leisure--quite the contrary.

The City of New York provides an exemplar of some trends we can expect in postsecondary education, especially in our urban areas, for the rest of our century. In that city, there is a clear pattern in the school-age population with regard to race and ethnic group characteristics. Between 1972 and 1977 the share of New York City school enrollment (public and private) held by blacks, Hispanics, and Orientals increased from 34.4 percent to 47.7 percent for high school seniors and from 56.8 to 63.7 percent for first graders.<sup>16</sup> The projected total number of graduates from high school in that city will be decreasing from 69,197 in 1977 to 49,792 in 1989. At the same time, total wages and salaries are declining, and the average age of college students is increasing.

There is no avoiding the fact that this demographic mix will bring about a more radical change in the student bodies of the many postsecondary institutions which serve that metropolis than any yet seen. Not all, but many more of the students will be poor, will have suffered the direct or indirect effects of historical discrimination, and will be terribly under-prepared, by "traditional" standards, to enter directly into

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<sup>15</sup> Stephen Adolphus, Guidelines for the Design of Developmental Education Programs, Institute for Services to Education, Washington, D.C., 1978.

<sup>16</sup> New York State Education Department, Regents Recommendations on the Future of the City University of New York (Albany, N. Y., 1979), pp. 21-23.



regular college studies.

All America is not New York City, but no part of the country will not feel the same pressures in varying degrees. Most of the public policy questions regarding postsecondary education for the rest of this century will be equity-related questions including but not limited to the categories discussed below.<sup>17</sup>

#### A. Admissions

It will be necessary, at other than open admissions institutions, to devise admissions criteria that do not depend upon traditional measures, such as standardized test scores and high school averages or rank in class. Admissions decisions will have to be based on predictors of success not yet well developed that measure the learning potential of nontraditional students and weigh that finding against the capacity of any particular institution to teach students at various levels of preparedness. Techniques such as more sophisticated interview settings, or measures in the area of affect, such as locus-of-control instruments, are some promising beginnings already in use.

#### B. Faculty

There is a sudden rise in the numbers and visibility of those engaged in "remedial" work. This field represents a

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<sup>17</sup> Stephen Adolphus, "Serving the Underprepared Student," one of a series of background papers for the 1980 Statewide Plan for Postsecondary Education, The New York State Education Department, 1979.

potentially fertile field for the placement of tenured faculty whose specialty is under-subscribed. However, restraining programs in this area do not exist. Moreover, serious conflicts can arise when formerly senior faculty view assignment to the teaching of remedial work as denigrating, a kind of consignment to Purgatory, when in fact the very best teaching is required at this level. Similarly, young and idealistic faculty with good will and no training can do more harm than good in a remedial class. These individuals need to learn how to synchronize their reaching with the battery of supports the students may be receiving outside the classroom, to adapt conventional curriculum material to special populations, to understand the culture and backgrounds of new students, to be familiar with the extant literature of this field, and to respect their own endeavors in this work.

As long as teaching in remedial settings is a relatively low-status activity at campuses, this last problem will remain. Questions of departmental affiliation, faculty rank, tenure, and promotion for these new professionals are all being fought out now at institutions around the country.

### C. Financing

The systems by which higher education is largely financed are undergoing strains. The major state and federal systems of financial aid for undergraduate students are based upon certain assumptions: that students in general will complete an associate degree in four semesters, a bachelor's degree in eight, and that students will enroll primarily or

entirely in credit-bearing courses. Students in intensive developmental programs, however, with primarily or entirely pre-college-level work in the first semesters, reduced credit loads, and a subsequent lengthening of the time to achieve the degree, do not fall into the established pattern. If they happen not to be in a specially supported program, they may find themselves cut off from financial aid, either early in their careers if their courseload is a non-credit or reduced one, or near the end of college if they run out of semesters of "entitlement" for BEOG or other benefits.

Alternately, institutions face great pressure to award credit for purely fiscal reasons for work of a remedial nature, or to schedule students into full courseloads they may be unable to handle in order to "generate" financial aid. In the first case, the system has lessened the worth of the degree by allowing pre-college-level coursework to constitute part of the required work and thereby indirectly cheating the students. In the latter, the student is more obviously ill-served as the chances for failure have been increased.

At certain public institutions, per capita financing is calculated based on students enrolled in credit courses only--or an added differential is calculated for full-time students or students in the upper division. Yet the smaller class size, supportive academic services, and expanded contact time of remedial education makes it more expensive than many regular catalog offerings. In all of these cases, financing systems will require reexamination to see how the education of

the underprepared college student should be supported with the least harm to existing structures.

Finally in this regard, financial aid systems' methods of calculating need often use expense budgets which are not fully sensitive to the needs of the very poor in terms of medical care, dependent expenses, negative (foregone) income impact on the family, full costs of supplies, and so forth.

#### D. Currency Issues

Institutions must work through the "standards" versus "motivation" argument regarding the currencies of higher education: grades, college credits, and the awarding of the degree. The best defense the colleges have for altering entrance criteria to provide access to new populations is to maintain that exit criteria remain unaltered. However, as long as criteria are subject to such relatively subjective standards as individual professors' grading techniques, a prevailing lack of strict distributional requirements at many campuses, and transcript policies which allow students to "erase" failing grades at some institutions, the currency of the college diploma in this country, never well accepted abroad, is in danger of being devalued at home as well.

This is the cruelest joke of all to play on newly enfranchised students. A result of the awareness of this issue is a groping toward some standardization of the skills the college graduate might be expected to have. The great and rich variety of American tertiary institutions probably precludes anything like the development of rigid statewide or

national standards of minimum college graduate competencies. But it certainly appears that the increase in underprepared students is forcing institutions and systems to consider more carefully their own standards in terms of measurable levels of achievement.

#### VI. Coda

We must try to accommodate, says Powell, the greatest number of people who can be helped, in ways that help people get what they need. As I see it, what they "need," when they seek higher education, is the freedom to profit from access thereto as fully as anyone else, regardless of any happenstance of birth or situation. This transcends McClellan's "fighting chance"! Certainly this attributes to the educational system powers it has not yet demonstrated. Certainly some inequities may be inevitable. Certainly there is a point of diminishing returns in terms of additional financing of the very poor. Nevertheless, the "need" as defined above is a goal set by powerful social forces. The success of postsecondary education in our lifetime will be in large part measured against its ability to move closer to this goal.

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## CHAPTER VIII

### THE FUTURE OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL EQUITY

Edward A. De Avila  
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The future of bilingualism in the United States, and by extension, bilingual education, is intrinsically tied to its past as well as to current beliefs and socio-political realities regarding the educational treatment of language minorities in the United States. These socio-political realities are in turn dictated by the interaction of minority and majority factors which are currently divided along ethno-linguistic lines. In the next decade the outcome of these interactions will follow from the relative strengths of the two interacting entities. As relative numbers change, so do potential spheres of influence. It would seem reasonable, therefore, that a thorough understanding of the possibilities for the future would be predicated on an examination of a broad range of issues over and beyond simple consideration of any particular program in isolation.

Educational programs follow from the priorities of the body politic. As such, programs are inspired by such factors as Sputnik, the influx of Latin-Americans, or trade possibilities with the Chinese. Bilingual education on a national scale arose out of the perceived need to provide remedial services to limited and non-English-speaking students.

The question now arises as to whether or not this initial impetus is sufficient to guarantee the future of bilingual education. This question can be answered through a consideration of the socio-political and educational issues. In the discussion which follows an attempt will be made to show that a consideration of:

1. Current and future demographic patterns of language minority populations residing in the United States;
2. Changes in the concept of educational equity and the role of education within American society;
3. Changes and evolving notions concerning the character and nature of programs designed for language minority students; and
4. Changes and evolving notions concerning the character and nature of language minority students residing in the United States

leads to the conclusion that the future of bilingual education is at the forefront of issues affecting the nature of education in the United States as a whole.

#### I. Changing Population Patterns

Demographic data from various sources reveal a number of generalizations regarding the character and distribution of language minority persons in the United States. Thus, data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the U.S. Office of Civil Rights, and the National Center for Educational Statistics, while not exactly comparable, are nevertheless indicative of

a number of generalizations regarding language minority students in the United States that will have to be addressed, in one way or another, if the social cataclysm of the 60s is to be avoided. In the following, statements will be restricted to students of Hispanic background for three reasons: 1) Space limitations do not allow for a more extensive coverage of Asian, Native American, and other groups; 2) Hispanic, by far, constitute the single largest language minority group, and 3) Data are most complete for this group.

1. At least 5 percent of the total U.S. population, or approximately 12 million persons, are of Spanish origin. See Figure I and Table I. To this one must add a significant number of Asians, including Chinese, Vietnamese, Filipino, and others as well as large numbers of other Europeans who come from homes where the primary language is other than English. What this means is that a significant percentage of the current population come from backgrounds where English is not the primary language.

2. The Hispanic and Asian population is young. More than half (54%) is under 25 years of age. For the Asians the figure is 40 percent. This means that large numbers of school-age children (40% for Hispanics alone) are from homes where English is not the primary language. As an aside, it is interesting to note that within California one half (50%) of all children enrolled in kindergarten classes are from language minority backgrounds. See Table II.



3. The vast majority of Asians (figures not available as of the preparation of this document) and Hispanics (84%) live in metropolitan areas. What this means is that the future of urban education will be significantly influenced by the presence of language minority students. Thus, the study of bilingualism and bilingual education interfaces with the study of factors affecting urban education in general. See Table II.

4. At least 41 percent of the Hispanics who are of school age live in households where the language spoken is Spanish. By the most recent study, NIE estimates that there are over 3.5 million students in U.S. schools who have difficulty with the English language. See Figure III.

5. Hispanics who live in households where Spanish is spoken and who usually speak Spanish participate less in the educational system—less are enrolled and more drop out. Hispanics who live in households where Spanish is spoken but who usually speak English (in effect, who might be considered bilingual) do persist at a higher rate than other Hispanics. See Figure IV.

6. The drop-out rate of Hispanic high school graduates who enroll in post-secondary education is higher than that of any other group, notwithstanding the fact that the actual number of Hispanics who do graduate from high school is very low.

7. A very high percentage of Hispanics who do enroll in postsecondary education enroll in community colleges.

8. Educational attainment of Hispanics is very low. Only about 7 percent of persons of Spanish origin have completed four years of college or more. Of all the doctoral degrees conferred, Hispanics earned a little over 1 percent. More than 17 percent of Hispanics 25 years of age or older have less than five years of school.

9. Hispanics represent a grand total of 1.4 percent of the total full-time faculty in institutions of higher education.

Given these simple and perhaps dated statistics, there can be little doubt that the presence of language minority students will constitute a significant influence on the direction of education over the next decade. It is also important to note that the number of children potentially involved seems sufficiently large as to warrant a reconsideration of the very concept of "language minority." One important change which may directly follow from this reconsideration is the forced development of an official U.S. language policy, which has been avoided since the mid-nineteenth century (Leibowitz, n.d.).

At present the question becomes whether or not there are sufficient mechanisms to accommodate these changing patterns; since current federal programs are designed to serve only about 10 percent of those "in need" there is every indication that enormous changes are called for. From these and other data,

it would appear the number of language minority students, particularly Hispanic, is expected to increase drastically. Furthermore, it should be readily apparent that current concepts underlying equal opportunity and compensatory education are insufficient to accommodate the needs of this growing population. It would, therefore, seem appropriate to consider some of the theoretical mechanisms for dealing with linguistic and ethnic diversity which have been employed in the past. This consideration necessarily involves a review of the concept of educational equity.

## II. Educational Equity

The concept of educational equity has its earliest beginnings with the notions of Jefferson. The fundamental belief since Jefferson was that an informed populace could not be swayed by demagoguery--that, in effect, education was the best insurance against tyranny. Moreover, it was believed that education was the best protection against a tyranny of social class. Thus Horace Mann argued:

If one social class possesses all the wealth and the education, while the residue of society is ignorant and poor, it matters not by what name the relation between them be called: the latter, in fact and in truth, will be servile dependents and subjects to the former (cited in unpublished manuscript, 1979).

Education is thus seen as providing the "balancewheel of social machinery." Predicated on this belief a wide variety of court cases has since evolved the notion of "educational equity." This history and the ostensible definition or approach

to education have therefore been written in the courts. A brief review of the cases shows how the current state of affairs vis-à-vis language minority students stands at the threshold to the future of educational equity in the United States.

The establishment of compulsory education laws provided an impetus to universal education shortly after the Civil War. The idea was that school attendance and minimal skills were a requisite for all, not just the favored few as had been the case during colonial and pre-Civil War periods. A first court case to uphold educational equity in this early form occurred in 1902 when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld state compulsory education laws. In the *State vs. Jackson* Decision, Judge Remick argued, "The Constitution (in New Hampshire) declares that knowledge and learning generally diffused through the community, are essential to the preservation of a free government" (as cited unpublished manuscript, 1979). Somewhat later, in the *Plessey vs. Ferguson* case, the concept of "Separate but equal" was established in the belief that education did not necessarily imply or require social integration between blacks and whites. It is interesting at this point to note that in its early form the concepts of social and educational equity were fused. It was not until the 1950 *Sweatt Case* and the *Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka* that the concept of "separate but equal" was challenged within the context of education. It was Chief Justice Warren arguing in the *Brown Case* who claimed that "segregation generated a feeling of inferiority. . . as to . . . status in the community; damage

to their minds and hearts might well be so grave that it could never be undone." The equal protection clause was cited as the constitutional basis for the concept of "equal educational opportunity," which was further promulgated by the Civil Rights acts of 1957, 1960, and 1965.

One of the first cases involving the issue of language as related to the Civil Rights of language minority students is found in Diana This particular case involved a  
 Spanish speaking child living in California, who was placed in a class for the educationally mentally retarded on the basis of an I.Q. test administered in English. When re-tested in Spanish, it was found that the low performance was attributable to a lack of English language skills and not to any real retardation. While occurring at the state level, the case was approached within the framework of the 1965 Civil Rights act and culminated at the national level in the 1971 May 25 memo issued by the United States Office of Civil Rights which stated:

School districts must not assign national origin-minority group students to classes for the mentally retarded on the basis of criteria which essentially measure or evaluate English language skills; nor may school districts deny national origin-minority group children access to college preparatory courses on a basis directly related to the failure of the school system to inculcate English language skills.

(Memo issued by U.S. Office of Civil Rights to all U.S. School Districts, 1970).

The May 25th memo also served as a primary source for a more recent U.S. Supreme Court decision referred to as the Lau vs. Nichols case. It is at this point that the issue of educational equity became most relevant to language minority children and

was broadened to include issues over and beyond physical segregation and to include issues of appropriateness of instruction. Specifically, the decision involved the failure of a school district "to provide English language instruction to approximately 1,800 students who do not speak English." This failure was interpreted as a violation of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 which barred discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in programs receiving federal financial assistance--a law involving virtually every school district in the United States and its territorial possessions.

Thus, with the Lau Decision, we find ourselves at a crossroads, where "questions pertaining to assessment, linguistic development, classroom placement, program design, and so on, which had previously been under the exclusive purview of educators, psychologists, linguists and other social scientists become by default the responsibility of the Office for Civil Rights officials" (De Avila & Duncan, 1976).

In the period between the Brown decision and the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act there was great debate, largely derived from social science data regarding its form and substance. In exactly parallel fashion, the recent decision affecting language minority students will spawn great debate over the next decade concerning legislature, policy, and treatment of program design issues. In this sense, the Lau Decision requires extension and modification of the concept of educational equity in the United States. This need or urgency is underscored by the rapid change in the

population characteristics of language minority students, discussed above. The debate which will take place over the next decade and longer will no doubt have a direct and lasting impact on the concept of educational equity in the United States.

### III. Programs

Given the above discussion concerning the changing population characteristics of the U.S.A. and the evolving concept of educational equity, it becomes necessary to view the general issue of treatment. In other words, given that there is a large and increasing population of students for whom the current curriculum is inappropriate or inequitable, it becomes necessary to examine the programmatic and practical assumptions underlying the design and delivery of educational programs for not only language minority children, but for all children. As will be seen, to do otherwise would be to isolate further the language minority student from other mainstream American children.

While the Supreme Court avoided prescribing specific programmatic requirements, numerous states (23) have enacted various bilingual education legislation aimed at compliance with the Lau requirements (see Teitlebaum & Hiller, 1977). To a large extent, the intent of these legislative acts along with other federal enactments (see Title VII regs.) has been to establish "transitional" programs aimed at remediating English language defects while providing minimal instruction in substantive basic skill areas.

Over the next decade it will be important to review and question the basis of this approach in light of 1) the appropriateness or practicability of implementing such programs, given the shifting nature of the population of children to be served; 2) the consistency of such programs with current concepts of educational equity; and 3) the outcomes to be expected from such programs, given the above considerations.

The practice of providing vernacular instruction is far from new and goes all the way back to the German schools in Pennsylvania and Ohio, where in 1837 laws were passed permitting schools to provide instruction in German on an "equal basis with English" (Faust, 1969). In reviewing the past as compared to present conceptualization of what constitutes an appropriate response to the "language problems," it is important to bear in mind, as pointed out by Leibowitz (n.d.), that initially, at least, the use of German posed no threat to the population at large since their numbers were small.

In more recent times there have been three basic responses to the problem of providing instruction to children from non-English-speaking backgrounds. These are 1) English as a second language (ESL) only; 2) bilingual core curriculum in conjunction with ESL; and 3) ESL in conjunction with "maintenance" of home language arts. The implicit assumption in virtually all of these responses has been that the poor academic showing of language minority students can be



"remediated" only through linguistic means or intervention. In other words, the superficial assumption has been that since the problem is linguistic in nature (i.e., the children don't speak English well enough to fully participate in English-only classrooms) the solution must be, therefore, linguistic in nature. This assumption has been questioned from a variety of perspectives (see De Avila & Duncan, 1978; Carter & Segura, 1979) as being deficit-based and not in keeping with current findings in other countries (see Cohen & Luosa, 1976; Chow & Luosa, 1977; Skutnabb-Kangas, 1976, 1979).

As pointed out in the above, the use of two languages in education on a small scale is not new per se (see Kelseth, 1973; Leibowitz, 1959; Fishman, 1977). What makes current implementations for bilingual education problematic in the United States is the lack of models which have been empirically or operationally defined so as to allow for their evaluation and wide-scale implementation. Given the plethora of languages and the vast diversity of groups to be served, it is no surprise that one finds equivocal results (AIR, 1978; CAL, 1979) as to the effects of bilingual instruction. It might be added that up to the present time there has been no full-scale evaluation of the effects of bilingual education in the United States over and beyond the AIR study which was restricted to Title-7 programs and fraught with design difficulties virtually negating the value of the study.

There is little doubt that bilingual education will exist in one form or another and grow over the next decade.

Given the shifting population patterns, coupled with the concept of educational equity and self-determination, there is little reason to believe that current pressures for education in the home language will abate in any way during the foreseeable future. As such, a wide variety of topics will need to be examined. These topics range from general considerations of socio-political decisions concerning funding patterns (i.e., school finance and governance) to more specific concerns regarding the nature of the pedagogical soundness of particular language mixtures in the classroom and their effect on achievement in different subject matter areas. In this regard, it is important to point out that the parameters affecting bilingual education are, to a large degree, not very different from the general issues affecting education in general. Bilingual education cannot be viewed in an educational vacuum or in isolation, as if bilingual education were some special form of remedial education applicable only to a limited segment of the community. Thus, in addition to issues affecting the interface of languages and cultures, bilingual education, like all education, must address issues of teaming, social status in the classroom, individualized instruction, integration, exceptionality, and learning disabilities, matching teachers to student characteristics, basic skills, social development, and on and on.

The problem of providing trained teachers for language minority children is indicative of the types of practical issues faced at the school level. It is a massive problem

as illustrated by the fact that in Los Angeles alone there is a current need for approximately 2,000 certified teachers. The enormity of this particular problem comes home when one considers that the institutions for higher learning within California are producing only about 600 per year.

#### IV. Children

If the future bilingual education is to endure, we must learn more about the nature of the individual served by it. The current conceptualization has provided brief discussion at the molar levels of population and programs. The following concluding discussion will consist of a number of brief comments concerning the nature of the children to be served by bilingual education and how their study might add to the development of a more coherent understanding of how the ends of educational equity can be best served in a linguistically and ethnically diverse society.

By and in large most of the past research of language minority children has been directed toward 1) documenting the low achievement of children rather than attempting to explain its basis; and 2) showing how they differ from mainstream children. Such attempts have provided precious little in the way of direction. And, furthermore, what little has been done has tended at one level to stereotype and at another to produce programs predicated on the presumption that there is something wrong (deficient) with children who come from homes where English is not the primary language.

Research concerning other linguistic minority children has also documented their low academic achievement and retention rates (e.g., Gaudia, 1972; Horn, 1970; Lesser, Fiffer & Clark, 1967; Stewart et al., 1955; Werner et al., 1968). It would thus appear that Hispanic and other children do not do very well in American schools, and because of this, they leave. One need not document this deplorable situation with other studies. The important question becomes "Why is the achievement of these children so low in the first place?"

Research concerning this question has produced explanations derived from between-group comparisons on variables thought to be related to academic achievement. Unfortunately, for example, when within-group analysis of the relationship between these so-called group difference variables and academic achievement is made, almost without exception English language proficiency is ignored. (See De Avila & Duncan, 1978).

Carter and Segura (1979) present convincing data which illustrates that not only do Hispanic children evidence lower overall achievement in virtually every academic area, but that the "holding power" of the schools is substantially less for these students than for any other group save Native Americans.

As an example of one approach, considerable attention has been given to the argument that the low academic achievement of at least some language minority children is due in part to an incompatibility between the "cognitive style" of these children and that which is emphasized in the schools.

Such incompatibilities are said to be the end result of socialization styles reflecting the cultural values and background of the ethnic group (Ramirez, Castaneda, and Herold, 1974).

Other areas of focus stem from earlier conceptions of the characteristics of low achievers. For example, Metfessel and Seng (1970) characterize the low achiever as one whose "cognitive structure" has important gaps in fundamental knowledge, is typically handicapped in language development, and generally has parents who are poor language models and who do not value or encourage intellectual development. In one context or another, such variables as self-concept, attitudes toward school, motivation to achieve, language deficiency, bilingualism, cognitive development, and even intelligence have all been identified as important determinants of low academic achievement (Coleman et al., 1966; Kagan & Buriel, 1977; Ogbu, 1974).

However, for a variety of methodological and theoretical reasons, recent investigations have tended to reject virtually all of these conceptualizations concerning academic achievement, especially with respect to Mexican-Americans (e.g., see Cervantes, 1976; De Avila et al., 1976; Duncan & De Avila, 1979; Kagan & Buriel, 1977; Ogbu, 1974). For example, in their recent review of the literature on language minority students, De Avila and Duncan (1978) found that in only one out of a total of over 120 studies which claimed to examine various effects due to the "bilingualism" of language

minority students was the oral language proficiency of the comparison groups actually assessed or controlled (Peal & Lambert, 1962).

In a series of recent studies, investigators have directly challenged prior research which had suggested that bilingualism had a negative effect on intellectual as well as academic functioning.

Finally, research by Cohen (1973, 1977, 1979) points to the importance of perceived status and teacher expectations in the academic performance of blacks, Mexican-Americans, and other minorities. Her research sheds new light on the effects of teacher judgments on student achievement.

Despite this knowledge, little information is known concerning those factors which contribute most to influencing the achievement of language minority children.

The following is a concluding brief review of past approaches to the study of children who come from homes where English is not the primary language. The purpose of the discussion is to show that the future of bilingualism is tied not only to the above considerations, but to the development of a better understanding of the nature of children as they grow up in a multi-lingual world.

Since the Coleman Report in 1966, the low academic achievement of many students has been well documented. Investigations have reported that the Mexican-American, Native American, Puerto Rican, and other ethnolinguistically different populations are characterized by overageness per grade,

excessive grade repetition, high dropout rates, and in general, low academic achievement (Anderson, 1969a; Cervantes, 1976; Crane, 1977; National Center of Educational Statistics, 1978; United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1971).

In particular, the educational problems of Spanish language background children have been well established in several reports released by the United States Commission on Civil Rights (Report I, 1971; The Unfinished Education, 1971; The Excluded Student, 1972; Teachers and Students, 1973; Towards Quality Education, 1974). More recently, the National Assessment of Education Progress Report (NAEP, Crane, 1977) has documented the low achievement of Hispanic school age children from 1971 to 1975 in five learning areas: reading, social studies, mathematics, vocational education, and science. In each of these areas, the Hispanic child is below the national average.

The reasons for this are various, but to some extent, at least, they can be attributed to an overemphasis on research approaches which inevitably end in invidious comparisons between mainstream and non-mainstream children (Anastasi, 1976; Cole, 1975; Mercer, 1975, 1973; Rosch, 1975; Scribner, 1974). Anastasi (1976) points out that "tests whose items have been selected with reference to the responses of any special groups cannot be used to compare such groups." Rosch (1975) points out the dangers in making comparisons between groups. She states, "(S)uch comparisons can unfortunately easily fall into the logic of a psychometric 'deficit model'." Given the tendency

for researchers to infer that tests measure underlying abilities or traits (e.g., see Tryon, 1979), such group comparisons can be devastating in effect.

In addition, in virtually all investigations into the sources of low achievement, much attention is given to those sociocultural aspects that correlate with academic achievement on the assumption of a causal relation. Consequently, it is not surprising that the tendency has been to focus on the personal and behavioral characteristics of language minority children thought to result from different and limited environmental experiences. Thus, the relationship between group difference variables and achievement is based on the observation that group differences on these variables occur concurrently with group difference in achievement does not follow.

It is the considered opinion of the present writers that past research must continue to be challenged; not so much so as to ensure the future of bilingualism (which is guaranteed by virtue of population), but so as to offer a more salubrious foundation upon which to base future bilingual (and other) educational programs.

#### V. Summary and Conclusions

In the above, the future of bilingualism and bilingual education was discussed. First, issues related to the rapid population shift within the ethno-linguistic community were discussed, indicating that the United States is, in fact, a multilingual nation and becoming more so. This discussion gave



rise to a brief review of the concept of educational equity, where it was argued that the history of the concept of equity reaches the present day in the form of the Lau Case which deals with the language minorities in the U.S. In the discussion it was argued that the Lau Case provides a bridge to not only the future of bilingualism, but to the future of the very character of educational equity in the United States. Furthermore, it was argued that past conceptualizations of equity lead to the belief that the needs of students from homes where English is not the primary language could best be served through the provision of program models, based on the concepts of compensatory education and seeming to yield equivocal results regarding impact on students. Finally, it was argued that prior study, as to the effect of bilingualism and other variables among language minority students, tended to reinforce prior programmatic conceptualizations vis-à-vis appropriate treatment.


These issues, it would seem, lie at the very heart of bilingualism in the United States. These considerations serve both as grim reminders to past inequities and as a rationale which serves as a coherent basis for the understanding of the future.

FIGURE I

# Ethnic Composition of the Population 4 Years Old and Over, July 1975

In 1975, persons of Spanish origin were about 5 percent and Blacks about 11 percent of the U.S. population 4 years old and over. The percent of each ethnic group between 4 and 25 years old was higher for persons of Spanish origin than for any other ethnic group identified.

See table 1.03




\*German, Italian, English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, French, Polish, Russian, Greek, Portuguese

†Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Korean

Source of Data: National Center for Education Statistics, July 1975 Survey of Languages.

FIGURE II Age Composition of Ethnic Groups

Population 4 years old and over  
Number, in thousands



Percent of each ethnic group between 4 and 25 years old in July, 1975.

Source of Data: National Center for Education Statistics, July 1975 Survey of Languages.

Table I

## TOTAL AND SPANISH ORIGIN POPULATION BY AGE AND TYPE OF SPANISH ORIGIN

(For the United States, March 1978)

Age	Total population	Spanish origin						Net of Spanish origin <sup>1</sup>
		Total	Mexican	Puerto Rican	Cuban	Central or South American	Other Spanish	
All ages....(thousands)...	214,159	12,046	7,151	1,823	689	863	1,519	202,113
Percent.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years.....	7.2	12.6	13.9	11.3	5.7	9.4	13.4	6.8
5 to 9 years.....	7.9	11.5	11.8	13.6	6.8	9.2	10.6	7.7
10 to 17 years.....	14.5	17.7	17.3	21.1	13.4	14.8	18.9	14.4
18 to 20 years.....	5.8	6.2	6.6	5.2	5.2	5.8	6.1	5.8
21 to 24 years.....	7.1	7.8	8.4	6.2	5.4	6.7	8.1	7.1
25 to 34 years.....	15.4	15.7	16.1	16.4	11.4	21.2	12.4	15.5
35 to 44 years.....	11.1	11.0	10.2	11.5	14.4	16.6	10.0	11.1
45 to 54 years.....	10.8	8.4	7.8	8.2	15.3	8.1	8.6	10.9
55 to 64 years.....	9.6	4.8	4.2	4.4	9.2	5.1	5.8	9.9
65 years and over.....	10.5	4.3	3.7	2.3	13.3	3.1	6.1	10.9
18 years and over.....	70.4	58.3	57.0	54.0	74.1	66.7	57.1	71.1
21 years and over.....	64.6	52.1	50.4	48.8	68.9	60.8	51.0	65.3
Median age.....(years)...	29.5	22.1	21.1	20.3	36.5	26.8	21.5	30.0

<sup>1</sup> Includes persons who did not know or did not report on origin.

## Source:

U. S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1978. (Advanced Report). Current Population Reports. Population Characteristics. Series P-20, No. 328. August 1978. Washington, D.C. U.S. Printing Office, August 1978, p.5.

Table II

**METROPOLITAN-NONMETROPOLITAN RESIDENCE OF ALL FAMILIES AND  
SPANISH ORIGIN FAMILIES BY TYPE OF SPANISH ORIGIN**

(For the United States, March 1978. Numbers in thousands)<sup>1</sup>

Area	Total families	Spanish origin families					Families not of Spanish origin <sup>2</sup>
		Total	Mexican	Puerto Rican	Cuban	Other Spanish origin <sup>1</sup>	
United States.....	57,215	2,764	1,623	437	186	518	54,451
Metropolitan areas.....	37,841	2,359	1,315	417	181	447	35,482
In central cities.....	15,360	1,412	752	345	69	246	13,948
Outside central cities.....	22,481	948	563	71	112	202	21,533
Nonmetropolitan areas.....	19,374	405	308	21	5	71	18,969
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION							
United States.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Metropolitan areas.....	66.1	85.4	81.0	95.2	97.3	86.3	65.2
In central cities.....	26.8	51.1	46.3	79.0	37.1	47.5	25.6
Outside central cities.....	39.3	34.3	34.7	16.2	60.2	39.0	39.5
Nonmetropolitan areas.....	33.9	14.6	19.0	4.8	2.7	13.7	34.8


<sup>1</sup>Includes families of Central or South American origin and other Spanish origin.

<sup>2</sup>Includes families with head who did not know or did not report on origin.

Source:


U. S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1978. (Advanced Report). Current Population Reports. Population Characteristics. Series P-20, No. 328. August 1978. Washington, D.C. U.S. Printing Office, August 1978, p.6.

**FIGURE III**  
**Language Usage**



Source of Data: National Center for Education Statistics, July 1975 Survey of Languages.

**FIGURE IV**  
**Enrollment of Persons of Spanish Origin,**  
**by Language Usage**



Percent of persons of Spanish Origin 6 to 34 years old enrolled in school, 1974-75.

Source of Data: National Center for Education Statistics, July 1975 Survey of Languages.

## CHAPTER IX

### AN OPINION ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

T. F. Powell

The 1960s and early '70s saw a revolt against the authority of traditional institutions, and against customary, established patterns of providing opportunity for young people. The first effect of this revolt was entirely salutary, opening opportunities for many who would otherwise have been unjustly blocked from entering channels to achievement and affluence. Americans in general, and modern liberals in particular, evinced unbounded faith in education as the principal avenue to success, however defined. The symbol of early success was the bachelor's degree, and access to it was broadened by opportunity programs and special admissions procedures for categories of potential students who had been denied by conventional criteria of admission.

A second effect of this revolt was that requirements for graduation from college, as well as those for admission to college in the first place, were overthrown. As William L. O'Neill succinctly stated, the 1960s were "hell on standards." Traditional requirements such as facility in standard English, mathematical literacy, exposure to a foreign language and culture, grounding in western and American history, and familiarity with the methods and laboratory techniques of science, seemed to imply invidious judgments, to make "elitist"

or "exclusionist" cultural claims. Soon it was no longer possible to assume anything about what the holder of a bachelor's degree knew or could do (and it still is not possible). Ironically, degrees were devalued just as they were made available to non-white, non-middle class populations, particularly poor urban blacks. It may not be too much to say that the worst enemies of blacks and other ethnic minorities turned out to be well-meaning critics of the old requirements and standards (like me); for the degrees to which they were finally provided access were abruptly rendered much less important than previously.

A period of disillusionment began. The great bachelor of arts degree was no longer a guarantee of anything much because nobody could tell from it anything much about the person who held it. Some institutions of higher education, most notably the City University of New York, were bitterly criticized for not being elementary schools. Some educators worried, even in print, about what would be the effects of allowing people to enter professional schools, such as medical schools, without the level of background education earlier deemed essential, and of allowing people whose credentials represented special concessions and indulgences to the ranks of professionals. Some lost their positions for expressing such misgivings. But, questioning has increased in recent years as to the wisdom, advisability, feasibility, or justice of straining to establish in a short time proportions of individuals in all occupational categories analogous to the proportions of their various groups



in the general population. As debate continues, the central question remains: What is equitable educational opportunity?

By way of prefatory remarks, some consideration of the idea of equality in the Anglo-American intellectual tradition may be useful. Thomas Hobbes, now appropriately returned to first rank among influential thinkers, wrote in 1651 that "when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he."<sup>1</sup> John Locke, the towering figure in the transition from rationalism to empiricism, wrote in the late 17th century that all men are endowed with intuitive reason to grasp self-evident truths. His confidence in discursive reason, the universal capacity to interpret the testimony of the senses, also had egalitarian implications. But in the 18th century Locke's view was eclipsed by a still more egalitarian and truly revolutionary persuasion, that all men alike have a sense with which they can perceive moral truths, without benefit of intellectual capacity or training. This moral sense philosophy had many forceful advocates: Lord Shaftesbury, student and later patron of Locke, whose essays appeared in 1711; Francis Hutcheson, the grandfather of utilitarianism; David Hume, the great Scottish logician; Jonathan Edwards, most eminent of 18th century Puritan theologians; Lord Kames; and Thomas Jefferson. Not to mention the work of Richard Price, the first thinker

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<sup>1</sup>Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1950), p. 101.

to use the term "intuitionism," the moral sense view is suitably exemplified in the work of Thomas Reid. In arguments over whether or not an assertion is self-evident, i.e., need only be grasped to be recognized as true (Locke's definition), ". . . every man is a competent judge; and therefore it is difficult to impose upon mankind. To judge of first principles, requires no more than a sound mind free from prejudice, and a distinct conception of the question. The learned and the unlearned, the Philosopher and the day-labourer, are upon a level, and will pass the same judgment, when they are not misled by some bias, or taught to renounce their understanding for some mistaken religious principles."<sup>2</sup>

Thomas Jefferson went even farther in drawing egalitarian inferences from the universality of the moral sense. In a 1787 letter to his nephew, Peter Carr, he suggested that there was no point in the young man's studying moral philosophy because "The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. . . . This sense is submitted indeed in some degree to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call Common Sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules."

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<sup>2</sup>Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1785, in Essay VI, Chapter IV, 566.

Perhaps no single development so buttressed the idea of equality as did the emergence of utilitarianism in the 19th century. The utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and James Mill in particular, were heirs alike of common sense philosophy, British empiricism, and the moral sense philosophy that led Hutcheson to formulate the magnetically appealing "calculus" of the greatest good for the greatest number. Their views pervaded and dominated ethical theory in the English-speaking societies as no other views have in modern times. Perhaps in great measure because utilitarianism was attuned to the ways of thought that seemed implicit in and complementary to the burgeoning industrialism and materialism of the 19th century, not to mention the scientism of the early 20th, its spokesmen were virtually unrivalled for influence in ethical thought. Despite the protests of the Transcendentalists and other idealists against materialism's objectification of individuals, the progression from utilitarianism through naturalism to functionalism, pragmatism, instrumentalism, and social science was inexorable.

After the publication of The Origin of Species in 1859, the Darwinian view of man as organism lent massive impetus to deterministic perspectives, and social science took shape on the basis of classification in a time when ethnic categories preoccupied scholars and others, together with the economic and class categories brought to the fore by Marx and his interpreters. Social scientific taxonomic habits formed along easy, "natural" lines, objectifying, quantifying, and

de-personalizing. Emerson's "man working," a complete man, thinking, feeling, being a lover, husband, father, friend, became "worker," functionally defined by socio-economic categories.

At the same time, the long collapse of institutional authority slowly accelerated. Commitment to institutions is possible, or at least sane, only as commitment to the principles, the values, they represent. Indifference to individuals breeds contempt for institutions. When institutions frustrate or deprive us, we hate them. But when they produce desired results, do we appreciate them, or feel grateful? Not if they are impersonal. We hate them then too, because they leave us no pride at all, but make us feel worthless, meaningless and fecal even in the process of meeting our wishes. We feel like mere things in categories addressed by policies. When benefits are institutionally arranged for us as blacks or women or Chicanos or Indians or poor people, nothing is done for me as a person, and no commitment from me as a person who happens to be in such a category is called for: just resentment, in response to being treated like a thing. The habitual taxonomy of utilitarianism and of social science is neither just nor practical, for it neglects individuals and commands no loyalty to institutions or society.

Just as the utilitarian-pragmatic thrust of social science has supported a radically egalitarian spirit, perhaps most clear in its quantitative, statistical fixation, so the same thrust has undermined traditional conceptions of morality.

People still moralize in abortive ways, but ethical theory as theory of obligation is of no use whatever in any attempt to show that educational opportunity ought to be equal or equitable in any sense. There is no way to demonstrate by reason that anyone owes to anyone else opportunity, education, or even decency. Ethical theory is overwhelmingly intuitionist, the ethicists having given up the effort to demonstrate obligation by reason at the time of G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica, 1902. The best efforts of contemporary ethical writers, such as John Rawls, to establish a "distributive" theory of justice, may persuade us of advisability, but they cannot compel us to acknowledge obligation.

Utilitarianism, so long dominant in ethics, has been repeatedly shown to have resolved itself into egoism in our naturalistic times. It demonstrates nothing more than that self-interest and expediency can replace more high-sounding ethical considerations: hardly a revelation. Yet there is hope for a wellspring of policy and action even in egoism. Egoism is attended by egalitarianism, not as a moral or ethical principle, but much more as a self-interested and aggressive claim: everyone is free to insist upon equality, however understood. I want, I demand an "equal opportunity."

Does this mean that I assert my right to be treated the same as everyone else? Not exactly; more like the right to be treated as well as anyone else, to have my needs met, to get "all I am entitled to." But I am "entitled to" all I can get of whatever I need, am I not? In fact it appears that what

the poor and weak want is to be rich and powerful, not equal. They are not so much crusaders or seekers after justice as after comfort. Minorities, for example, are not morally superior, just hungry; not only for decent opportunity but for advantages, favor, goodies, toys, just like everyone else.

People now disparagingly called liberals, who sought widened opportunity on the basis of sympathy, compassion, or what was sometimes expressed as "moral outrage," were often disabused of their assumptions by concrete experience of the Jack London Phenomenon. Like that author, whose heart ached for the poor but who was invariably disillusioned when among them, moralists seemed to think that there are some "minorities" who must be collectively "deserving" because of having been oppressed and exploited. They--we--were soon relieved of such romantic notions. Shortly the fact was clear, that everyone is motivated by pretty much the same kinds of concerns, that it is both unrealistic and disrespectful toward any people to think that what they seek is anything different from what the rest of us seek. The concern of the whole society for the "disadvantaged" is moral; but it should not be an exercise in moralism. It is hard to make a case for people "deserving" anything, just as blame is not very useful. But the point got made, we are all persons; and the question is, what do we have coming as persons in the way of education? The individual makes a demand for attention. How is this demand to be met and reconciled with the demands of others?

As noted, this question admits of no compelling answer in terms of obligation on the part of anyone. It is a question of what the sense of the meeting is, among those actively concerned, on what we want, not what we are obliged to do. I take it that, for self-interest if for no other reason, we want as nearly as possible for everyone to be an able, productive, useful member of society; to feel, as a person, pretty well satisfied that he or she has gotten a fair shake and is receiving rewards commensurate with abilities and efforts. Nothing new here; but what is a fair shake in this regard?

The law called 94-142 is surely a truer application of utilitarian spirit and of social science. Enough of black and white people, male and female, Hispanic and native American people; let us see instead who needs what, regardless of easy categorization in other ways, and provide what our resources and our will permit us to provide. Everyone having come up empty from other branches of the philosophical and historical streams, the authors of this law are informed by a pragmatic spirit that draws upon our traditions of both egalitarianism and individualism; Educational programs, to the extent that they can address the accumulated injustices of groups against one another in the past, can do so fruitfully only by dealing with the educational needs of individuals. If the public goal is to let each one become (make each one?) as competent and well situated as circumstances permit, then individuals for whom some identifiable obstacle stands in the way of our all reaching this goal must have special attention. We must

classify people, but let us classify ourselves on the basis of individual needs rather than ethnicity or gender or some other irrelevancy. The demands of individuals must be assessed in terms of how accurately they reflect needs; we must choose classifications that violate individuality as little as possible, and classify to serve individuals.

Treating people's opportunity on an individual basis appeals not only to reason but to American tradition as well. Jefferson's famous letter to Adams on the idea that a society should be open to virtue and talent (October 26, 1813) is priceless; but nobody was ever more succinct on the subject than Noah Webster, Jr., in 1793: "Here every man finds employment, and the road is open for the poorest citizen to amass wealth by labor and economy, and by his talent and virtue to raise himself to the highest offices of the State."<sup>3</sup> This has never been an accurate description of reality, obviously; but it has always been a description of a real goal.

Although justice is all of a piece, I have to leave to others the unenviable task of dealing with educational equity for children. My proximate concern is with transitional adults, in their later teens and early twenties, and with adults. "Opportunity," as it concerns me most directly, is opportunity for people of some maturity to attend and benefit from college. In this setting, classification of people according to the old conceptual habits of social science--black, Spanish-surnamed,

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<sup>3</sup>Noah Webster, Jr., Effects of Slavery on Morals and Industry, Hartford, 1793, pp. 31-32.



and the like--utterly fails to recognize the real, actual needs of individuals. It violates our whole American tradition of accommodating individual differences, and we are more practical and more genuinely moral when we use the tools of social science rather than following slavishly its misleadingly convenient taxonomies.

The recent trend in legislative and theoretical thinking recognizes this error in past efforts to recognize diversity; but of course we can only assume that in the endeavor to meet individual needs we shall also meet needs that fall, for whatever reasons, into patterns or categories of the general population. Without doubt, individual programs of instruction will or would have far greater effect on urban black people, for example, than on people who are more comfortable with standardized devices such as the Scholastic Aptitude Tests. Much evidence suggests that meeting problems on an individual basis is equitable toward minorities, including the poor; and in fact, any effective individualized program will necessarily be a real "affirmative action" program. The poor, among whom sociological minorities are disproportionately represented, suffer more than others from every kind of handicap, as Michael Harrington and others so dramatically showed in the early '60s. These "populations," then, would receive the greatest attention on the basis of individual need; but with the important difference that the appropriate "members" of each category would have their educational potentialities and needs dealt with.

College opportunity is, in Martel's indispensable terms, first of all possibility. Any attempt to convert colleges into facilities that accommodate people who cannot learn, or people who are unmotivated to learn about the human capacity for abstraction, would seem to be misguided. When we speak of college opportunity we refer to opportunity for those who have some tolerance for abstraction to develop, refine, and fulfill their intellectual dispositions. Whatever our broader social and political concerns may be, the direct business of the college is with one segment of the general populace, no matter what factors in the natural and institutional environments have shaped it.

When we consider equity in relation to college, we confront the same problem met by those whose principal concern is the accommodation of handicapped children: namely, what is a handicap within our purview? How do we define "handicap," and how identify specific individual handicaps susceptible of educational solution? Laurence Martel and Joseph Marr Cronin address the problem of definition with regard to "opportunity" and "equity"; and in another way we probably need to define as well the task of education. Educational institutions seem to have no alternative, however beguiling may be the notion that they "should" be able to cure the difficulties of the world, but to address opportunity and equity on the basis of education. The consultant Barbara Aiello says of teaching handicapped children that "Teachers have shown themselves willing to put up with severe physical disabilities so long as the child is a

more or less normal learner. The opposition comes with students who are likely to be disruptive and pose classroom management problems."<sup>4</sup> Transposing this observation to college education, one might say that faculties are willing to "put up with" just about anything in the way of other characteristics, as long as the student is a more or less apt learner of what they have to teach; and opposition comes when the people in classes are not really students. Our effort is to reach all those people who can derive some benefit from systematic attention to the various forms of intellectual experience.

A liberal arts curriculum, for example, is for people who have the desire and the ability to do intellectual work. How about open admissions, then? In all seriousness, I would suggest that we have open admissions in the same way that we have open try-outs for university sports programs. A professor of English once placed in a student newspaper an open letter to the head football coach. He said that he had a student who had all the qualifications for a Rhodes Scholarship except a letter in a varsity sport; and he asked the coach, as a favor, if he would let this one hundred-twenty-pound, near-sighted, uncoordinated boy play on the football team for a few games, perhaps in some inconspicuous place, in the middle of the line. But football, it turned out, is for people who have the desire and the ability to block and tackle.

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<sup>4</sup>The New York Times, May 13, 1979, 8E (emphasis added).

Open admissions? Yes, but to appropriate programs determined by the individual's having some possibility of successful experience. College is for people who have the desire and ability to think and study. Is that "elitist"? I would deny it. I would also deny the notion that intellectual matters should (or can) be presented so that anyone can satisfactorily deal with them in the same courses. The coin of the realm of discourse about ideas is an amalgam of analytical and symbol-manipulating abilities, just as the coin of the athletic realm is an amalgam of strength and speed. This is the practical reality of Martel's observation that without possibility there is no opportunity.

My plea is for open admissions for everyone to whatever he or she needs and can use; but for everyone's sake, let's recognize that "college," in the traditional sense which should be preserved, cannot create opportunity for everyone to do everything. We do not provide opportunity when we enroll people in programs in which success requires potentialities they do not possess. I, for example, do not have and never have had any opportunity to become a respectable musician. I have the same opportunity as anyone else to pursue music at my own level of ability; but would it be fair or reasonable to expect the public to invest in such a pursuit. Only as a recreational program. The lack of serious ability, or possibility for development, is quite real; and there is no kind of opportunity that anyone can or should attempt to provide to change that fact.

Under our system and set of traditions, we are all entitled to recognition of our abilities. We can demand that we have the opportunity to bring our possibilities to fruition. We have the virtually undisputed right to demonstrate and use our abilities; but there is no right to have the claim of them taken seriously or supported if they are not demonstrable.

Much of the confusion about formulating a sense of purpose for colleges has stemmed from the historical fact that the same people who have given systematic attention to intellectual experience have, by and large, been economically successful. It has been easy, even irresistible, to assume that since educated people and prosperous people are often the same people, education brings about prosperity. This is a disastrous oversimplification. Trained, marketable abilities bring about prosperity. Practice does not make perfect; practice that is perfect, of skills that can be perfected, makes perfect. Poor practice, or practice aimed at unrealistic goals, makes frustration. Not equity. Richard Freeman's unfortunate expression, the "over-educated American," only muddies further the dismal pool in which vocational training is mixed with liberal and general education. There is no such being as an "over-educated" anybody. Inappropriately trained, perhaps, for the labor market. It may be that our unemployment of college graduates shows a surplus of skills; or is it that educational credentials don't represent the kinds of skills they are purported to represent?

What do these documents, diplomas and degrees, mean? Ideally, I would suggest, they mean that the bearer, already possessing some capacities for reflection, analysis, and expression, has taken advantage of an opportunity to develop and focus these features of himself. But we are now frustrating the sound purposes of our own colleges; and more importantly, still, we are frustrating large numbers of people who have been led to believe that their economic opportunities depend upon stoically allowing herds of ideas to trample through their heads. The equations of opportunity to education and education to college have brought us to a pass at which we should concentrate on diverse alternatives without delay; and when they are provided, the colleges themselves can become what they ought to be: institutions for intellectually inclined people whose other characteristics reflect the diverse composition of society.

Need for what Professor Thomas Green calls a share of special attention should be determined on an individual basis. Not every kind of handicap or deprivation can be dealt with in or by the educational system. Not every regrettable set of conditions indicates the reasonableness of an educational attempt to find a remedy. At any given time we confront the cumulative sad consequences of past conditions, such as the day-after-day, year-after-year distractions inherent in poverty, or the life-long acculturation in a reservation value system that holds education in little or no esteem, and indeed militates against it.

Our system asserts that people are equally entitled to what they need: i.e., to what they can use toward their own

ends. Every person who is blocked by lack of facility in standard English--the language of instruction because it is the basic language of social and economic intercourse here--is entitled to extra instruction. Standardized tests in Spanish, e.g., are necessary; but the United States should not casually give up the great advantages of a national language. The "English schools" in Spain might provide a useful model: they simply teach the same materials in Spanish in the morning and in English in the afternoon; and when one can function in the morning, he or she needn't attend in the afternoon. As for teaching ghetto argot as the language of a subculture, one would hope that we were beyond the stage of perpetuating such deliberate racial handicapping.

Every person with an uncommon talent or high level of ability should have a share of special instruction. Jefferson's great 1778 proposal, the Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge (never enacted), set out two goals in its preamble: "... to illuminate, as far as practicable, the minds of the people at large and to make sure "... that those persons, whom nature has endowed with genius and virtue, should be rendered by liberal education worthy to receive, and able to guard the sacred deposit of the rights and liberties of their fellow citizens, and that they should be called to that charge without regard to wealth, birth, or other accidental condition or circumstance."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Cf. Merrill Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation (New York, 1970), p. 146.



Every person whose economic circumstances distract him or her from the tasks of self-development should have a share of extra financial help. One would hope and assume that economic access to education is no longer an issue. Every person hindered by circumstances that can be improved through social service or clinical avenues should have appropriate help.

What is the role of public agencies in extending opportunity, then? I would say it is to seek out ways of identifying individual potentialities, to support ways of fulfilling them, and to disseminate information about those real opportunities to everyone. To broaden and make more equitable the results of college experience, a desirable "output," requires three kinds of differential "inputs":

1. Input as student recruiting: axiomatically, colleges offer instruction, intellectual stimulation and experience, and opportunity for development of primarily mental skills and abilities; and they should offer them to every person who has the intelligence and motivation to make use of them.

The first national model opportunity program was the Experiment in Higher Education, federally funded, accredited under Southern Illinois University, and fully operational in the East St. Louis ghetto in summer, 1966. (Volunteer projects in Akron and elsewhere, even before the Community Action Projects, had tested its premises.) Ten very "hip" young staff members who had demonstrated ability to succeed as advanced students recruited one hundred young people on the basis of



motivation and evidence of ability to learn. The students in this first class had to be out of high school for at least one year, unemployed, and recommended by someone as having the ability to learn--not earlier success. They also had to convince the staff members that they had a strong desire to "get off the street." There were no other strict qualifications for enrollment.

Of these one hundred persons, who included pregnant students, drug users and a number with criminal records for offenses including major felonies, eighty-four finished the two-year program and became regular juniors in good standing at Southern Illinois, or transferred to other institutions. They went to Oberlin, Antioch, Michigan, Minnesota, Illinois, and S.U.N.Y. Oswego among others. To my knowledge, they were all graduated. Some have advanced degrees. One poor devil is a dean.

In the later 1960s the idea of opportunity program student recruiting became radically egalitarian, proceeding on the premise that students could be enrolled without regard to any identifiable capacity for mental work, or to motivation, or desire to use what the system could provide. The results stand in appalling contrast to those of the East St. Louis model and others like it, particularly when one considers that every space wasted could have been filled by a young person who would have had an excellent chance of "equal" or equivalent outcome. The premise of the East St. Louis experiment proved accurate: "Hip on the corner, hip on the campus,"

as I put it at the time. If a kid could figure the odds in a crap game, he could do math. But not every kid who "hung out" on the corner was a likely prospect for higher education. They had to be recruited for initiative and mental alertness. Nobody could provide those qualities.

2. Input as special attention: In the Experiment in Higher Education (EHE), each of the ten junior staff members was a tutor-counselor assigned to ten students. Each tutor-counselor (TC) went to class with the students, met with them directly after to review and clarify what had been presented in class, met with them daily for skills clinics in standard English, and tutored them. In addition, each TC was "on call" twenty-four hours a day to help the ten students in coping with their sometimes awesome personal problems. Staff attention was virtually unlimited.

The curriculum was purely authoritarian: every student had to take English, history, German, mathematics, and social science. No electives, no choices. This inflexibility was not only administratively necessary, but regarded as simply the price that had to be paid to overcome such serious deficiencies of academic background.

3. Input as student commitment: The students in EHE had to agree to go to school all day, five days a week, eleven months a year, for two years, in order to become college juniors. To earn the college credit for their five courses a semester (equivalent), they had to take all the non-credit remedial work the staff prescribed for them individually. The

incentive to do remedial work fast and well was the achievement of a more normal college student schedule. The performance of some students was nothing less than astonishing to the Ph.D.s who taught their courses--and often to themselves. Student effort is a necessary input.

EHE was a casualty of the radical or false egalitarianism between 1968 and 1971. Student and faculty qualifications were deemed irrelevant by an insurgent group that claimed all people created equal not only in entitlement to access but in every way. Accreditation became suspect, paralysis set in, and most of the conventionally qualified staff members, black and white alike, were driven out.

The EHE approach cost about ten thousand 1960's dollars per year per student, success or failure. It was applicable only to that percentage of people who are clearly academically inclined but have a history of failure for some reason or reasons. If the expenditure seems high, it should be remembered how much it costs to keep a person in prison, and how much damage a frustrated intelligent person can do in a lifetime. It is also worth remembering that the original G.I. Bill, regarded by some at the time as a "give-away program" initiated in an excess of patriotic fervor, became a profit-making operation for the Government by 1960, because of the additional taxes paid by recipients of educational aid. This estimation, made by the Chase Manhattan Bank, not the Socialist Labor Party, may mean nothing in light of skill surplus, but I suspect it still means something.

Equity in education means ~~accommodating~~ individuals and meeting their needs, in the interest of meeting collective societal needs; or meeting societal needs by accommodating individuals. Individual need and societal need reciprocally imply and entail each other. There is no question of priority. So we need to assess each individual situation in which any evidence suggests the possibility that extra attention is warranted. Some are obvious, some not.

We have to use as guides all the pertinent tests, interviews, background reports, and descriptive records of performance, because they are what we have available. I think the most crucial selection factor is serious demand. Those who most need college are probably those who most want it once they know what is involved--including what they can and cannot reasonably expect about later employment. We, the public at large, can give individuals any benefit of the doubt where resources allow us to do so. The degree of flexibility we have in providing special attention is determined by our ability and willingness to invest in it.

We must try to accommodate the greatest number of people who can be helped, and in the ways that really will help people get what they need. "Greater need," the criterion that directs the greatest amount of help to the most unenviable people, has been a disaster in opportunity programs. No student with a poor record should be given more help than a similarly needy student with a better record, on the meretricious reasoning that poor performance eo ipso demonstrates justification for

greater attention. We ought not, in some vain, quixotic fantasy, assign inordinate amounts or academic kinds of attention, material and other, to those among us least able to profit from it.

Extraordinary needs that can be met in a college fairly require extra attention: equivalent, analogous, or of proportionate cost. As Jonathan Mayhew pointed out in a 1754 sermon, equality has to be construed as fairness if it is to make any sense at all. It requires universal access to analogous attention, toward analogous outcomes. Analogous attention? Yes, "separate but equal" in a sense, despite the horrors of Plessy v. Ferguson and so on. This may require, for the sake of honesty, precisely the same minimum and maximum economic investment in every person in the same need category. Analogous outcomes? One young person's share may equip him or her to function quite well, another's to move from 96th to 99th percentile rank. If college is still regarded as something to be won, we have, as William James put it, a world of "real winners and real losers"; and none of us chooses his or her circumstances. Our capacities to affect our prospects are finite. Within them, a reasonable effort to acknowledge different needs and to meet them seems to be what equity demands. "Different deeds for different needs," to modify a well-known ghetto expression of a few years ago.

If the individual's entitlement to educational opportunity is whatever he or she can and will make use of, I hope we can really act upon the realization that higher education

does not end at age 22 or 25. The best model I know for providing permanent educational opportunity is the Federal Republic of Germany's Volkshochschule program, in which I have long participated. Recognizing that early lacks can be made up for, and that needs change, the West German Government subsidizes educational efforts of all kinds, and provides an enormous range of programs for persons of all ages and occupational categories. I have worked, in the same program, with a 70-year-old medical doctor, teachers, secretaries, university students, business people, judges, attorneys, scientists, and engineers, as well as retired people and housewives. What were they doing in such a diverse group? Many, obviously, were university graduates; others could never be admitted to a university. They simply had a common interest in the English language and in American life--for their own various individual purposes and reasons. Each was given access to what he or she wanted. Each got the appropriate level and kind of instruction, with the emphasis desired. The outcomes were analogous, equivalent, but never identical, of course. And parenthetically, in eight groups of this kind, there was never the slightest sign of social uneasiness. They really appreciated Jefferson's concept of the society open to virtue and talent, character and ability.

I would simply ask, What kind of opportunity does this particular individual's performance suggest he or she can use? What kind does the individual want? If it is college with help, let's arrange for it; but let's also arrange for plenty of alternatives.

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SECTION IV  
THEORY OF INEQUITIES

## CHAPTER X

### EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: THE CLASS STRUGGLE PERSPECTIVE

J. E. McClellan

Long I pondered but could not imagine how to get across to my academic colleagues what a class struggle perspective sounds like. By the veriest chance, a remote acquaintance of mine noticed a neat box of print-outs in the process of being devoured by a garbage truck in Georgetown. He rescued it after only partial damage to find that it contained mostly student exercise work interspersed with what appears to be an order from Supreme Headquarters, NATO, to the Chief of the NATO Liaison Section in the Pentagon, together with a response from the latter and, most remarkable, a long, rambling, almost incoherent letter from a Commodore Byron Henry, a quaint, anachronistic expatriate serving as ADC to the Supreme Commander in Paris. Only Herman Wouk himself can verify Henry's authorship of the letter, but for me authenticity is not significant. I patched it together (with numerous inaccuracies, I'm sure) and pass it along without comment, for it reveals the class struggle perspective more clearly than anything I could possibly write.



Pursuant to Your Order

GO 79 05 6 - Dated 3 April 1979  
Headquarters, Supreme Commander

Initial Report Form - 74-J Date Filed: 14 April 1979

Security Classification - SECRET

To: Lt. Gen. M. L. Walterson, Chief of Staff, NATO  
From: Colonel H. V. Carlton, Chief Strategic Planning,  
Liaison Section, Washington, D.C.

I. Subject(s) of Order:

I.1. Review all contingency decisions relating strategic ends to available means for their achievement, adding new data from recent events in China, Iran, the Mid-east, and Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania. Search Questions: Q1: What general Model of social change is confirmed by data from those four events? Q2: Is any Model currently used to generate alternative futures sufficiently unconfirmed by these data to justify its removal from strategic circuits 506 (79-85) and (79-05)? Q3: Are presumptions of fact in contingency plans in circuits mentioned rendered sufficiently improbable by these data to require a General Staff Strategic Review?

II.1. Q1 answered by comparing each Model's projection (from 17 Dec. '78 to 3 April '79) on China, Iran, Mideast, and nuclear power with actual events. For each Model: How much distance between projection and actual event--in timing, direction (pro-Friendly or anti-Friendly), and demographic basis? For which Model is the indexed sum

of distances the smallest? Answer: M-ivb (so-called "class struggle" model) originally devised by CIA as "Unfriendly Model."

II.2. Q2 answered by a judgment call. Despite valiant efforts of intelligence services of all Friendly Nations, the data on recent events are not yet sufficiently disaggregated to enable precise measurement of distance between projection and event. And thus it is not an opportune time to re-open previously made decisions on Models. Even though M-ii (so-called "liberal" Model) captured less than 1% of variance unaccounted for in M-ivb, it was thought that M-ii may have more predictive power in other parts of the world, and thus the least probable Model, M-ii, is retained in designated circuits.

II.3. Q3 answered by generating "Can Do?" scenarios (using M-iv, updated from 17 December to present) for all branches, all services, all Friendly Nations. Quality of responses not yet sufficiently standardized to enable precise strategic calculations. Do not recommend General Staff Strategy Review at this time.

Respectfully submitted,

Henry Carlton, Col. USAF

12 April '79

Hank - I'm awfully glad you let me see this before sending it on to Walterson. He'll give you a nice pat on the back for not being a nuisance, he'll have wheelbarrows full of computer print-outs to pass around, he'll have some asses to

kick for "low quality of response to scenario," and we'll be back to business as usual in NATO headquarters. As if we hadn't had a major catastrophe in the Intelligence and Operations Sections of the staff! You were asked for a damage report and you say--"The information's so bad that I don't think we have anything to worry about"?:

But look, Hank, it's your report, not mine. You're sitting there in the Pentagon, reading this message off your console, hooked up to an information processing system too large and complex even to be comprehended by the human mind. You know better than anybody in the world how to make that system "talk" to human beings--I'm thinking of that dark October day when you ran down the OPEC options for Prince Hourani, since when the Saudis have been our accomplices if not allies. When your well-earned promotion comes through next week, you will be among a scant handful of flag officers on active duty who look upon military service as something other than a ticket to political power or big money on a corporate board. It is our historical mission to ensure that high culture and personal freedom are provided a military capability equal to the dread challenge they face over the next crucial decades. By birth and breeding and personal disposition, you are committed to that mission.

I know I risk giving offense by repeating what we've pledged over many a solemn toast of comradeship. I do so only to ask you to think one last time about the inconclusive damage report I'll be trotting upstairs tomorrow. One question: have

you really put your intuitive powers to work on the M-ivb scenario for the North American working class '79-'05? The programs you're using print out the indicators clearly enough. What do they mean? Let me mention some of the more obvious trends. Real capital (investment in production) is going to continue to leave North America until the American working man can compete as a source of profit for the owners of capital. With the normalization of relations with China, that efflux of capital will certainly last beyond the 2005 cut-off for strategic planning. In China there is a working force of at least 500 million persons--literate, disciplined, organized, provided by their standards with adequate housing, food, education, medical services, and cultural enrichment, and willing to work for \$42/month average wage! There is some \$500 billion available for immediate investment by Friendly corporations. Is it likely that any sizeable proportion of that \$500 B will go into new production in the USA or Canada?

No, the historical destiny of the working class of North America is not a happy one. They have frivolously wasted the most lavish cornucopia that God ever set before a people. They have reveled in the mindlessness of a throw-away, no-deposit-no-return simulacrum of culture. They have wasted utterly the political power they inherited with an enlightened eighteenth century Constitution; having sold their democratic birthright for a mess of artificially colored and flavored pottage, the American working class must now endure the

bondage that always follows profligacy. There is no escape from the justice of history.

Inflation and unemployment will be manipulated to control the decline of effective purchasing power in the American worker's hand and, at the same time, allow maximum profit to be wrung from the enormous wealth still produced on that well-endowed continent. While suffering a gradual but unmistakable loss of affluence, the American working class must build and maintain an ever-increasing military establishment; the vast majority of all Friendly Forces will continue to be USA in both personnel and material. The American worker will see the price of a Sunday drive in the country more outside the orbit of his budget, while the petroleum requirements of the military constantly increase. His sons will soon be drafted to fight "conventional" wars under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence. Notice that I am picking out only the more obvious indicators from the so-called "class struggle" scenario.

But will the American working class cooperate in that scenario? Your "Can Do?" questions were all answered affirmatively, I know. We have two weapons that may be employed in the struggle against incipient rebellion: Education and Repression. Both departments report that they have adequate resources to maintain control under all circumstances save catastrophic defeat in war. Your calculations, in fact, show us being able to exact a level of discipline from the American

working class equal to that the Nazis got from German workers in WWII. That's the key datum, I would bet my hat, in your decision not to hit the panic button with a request for a General Staff Strategic Review.

But that very certainty makes me uneasy. You computer people have a reputation for presentism, if that's the fashionable word now. Whatever, if it means ignorance of or insensitivity to history, it is certainly not appropriately applied to you, Hank. So I ask you, fellow history buff, are your calculations themselves not rendered suspect (pace Helmer's Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences) by that historically suspect conclusion? You just can't be that sure about the American working class. You remember 1893 and the Populist Revolt that damned near reached the White House in the person of Wm. Jennings Bryan. You remember the 30s and the growing domination of the CPUSA within the labor movement, then winning great victories by tactics of mass action. It took a war to pull us out of that one and give our economy a momentum that carried us on to the Great Gluttony of the '50s and '60s. And you remember other uprisings as far back as English was heard on North American shores.

What battle cry have they uttered? What banner have they marched under? "Equality," every time. Can you be so sure that that deep impulse will not stir again within the breast of American workers? Nor soon? The basis for your optimism is the enormous capability of our branches in Education and Repression. But surely your historical sense

must have registered an incongruity here. For education in the USA has been an effective weapon in controlling the masses only because it has been regarded in popular consciousness as the indispensable means to the goal of equal opportunity for all. Today, however, we have lost the banner emblazoned "Equality"--whatever you may put with it, but especially if you add "of Educational opportunity." However you cut the cake, the Unfriendlies always come out with equality--even though they mix it with terrorism, chauvinism, totalitarianism, barbarism. When we bore the banners, Egalité marched with Liberté and Fraternité. Of that gallant trio only Liberté remains in Friendly hands, besmirched though it be by bloody dictatorships we have on occasion been forced to support. Not that I'm complaining: when your enemy will go to any lengths in repression, you cannot forswear repression altogether; where you draw the line has to be determined by the tactical demands of the moment, as confirmed by the rules of war governing hostages and reprisals.

But I wander from the point, which is that the American working class has been aroused by "Equality" before and may be again, thus upsetting all your strategic calculations. Look, suppose that the lesson of Iran is taken to heart in the bosom of every Mexican peon who still dreams of plundering the hacienda under the guns of Pancho Villa and his thugs. That's what "La Igualdad" means to him, and he possesses historical traditions and geographical location ideal for extended guerrilla action. No doubt, our counter-insurgency forces

have the capability to deal adequately with Juan el Loco militarily, but probably not without a certain level of mobilization in the USA. Suppose the question went round National Guard Armories, among the youth drafted from the working class, "Why are we fighting against poor Juan in his struggle for equality? Why don't we turn our guns the other way?"

Now we're not talking about next week but some months or years down the pike, when the American Dream is no longer even an evocative memory, when the undercarriages have rusted off the still gleaming Airstreams. We're talking about a generation's complete loss of the illusions created by our unprecedented overall prosperity--1941-1973. We're talking about the generation that will have to pay the price in moving the American worker back into world competition as a source of labor. In short, a generation that cannot be trusted to hold guns against an enemy carrying the banner "Equality." Your class struggle Model comes out with "widespread disaffection...desertion...overt rebellion" in the American working class from 1985 on, which you also show sufficient "Can Do" strength to handle. What you don't show is a place of retreat left to the American working class. If there is none, the result may be the Jacquerie, the Resistance, Armageddon. Or maybe not. Anyway, it is an utterly new ball game when we cannot count on bribing the American worker into factory and army but must lay again upon him "the whip of necessity," which E. H. Carr had thought abolished forever from civilized economies.



Notice, Hank, I'm not saying that these speculations justify putting aside your carefully crafted projections. But I am saying that a bit of caution, perhaps a note of foreboding, should be found in your 74-J. Military men are professionally trained to be particularly alert to the danger of overconfidence that follows upon victory. American interests have rallied magnificently from the national and international crisis we faced after the shock of Tet in 1968. Never before in history has so much investment potential faced so much profit potential in an international market so well protected from external and internal threat. Like Hannibal after Cannae, Napoleon after Austerlitz, Yamamoto after Pearl Harbor, Rommel after Tobruk--we seem to stand alone on the field; our enemies, vanquished, vanish. This is the crucial time. The first step after victory is all too often the first on the road to defeat.

OK, Hank, are you with me? I make two suggestions on your damage report, food for thought only.

1. Throw in a word of caution about the working class in America; ask authorization to open up some R&D operations aimed at getting the handle on equality before the Unfriendlylies plant it squarely in the front of a militant, united working class opposition. OK?

What kind of operations? Well, think of it this way for a moment. You take your true conservative: he has lots of ways--from "science" to sarcasm--to make equality look silly--to those on top! What we have to look for is a way of making it utterly unappealing as a slogan to those on the

bottom. To that end, I've put out probes into all the scanning circuits just to see what's happening around "equality." Turned up an awful lot of activity, including an interesting project [HEW NIE L4H2 - 8801 - 9] labeled "Itinerary of Equality of Educational Opportunity-EEO." It's a frightful mess now, but I think it can be reprogrammed so that it can be fitted into our Mivb program and turned into something practical. I've taken a whack at it in English; your guys (and gals) can put it into useful form, I believe. But right now for your personal reflection, here's one way it might go, Mivb-wise.

You map a standard sociological progression on EEO, the phrase to be understood first from a functionalist standpoint, second from a group conflict standpoint, and third from a class struggle perspective. First Stage, Functionalism. The eighteenth century saw the idea of salvation secularized and put to work for social utility. As Augustine had laid upon Civitas Terrae the obligation to give each human soul access to the Good News and thus opportunity for salvation as conscious participants in Civitas Dei, so Jefferson laid upon the Commonwealth the obligation to provide each boy with access to schooling and thus opportunity for education, i.e., self-conscious cultivation of the arts and sciences of civilization. Just as access to village priest and the Word he carries cannot guarantee salvation, so access to village school and the culture it dimly reflects cannot

guarantee education. In both cases the virtues of humility plus the Grace of God are required ere opportunity translate to actuality.

The obligation of the Commonwealth mirrors a right in each individual. The motivation to claim and exercise that right to schooling (or the Mass) comes both from the benefits accruing to those who become educated (or saved) and the liabilities incurred by those who do not. It is of great advantage to the Commonwealth that every boy have both opportunity and motivation: if the child of everyman has schools equal to those the rich man provides for his sons, then the nation as a whole benefits. In the struggle for fame and fortune, if each boy makes his best effort in an open and free contest, who rises to the top will be best qualified for the delicate tasks of leadership in a democratic, free enterprise society; those who stay at the bottom will be those whose talents and drives fit them best for that social station; and those who achieve intermediate positions are likewise appropriately placed. (Where salvation had been a yes or no affair, education was always a matter of degree. By the time it had become a matter of degrees, the Jeffersonian ideal had long been lost.) Thus the competition as each boy attempts to turn initial access to school into maximum educational attainment is functional in a social system that depends on individual initiative in the pursuit of profit to develop the means of production.

The argument in the functional stage is perfectly straight-forward.

(i) Educational opportunity = access to schooling.

When Jefferson's dream becomes real, when the Commonwealth assumes the obligation of providing access to schooling for children, those children may be said to have a right to educational opportunity. When that right inheres in all children equally, then each child may be said to have an equal right to educational opportunity, and the Commonwealth may be said to have achieved equality in respect to the right to educational opportunity. If, for convenience, that expression is shortened to "equal educational opportunity" (EEO), no apparent harm is done, so long as it continues to be understood strictly as shorthand for an equal rights claim, which is all it can ever be in functional terms.

Functionalism entails individualism. An individual may be said to have or lack access to schooling, also to have or not have a right to educational opportunity. Concerning two or more individuals it may be said that their access to schooling or their rights thereto are equal or unequal. But by the time that the legal and conceptual base had been established for an unrestricted equal rights claim for all children's educational opportunity (which it had by the time of Plessy v. Ferguson), the focus of attention had to shift from the individual to some collectivity. Functionalism ceased to be the cutting edge in social thought.

Second Stage, Group Conflict Theory. The individual is an abstraction, of course. Human beings live as members of particular collectivities--families, clans, gens, racial and ethnic communities, occupational groups, etc.--or they do not live at all. Different collectivities can be compared on various scales of school achievement. As demonstrated by data in programs your section supplied for Training Section, rates of school achievement, in turn, can be mapped onto other rates which vary among the same group of collectivities. Etc. Etc. [The success of Mivb in accounting for the correlations among those data was one of the prime factors in our initial decision to include Mivb among Model Options, if I remember the case correctly.]

Whatever, the data make it apparent that rate of school achievement inheres in the collectivity. But our legal and ideological systems presuppose the functionalist argument at several central, pivotal points, and that argument leaves educational opportunity as a right held by each child equally with every child. But that equal right does not, in practice, give each child an equal chance of success in school. Like so:

- ii. Equal Educational Opportunity = Equal [Access to Schooling]
- iiia. EEO = Equal Access [to] Equal Schooling
- iiib. EEO = Equal Access [as measured by] Equal  
[rates of achievement or attainment in] Schooling
- iiic. EEO = Equal Access [to and] Equal [treatment in the  
process of] Schooling

The functionalist would, in effect, parse EEO as "E [Right to] EO." The fact is, however, that EEO figures prominently in our legal decision theory, for we have become a group conflict society. So the functionalist has to parse it somehow; he does so as iic.; the conflicting groups parse it as iib. on the very sensible grounds that equal treatment of equals will produce equal outcomes. If the collectivities being compared are large enough, that transitivity of equality from input to output is guaranteed by statistical law.

Where did "treatment" enter the argument? (I think this can be formalized to integrate with your data base fairly easily. Do you see any problems?) Well, the legal argument has to be that if "access to schooling" is to be construed broadly enough to cover "opportunity," then it must include more than merely entering the door of a school. So much was all worked out long before the Brown decision. But how much more? Well, when our ancestors were trying to lure the lower ranks in Europe (beginning with Lowland crofters) to leave their squalid homes for the "Land of Opportunity," forsooth, they did not mean to guarantee them equality of treatment in anything. But they did give them an opportunity--a fighting chance, mind you, not a fair chance, really, and certainly not an equal chance--to make it to the very top. Isn't it that fighting chance that Jefferson intended to give children from the lower orders in the "General Diffusion of Knowledge"? What more could be asked?

But even that fighting chance had to include more than just entering the door. Jefferson's bill foresaw schoolmasters

giving the same lessons to squires' and tenants' sons; the bill's framer could not have been insensible to the scion's advantages in preparing those lessons. But then all the more credit to young Tenantson when, against odds, he excels! And he must be given a chance to prove himself. Sticking him in the corner blindfolded and earplugged denies him access to schooling; he's got to be allowed to enter the process, not just the door; that's his opportunity for education. If he lacks the truly exceptional qualities required of those who would take advantage of that opportunity, then he's no complaint against the Commonwealth; his right has been exercised.

To move from "fighting chance" to "equal chance" is to move from iic back to iib; it is to move from a sociological culture of individualism to one of group conflict. It is to throw a hell of a lot of strain on the legal and ideological systems that have FEO built in at crucial points. It is to tempt all sorts of collectivities to organize all sorts of legal efforts aimed at achieving iib; those efforts will persist as long as there are legally discernible steps the Commonwealth could do, but without court order would not do, to honor all children's recognized right to iic.

That's where group conflict theory takes and leaves us. But the great thing about class struggle theory is that it enables us to understand and use to our advantage the contributions in the existing social theories--i.e., the contradiction between iib and iic as parsings of iia. What

is our advantage? From the basic premises of class struggle modeling comes a simple answer: keep the working class in the USA weak, disorganized, disunited, struggling against itself. We want to create as much distance as possible between black and white, minority and majority, men and women, foreign and native-born, Anglo and Latino, X and Y. So what do we do? We make a model of the bussing issue--our greatest success, so far,--and we cast as many replicas as we can in as many fields as we can. We take some group X that is getting the short end of the stick according to iib. Under the banner of equality we get a court order establishing a closely prescribed process--of school assignment, of admissions, of grants, loans, and employment, of housing and curriculum, of whatever--to make specific members of group X as-visible-as-possible recipients of special privilege, which special privilege they will have to have if their chances of success are ever to equal those of already favored group Y. We get group Y organized to struggle against that privilege under the banner of equality--iic. Each sees equality on the opposing banner and decides that equality cannot be the goal of the struggle; it turns out to be "my fair share" vs. "no special favors." When all that the working class child of group Y has at best is a fighting chance (and probably less of a chance than Tenantson had in Jefferson's time), he can be enticed to considerable rage when a child of group X gets favors. And as group X becomes progressively impoverished



(including educationally impoverished), the collective action for a fair share (which means special favors) will become stronger, likewise the reaction, and so it goes, to our benefit.

Using the class struggle model we thus easily understand the basic strategy to be followed: trace out the contradictions that arise naturally in the Enemy class, use the levers of power that come into our hands with control of the State (class struggle sense), use them specifically to maintain and (within limits) exacerbate those contradictions. Easy enough to say, rather like Hitler's encircling the map of the Ukraine with both arms, but very hard to translate into workable operational plans. But you know all of that, else your title wouldn't say Strategic Planning. We have to coordinate our class strategy within those sectors of the economic system, e.g., the mass media, the universities, particularly the professional schools, churches, unions, etc., where our levers of control are not clearly defined, and coordinate planning in those sectors with other sectors where we do have clear controls, e.g., industry, the Armed Services, Congress, and the White House. Large areas of the federal and state bureaucracies are still largely out of control, by the way, but there are encouraging signs that responsible senior officers in government have detailed plans for using the coming recession to strengthen class control over HUD, state welfare programs, and the vast range of institutes,

funds, public corporations, etc. doing ideological work through HEW funding.

Let me refer back to the "Itinerary" file I mentioned earlier. An M-ivb output from the data in the initial report shows that the contradiction between "To Each a Fair Share" and "Special Privilege for None" can be exploited a great deal more thoroughly than it has been to this point. The most promising move is to pick up on "treatment" which entered above in iic. Try it as

iii. Equal Right to Educational Opportunity = Legal  
Obligation to Attend Plus  
Right to Equitable Treatment in Schools.

The legal obligation takes care of the sameness component of "equal." The only way you can insure the working class child's presence in school, which insurance you must have if you are to guarantee his right to the educational process, is to lay upon him the same obligation to attend that you lay upon all other children. In the first clause, then, Equal = Same. But "equitable" does not. Would it be equitable to give the same treatment to each of two patients in the hospital, one having suffered a stroke and the other a broken leg?

The medical analogy, by the way, is perfect for our purposes. It carries the connotation that there's something wrong with those being serviced (sic) by the institution, and likewise, the connotation that those doing the servicing have special expertise grounded in white-coated science-all

bully connotations from our point of view. The "professional" educationists have been playing on the medical analogy for a long time, it seems, but some of the data in "Itinerary" make it appear that that analogy has received a powerful boost from a peculiar law passed by the Congress a few years ago to give EEO to handicapped children. Each such child is entitled, it appears, to diagnosis by experts, to individualized plans for treatment with prognoses, to various forms of remediation (sic), and to post-treatment evaluation--with parental or guardian rights to participation in the entire process. What could be more equitable than that?

Now consider that we extend that right to every child, keeping all the connotations of the medical analogy alive and operative in the process. We test, we diagnose and classify, treat and remediate, re-test ad nauseam. The psychologists have invented a most marvelous illness called "reading below grade level"; statistics will always "prove" that 50% of the children tested suffer from it to one degree or another. The principle can be generalized--"X-below grade level"--to insure that every working class child comes to feel deficient in certain significant aspects of life, dependent on "experts" for relief from those deficiencies, and above all, personally implicated (along with the parents) in a process that has taken from the child any right to complain about the share of school-connected benefits actually received from that process and derivatively from life itself. The patient who dies from his stroke cannot

complain that his right to equal treatment was violated if the treatment he receives is the best, state-of-the-art-wise, that could be done for him. Likewise, every working class child who comes through an "equitable treatment" process in school should feel personally to blame for his, and especially her, low attainments.

Remember, Hank, there are Communist preachers out there in the working class neighborhoods right now. They are applying class struggle theory, you may be sure. We have the historical obligation to defeat them with all the means at our disposal. As the economic crisis in the USA deepens, their job gets easier. There is solid evidence that they're beginning to be heard. We've got to get underway with this anticipatory ideological counterinsurgency operation, to call it by its ridiculous class-struggle name. Nixon's gang called it "dirty tricks" and played it like amateurs. But here we have the setting for a serious operation. Notice the two prongs of the attack:

1. From the contradiction between iib and iic above, we derive a plan to exacerbate the group conflicts within the working class. That plan hinges on making "my fair share" equal "what I've got" in the minds of the favored portion of the working class, particularly among that vast army of white collar, managerial workers we hire to control, discipline,... manage the rest.

So we switch off from "equal" which carries the presumption of sameness to "equitable" which does not. From that comes:

2. A plan to establish a base for "my fair share" for each child, a base which will justify in the mind of the child a gross disproportion in the actual goods received. We can depend upon the psychologist to provide "scientific" measures proving that the favored are that way by nature and not merely by social artifice. And we can depend upon the educationists to exploit every opportunity to expand the use of specialized "psychological" personnel in schools. What we can't depend on is the political sense in responsible state and local officials to give this operation the kind of support it urgently needs. Unless we act soon, we may well have to face a working class united under a red flag emblazoned "Equality for All," a whole nother ballgame, as the adman would say, full stop.

So that's my first suggestion. Show a keen interest in this "Itinerary" file.. It's potentially the key piece in the battle that lies ahead. And anyway, showing some interest in an obscure HEW project is damned good politics, as I'll be happy to explain if it's not as obvious to you as to me. I have a feeling that you'll see things my way on this matter and send a revised Strategy Note to G.S. tonight.

But before I make my second suggestion, I'm going to shift to once only-visual mode, also to code M+N, where M=the number of letters in your mother's family name, N=the spot your horse finished the Preakness last year. Execute...

Back on, I hope. I hope also that you'll indulge me for a bit, old friend-young friend. You were one of Father's dearest people from the time Anderson first dragged you into

our family. Let us ask ourselves what the Admiral himself would have said about what we are doing here. Put the old console on "Rest" for a minute or two, light a pipe, sip a little bourbon, think back upon those evenings over the fire in Arlington. Himself reads with his head tilted to bifocal range, reads deliberately, making quick little marks in the margin. He reached the end, hands the document back to us-- the original order, your compliance report, my suggestion-- he takes off his glasses and looks far beyond the plan of firelight and shadows...

"Sometimes a man has to put the welfare of his country above everything else." That, I think, would have been the elementary principle he would have followed, the same he would have asked us to follow, as we try to plot a course for (read "upgrade planning capability for") the Armed Forces of the United States of America. "Can it be our professional destiny to conduct operations against American working men and women on behalf of international monopoly capitalists just because the latter can no longer afford to provide those workers with steady, well-paying jobs? [I wonder what he would think if he could see the plans for domestic counterinsurgency already being gamed?] Even if it is the mission of the multinational to transfer the excess capital of North America to other continents of this globe, as you claim," the old man continues, "can it be our mission to force American workers to accept their impoverishment at the hands of international capital? And even to use the respect that Americans feel for fairness,

for equality, for personal rights as a weapon in the domination of American workers? There must be another solution if we really intend to put the welfare of the nation we've pledged our honor to defend above all other interests." He looks back from the farthest reaches of the globe, his glasses snap back into place, and he peers at us as if we were his division heads at Staff. And you and I would duck his gaze, look at each other nervously, and one of us--my job as senior--says, "Why yes, Admiral, there is another solution." And with that let us lay Father's ghost and speak directly. For it is we, not he, who carry the burden of these historical imperatives. The Admiral enjoyed the luxury, and he was among the very, very few who understood how blessed the luxury of fighting a war with wholly undivided individual loyalties. The source of military command was, for him, also the object of his most cherished loyalty, the nation embodied in a state he had pledged his honor to defend. He could suffer under and struggle against the incompetence, short-sightedness, stupidity, even the treachery of his superiors, but he never had to question whether the welfare of the command structure in which he served was congruent with the welfare of the nation he offered his life to defend.

But we're different, Hank. We know that far from being congruent they are directly in conflict. We are privy to the policies and processes that are currently being used, as yet covertly and incompetently, against the American economy, measures that will be used with increasing sophistication and

effectiveness as the current economic "crisis" is allowed to work its way out. The Admiral often wondered how he could have acted had he been a German officer privy to the demonic beastliness of the Nazi regime. We don't have to wonder, Hank. We can just watch ourselves react to what's going on around us. There is the growing threat of defeat in war all over the globe. There is a great felt need among us these days to do something, to pull together, to regain the camaraderie of a victorious fighting force. So it was for prescient German officers, even those who knew with utter certainty that the chain of command centered on Hitler was inexorably committed to policies directly contrary to the interest of Germany and its people.

I know what I have to do. My "career" as a Naval Officer has been over a long time. They leave me here breveted a Commodore just because no one else can run this rabbit warren of a headquarters. I stay because it's familiar and because it's Europe. But I'm soon to be sixty-five, when they'll have to kick me out. In the meantime, I'm storing up every item of information, every detail that I can use to help the American people shake free of this demon they've given birth to.

How is it to be done? I'm in touch with some individuals who are in touch with others who, in turn, etc. We believe that the constitutional system of the USA has enough strength left in it to overthrow the foreign domination that international monopoly capitalists have imposed upon the USA.



We have plans, if you professionals would call our as yet sort of dreamy scheme of ideas plans. We have money--every day at least one American manufacturer wakes up with the bright idea: we don't have to prostitute the American economy to the needs of international capital! And that businessman calls another and soon he's in touch with the people who are laying the foundation for the new American First Party.

The fundamental difference between our thinking and that of the existing parties is that we will halt the flow of American wealth into the neo-colonialist "development" abroad. The only way that we can prevent the total degradation of the wasted "American Way of Life" is to offer the American people--workers, businessmen, professionals, all Americans--a chance to participate in a magnificent world historical movement--building a national government of all the people, and that means first off one that will provide jobs for all. Our Party takes its cue from Lenin: He who works not, neither shall he eat! But work there will be for everyone. North America is a continent filled with junk, pollution, decay, brutalizing ugliness everywhere. And there is a generation of young men and women coming on who will never know the satisfaction of hard work in behalf of socially worthwhile goals. Our Party has the simple, straightforward task of bringing workers face to face with work-to-be-done. No party under the domination of international capital can perform that task because it cannot be done "profitably," i.e., done so as to generate liquid capital that can then be taken out of the US to strengthen the competition against US workers and business from abroad.

What is progressive at one stage in history becomes regressive at another, and vice versa. Who can say what might have happened had the conservative, isolationist tendency in American politics during the 30s prevented FDR from taking the steps that led to Pearl Harbor? But you and I know that without a drastic change in American political life today, we are heading for another war that can have no progressive outcome, not for the USA, not for the "under-developed" nations, not even for the USSR or China. And most certainly not for the humane, civilized values we have spent our lives trying to secure. Now let us look back at Model iv-b once again. We who are in the business of modeling, gaming, simulating, 'futuring,' etc. tend to be instrumentalists, philosophically speaking. That is to say, we look upon theories simply as instruments to be used in making predictions and controlling for desired outcomes. Thus we have come to accept class struggle theory as the basis for our planning simply because we get better results with it than with any other model(s). But beyond instrumentalism lies a hard-headed realism: our theories work--in the long run--only if they reveal to us something about the way the world really is. Insofar as M-ivb is true, to that extent war is inevitable. All the objective indicators--the building of armaments, the volatility of pressure points throughout the globe, etc., etc.--point in the direction of WAR! Even more alarming, the subjective indicators are also turning inexorably toward that dreaded outcome:

throughout the world, but especially in the USA, the consciousness of the people is being prepared for WAR! Your computer system can come up with scores of plausible scenarios for its beginning, but ask yourself honestly: Can there be any outcome of any scenario that truly advances the national welfare of the USA? I confess that I can find no such outcome anywhere in the realm of possibility.

Our Party (and we alone, I believe) can offer the American people a platform of Peace With Strength. We will draw the lines of our realm narrowly. We will restore the martial spirit of America, not in the service of an international banking system that is bankrupting the nation with inflation and unemployment but to protect the lives and homes of the American people.

In short--I can't go through every plank in our platform--we offer the last chance that America will have to escape the ash heap of history: a government of all the people, all economic classes, races, religious, sexes, ethnic groups united as one to protect our distinctive way of life. Only so can we transcend the class struggle that is driving the species to suicidal conflict.

I know what you're thinking right now: "Old Byron has gone off the deep end. He has been taken over by the Nazi way of thinking that he's spent his life trying to combat. Poor fellow!"

You may be right, Hank. But consider: the Nazis could not have achieved what they did without having done

something right. They provided a government that transcended the economic class struggle. If they had not, the Communists would have taken over Germany and turned that class struggle into a permanent dictatorship of the proletariat. That way of dealing with class struggle sets back the clock of civilization a thousand years, requiring a new emergence from the Dark Ages generations hence. The only other alternative is a government of all the people mobilized in a great crusade to wrest control of their national destiny from the hands of international exploiters. The Nazis achieved national liberation for Germany, whence arose the enormous energy that sent armies from the Pyrenees to the Volga, from the Sahara to the Arctic Circle. That same energy lies latent in America today; we are trying to build a Party that can arouse, discipline, and channel that energy for the benefit of the American people and the cause of world peace. We want to see our schools become forces for unity in the American people. We want to see children organized into youth brigades that perform useful work in the community and give children the rudiments of martial discipline required of all citizens in a free society surrounded by totalitarian enemies. The Soviets believe today that we would not dare arm working class youth and send them abroad to fight. Our party would organize youth in forms such that the Soviets cannot mistake their loyalty, these children of all races, classes, religions, ethnic stocks, etc. united as one in service to the country and its people.

It's up to international monopoly capitalists who hold American passports whether they will send their children to American schools--it's the choice they make when they choose their residence. But those who live in this country will go to American schools and there learn that loyalty to America means taking an active part in the struggle to free America from domination and exploitation by the international capitalist class, owners of a trillion Euro-Asian dollars they are actively using against the economic welfare of this country. In that struggle for a new independence, economic independence, the most basic of all, we are all--children and adults--equally involved. And we must provide each child an opportunity to serve; thus the AFP affirms that right to serve as the most basic right of childhood. On this point Marx, with slight editing, was quite right: from each according to his ability to serve.

And to each according to the needs of the service he performs. Thus a brain surgeon needs an education somewhat different from that of a butcher, and that education, in turn, requires and justifies a different life-style, tastes, culture, etc: The American people accept, indeed honor, cultural pluralism. We intend to promote and encourage the flowering of art, music, poetry, drama; of all varieties, shapes, forms, modes, and views.

The point is that we intend to run a primary school system that gives essentially the same education to all, one

in which we mix those young people up and make them one. And we run a wide variety of secondary school options with strict entrance exams and rigid sequential tracking. All evidence indicates that children from our class will fare quite well if the system is run fairly and those who don't will have to accept that spot for service that their talent and effort win for them. The "victims" of downward mobility carry with them a message of great importance: There is equal dignity and equal right to self-esteem in all forms and stations of service to our nation. The AFP is thus to be the party of all the people.

These remarks are not well organized, I know. But they may be enough to show you that we would view EEO very differently from the way it is actually used by those who serve the class of international monopoly capitalists.

You've heard many times, Hank, how I went back into the Navy because Father proved to my satisfaction that America military strength was the key to a peaceful world after Hiroshima. I think I have done my part in keeping the ravages of war from touching Paris and Washington; the tumult of my private life has been tempered, has even touched upon a certain tragic dignity, because I have been caught up in my generation's struggle to preserve peace. In the autumn years of my life I shall continue to struggle for peace, but it will be under new banners. If the Europeans do not wish to see T-54s rumbling through Brussels, Paris, and Rome, they will have to find some way to stop them without my aid from now on.

Whatever organizational skill I possess now goes to our Party. We are looking for a leader who can capture the imagination of the American people, but more importantly, we're building an organization that will be able to control or replace that leader, if his mind or will falters.

And you, my young-old friend, you are my choice right now for leader, unless you can convince me of another's superior qualifications. Not the "leader" we put up to get elected by the masses, but the leader who will be, in fact, primus inter pares in Party councils. There's one question I should like to leave you to work on till we can talk freely. When we look at Germany's turn to Nazism, we cannot avert our eyes from the fate of the Jews. The objective facts show that Hitler's rage against the international banking cartels was entirely justified; they were never going to allow Germany a fair shake in the international money markets. Now a historical coincidence had led "international banker" and "Jew" to become associated terms, and Hitler would never have been able to turn the latent anti-Semitism endemic throughout Europe (in varying degree) into the horror of the holocaust were it not for the truth of his claim that the international banking class was Germany's national enemy. The unspeakable tragedy, the brutal horror...I cannot think of it, much less speak of it. But I can ask: Were the bankers of the City, le Bourse, and Wall Street entirely innocent?

Today it is that same class, now merged and coordinated as "the multinationals," who constitute the real national enemy

of the USA. It is that class alone which will profit from the divisive attacks that are being directed against America's working men and women under the guise of promoting EEO. The question we must ponder, one that you, with your understanding of intelligence capabilities, can help us think through is this: can we identify agents of the multinationals in the USA by such means that we can render them powerless in an "emergency" but without creating a popular witch hunt that may destroy myriads of innocent people? We simply cannot proceed with any other operations until we're protected from the enemies in our midst.

You are as aware as the rest of us of the need for haste. Domestic politics in the USA is an extremely volatile affair at the moment, more volatile than you commuters on Memorial Bridge are likely to believe. Some enterprising adman in Chicago is no doubt putting together a whole package to capture the 1980 presidential election for a real American Nazi party, one that puts the Negro in the role of the Jew and destroys forever our chance of achieving a unified national government built on a rational appraisal of national interest in these troubled times. If we do not forestall the nigger-haters, we shall be forced to join or repress them. Keep that in mind as you start manipulating EEO-operations to exacerbate racial tensions. We must watch very carefully for those whose interest in such operations is unduly keen.



There's more, more, more. But all can wait till I'm next on your side of the Atlantic. Till then, drink a toast once again to the noble traditions of which we are the heirs and think of the comradeship to be shared in the struggle ahead.

To victory!

Byron Henry  
Commodore USN  
Deputy to Supreme Commander  
NATO

35.

## CHAPTER XI

### EDUCATIONAL EQUITY: ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

Joan I. Roberts

I'm Nobody! Who are you?  
Are you Nobody, too?  
Then there's a pair of us--don't tell!  
They'd banish us, you know.

How dreary to be somebody!  
How public, like a frog  
To tell your name the livelong day  
To an admiring bog!

Emily Dickinson  
written circa 1816  
published 1891

It is ironic that a group of people, convened to consider what is fair and just in the production and dissemination of knowledge, was originally formally organized with only one woman member. The inclusion of a woman's perspective occurred in part because of the insistence of the Board of Directors of the Center for a Human Future, one of whom (a woman) noticed the omission and refused to approve the project until females were included. The National Institute of Education expressed concern that research on educational equality has been hampered by the lack of consensus by scholars and practitioners on a definition of educational equity. Yet, N.I.E. had approved a project that covertly expressed exclusion of women, the common practice of prejudice historically observable with women of all backgrounds and minority men. The original formation of the project group of scholars, itself, reflected

one of the barriers the group was supposed to reduce or eliminate. Evidently, the centuries-old idea that women were subsumable under the category man who could adequately speak in behalf of both sexes, still was not recognized nor eliminated in a project whose purpose was to reach some consensus on inequality. It is somewhat difficult to understand how consensus can occur when the objects of discrimination are excluded from the process of reaching consensus.

However, now that I am Somebody and can along with the men originally designated for the project publicly tell my name like the Frog to an admiring bog, I find that I am still Nobody. Is it really of any particular importance that a token frog has joined males in proclaiming herself to the admiring bog? No. After listening to the tapes of the project session, reading carefully each of the papers, taking pages of notes, and reflecting for some time, I have reached the conclusion that the underlying conception of equality cannot be defined within the thought system that produced the inequality in the first place. To add my croaking as a corrective is insufficient.

What really is at stake is the conception of ontology, the definition of being, of epistemology, the nature of knowing, and cosmology, the ordered world view of the eternal play of forces in the universe. The world view is based on an integrated value system, which in every known culture expresses a morality, no matter how strange it may seem to other cultures, that does or does not justify unfair treatment of some members

of each cultural group. Obviously, the thought system in part defines the self. Clearly, educational equity ought first of all to be focused on the exclusion of the right to define the self; that is, the exclusion from the thought system that defines being and knowing and that explains the reasons for life and death. Obviously, token croaking within the male thought system will not lead to an integrated conception of reality, to a new paradigm of what it means to be human. At best, all I can do is to critique the men's thought system, showing the inadequacies from a woman's point of view, that if continued, will make consensus of the male definitions of educational equity difficult to achieve.

To begin at the beginning, it appears from the outsider's point of view that the alternative thought systems that emerge in political groups are to be excluded. Since blame of students, institutions, and professional groups has led to varied backlashes, we must, according to Laurence Martel, depoliticize the research. Yet, it was a political act that led to my inclusion in the group. And the acts and thoughts of women or blacks or Native Americans or Hispanics together allow them to consider their own conceptions of life and to define their own conceptions of equality. Throughout many of the project papers and tapes, there runs the theme that people are not responding well to being asked or told that they must not discriminate, that they must be moral. Therefore, we must avoid political groupings and turn to individual answers to individual problems. Not only does this approach

negate alternative world views of the groups involved, it avoids the central question of morality, and finally asks those discriminated against to agree with an individual solution to a collective problem. Many political scientists see democracy as merely the interplay of pressure groups; the high-sounding moralisms about "democracy" that are common in the general culture mean relatively nothing to many political analysts. The current move toward individual opportunities, shares, and solutions, although well intended, denies the production of alternative conceptions of life and the pragmatic political processes of pressure groups to achieve equality.

To redefine the nature of equality or equity in a depoliticized manner, Mr. Martel uses the metaphor of an itinerary. Presumably a trip has been taken, which involves conceptual shifts from detailed arguments of equal access, equal standards, equal treatment, equal quality, proportional representation, and finally equal outcomes. The critical question is simply this: Has a trip actually been taken by persons? Or has a linguistic or rhetorical journey been traveled by male scholars? From a woman's point of view, the itinerary describes changes in the men's thought system, not changes in female or minority emancipation. In the last decade, the failure of Affirmative Action is by itself sufficient proof to women scholars that a facade of change has been erected. The screen, constructed of words, media manipulation, and bureaucratic paper shuffling, covers the lack of any substantial progress toward equality or equity.

Even were we to accept the idea of an itinerary, we would have to eliminate the linearity of the concept. From the point of view of minority and women's groups, the problem of access, for example, has not been considered separately from quality. Each group has emphasized, out of whole set of concerns, those issues that seemed morally more important or pragmatically easier to win. To men in power who react to these demands and to male scholars who write about them, the appearance of linearity is possible. To the women who were defining the inequities, Gestalts of all these factors were usually present. To women, a spiral that does not move forward in time is a more apt metaphor. For all of recorded history, the subjugation of women is from any competent scholar's point of view indisputable. Only in the current male thought system could an actual as opposed to rhetorical trip from one point to another be conceived. Throughout the world, illiteracy is still the usual fate of the vast majority of women.

The next theme relates to time itself. Within the papers and discussions there is no agreement on the span of time. Some participants begin their analysis of the itinerary twenty years ago, some start prior to World War II, some start before the Civil War, some begin in the 1600s. For women scholars, the time of sex discrimination stretches back into the beginning of recorded history. Further, there is little agreement on spacial dimensions. Some stick to the American scene, some consider England and America, some consider a

Western class struggle. For women scholars, the spatial dimensions of sex discrimination are world-wide. However, what is common, with only occasional exceptions, to all papers and to the recorded discussion, is the consistent omission of women and sex discrimination. There is the tendency to accept discrimination against blacks in timespan and space; when dealing with women, Hispanics, Native Americans, or disabled groups, the resulting model is thus ineffective. Even were we to accept Martel's itinerary as a linear model, it would have to be reproduced in a multilinear fashion if it were to adequately describe each of the time lines and the intersection of the time lines of stigmatized groups.

Much as we may want to simplify the conceptualizations of educational equality or equity, the particular histories, characteristics, and needs of groups simply require differential understanding and treatment. Thus, another major theme is confusion of equity or equality in relation to particular groups. Historically, women comprise the one group preceding all others in discrimination over time. The history of black, Native American, and Hispanic discrimination covers a 400-year period of time in Western history. The forms of discrimination are subject to the historical appearance of colonialization, emigration, and slavery. None of these is original to white Western groups. The uncomfortable fact is that members of all racial groups in at least some cultures at some points in time are guilty of group expansion, group

migration, and group subjugation. In contrast, the universal sex discrimination experienced by girls and women, and their subjugation, precedes the subjugation of particular groups, and in my estimation, provides the prototype upon which all other forms of discrimination have emerged.

The earliest social role learned is the sex role; by eighteen months of age this identity is formed. Along with it comes a spurious identification with superiority of male and inferiority of female. These forms of discrimination have historically been structured into the family, the most basic unit of society. This primary group is the basis for the emergence of kinship systems, which in turn are the basis for the emergence of political, legal, and social systems. An interesting trend in the discussions or papers is the almost total exclusion of the family. Yet the family is basic to an understanding of discrimination and, at this time, is in severe flux. If male scholars do not examine women or sex discrimination, they will not be inclined to see the family. If the family is not related to equity in educational systems, of what value are the definitions of equality? Briefly stated, the conceptual itinerary is devoid of the intersecting relationship between informal and formal education.

It may seem easier to get rid of all classifications by sex, race, and ethnicity, but in the long run the harder political and intellectual task is to define the intersection of discrimination among groups. These, in turn, must be inter-related with family and educational systems. Until this is



done, there will continue to be lack of consensus on definitions of educational equality or equity. In very few instances do the papers concern themselves with sorting out the interactive effects of varied stigma. Being poor, female, handicapped, and black is different existentially, economically, and socially than being white, middle-class, male, and handicapped. Again the itinerary, the trip metaphor neither accounts for the distance traveled nor the road taken. A rough, mountainous trail is different from a paved road with road blocks set up at irregular intervals. It is impossible to achieve consensus of educational equity or equality without understanding the kind of trips taken by individuals and groups. Minimally, we must take into account sex and age as the most universal roles defined in all cultures. Next we must consider how these basic rules intersect in kinship or family structures, and how these interrelate in complex cultures with ethnicity, race, social class, and religion. These must also be considered in terms of each person's physical and psychological disabilities, capabilities, and talents.

It is at the intersection of multiple inequalities where the greatest damage to the human spirit can be found. In this way we would begin to understand the origins of discrimination and the patterning of inequality. The rhetorical trip is no help to people; the actual mapping of the interconnections of traditional prejudices toward real lives lived by real human beings may provide a spiral model that reflects lived reality and gets us out of the whole male rhetorical

model. This is harder to do, and in American culture, where facts define the next group to be studied, it is almost impossible. Yet the intellectually-honest job involves this kind of hard work. Without doing these analyses, it is possible, as was more than readily apparent in the papers and discussions, to exclude one group--women--almost entirely, and thus deny the validity of the whole intellectual exercise. Further, by excluding age as the other basic universal category, the sloppiness in definition pertaining to levels of education is even more apparent. Some writers focused on public, some on private, some on higher education, some did not distinguish between undergraduate or graduate levels. Nursery schools, day care centers, and families were almost entirely dismissed.

I could continue enumerating general themes, but I turn now to a consideration in greater detail of the discussion tapes and project papers to find out if we are really just croaking out there in the academic wilderness or if we are actually creating a new conception of educational equality.

When one looks at the individual papers, still another theme in the work of the project members emerges: the tendency to present the standard male intellectual tradition, almost completely excluding the work of members of the group against which prejudice has been expressed. With few exceptions, references were almost entirely male and white. The thousands of books and articles written by women and minorities were simply not in evidence. Thus, well-intended men sustain, once again, the exclusion of those they are attempting to help.

This kind of help leads to further stereotyping and further exclusion from the construction of thought systems and of social reality. Frankly, as a woman, I would rather not have this kind of "help."

Equality from the Viewpoint of  
Intellectual History

Dr. Thomas Powell, a specialist in intellectual history, proposes that the historical understanding of groups, institutions, and blocking mechanisms in a three-dimensional grid would allow us to identify blockages and thus to refine definitions. If we locate blockages, we might find that inequality is not the fault of the educational institution. For example, the fault would lie with unions who refused blacks into apprenticeship programs, of Native Americans who would not accept Western education, or of court rulings on women and children. From a systems theoretical approach, all parts of the grid should be interactive. Thus, the court decisions on labor legislation, although originally well-intended by some proponents, were also backed by some unions and businesses. The former used them to reduce female competition for "male" jobs, and the latter used them to channel women into low-paying positions, such as secretaries, who were not covered by unions. Education reinforced this state of affairs by assuming a sex-neutral world in which they treated boys and girls "exactly the same." Therefore, in history the standard curriculum depicts court rulings as humane happenings. From the women's point of view, this is certainly not the whole story. Clearly,

the important aspect of Powell's grid should be the varied perceptions of historical happenings within an interactive system.

Intellectual history requires multiple views. For example, Powell should look carefully at the ethnographic and survey studies of education and Native Americans, conducted by Rosalie and Murray Wax or Robert Havighurst, or a number of other researchers since 1896. From these studies, the Native Americans did not reject education. They rejected the imposition of a foreign educational system that was poorly adapted to them and the foreign educators who did not understand their values. They acted to save their thought system and world view, their own conception of reality. Ironically, Powell's call for case studies to locate blockages is paradoxical, since most of the research on Native Americans is ethnographic. Clearly, for both women and Native Americans, Powell's location of blockages would not lead to definitional consensus.

The incapacity to see intellectual history from the vantage point of oppressed groups is evident in Powell's analysis of the revolt of the last two decades, which, according to him, led to the overthrow of traditional standards for admission and graduation. He concludes that the devaluation of academic degrees was caused by those in revolt. "It may not be too much to say that the worst enemies of blacks and other minorities turned out to be the well-meaning critics of old requirements and standards (like me)." Note the emphasis on blacks, lumping together of all other specific minorities, and

the total exclusion of women. The use of the black model for equality has many dysfunctional effects, even for blacks.

The last two decades were marked by a multiplicity of revolts. Special opportunity programs, for example, had a lesser impact on women of any color. In fact, the heavy emphasis on verbal, not mathematical deficiencies, led to an increase in black males, disproportionate to black females. The rightness of the paternalistic system, as stated by Moynihan, could only mean that the so-called black matriarchy was the cause of family and community disorganization. The result of efforts to help blacks temporarily led them away from an enviable record of traditional equality in numbers of black men and women entering higher education, and toward the sexist differentiated power system of whites. Because no one attacked the central issue, the sex-segregated labor market place, many blacks, after receiving degrees in "women's fields," found rewards incommensurate with efforts.

The overthrow of standards, resulting from any equity model, probably has not occurred anymore than Affirmative Action has been implemented. Institutional inertia is the order of the day. If women had been considered, their increased numbers should have led to higher standards, since women have higher SAT scores, higher school and college grade-point averages, and higher verbal GRE scores. Specifically, considering black men and women, few systems had open admissions policies, such as those espoused at CUNY. Many were five-year, extended programs, and the research on these programs showed

that students, who would previously had been considered unfit for higher education, achieved creditable records.

Dr. Thomas Green's analysis of the devaluation of degrees is probably more useful. With increased numbers of educated persons, the supply increased and the search for higher levels of credentials in graduate schools began. What Green does not point out is that the sex-segregated labor market forces those women and minority men into a search for higher degrees, because the reimbursement levels are insufficient. Ironically, for those in education and government, two prime employers of women, equity rewards for educational efforts are probably worse or not better than in business.

In Ryan's terminology, blaming the victim, from a scholarly point of view, creates problems. But the exclusion of almost half of humanity from an intellectual analysis in equality is disastrous. Unfortunately, much of the remainder of the paper reflects the male intellectual historian writing about equality from only the history of previous males, who set out to determine the nature and meaning of equality. There is another intellectual history of which Powell seems oblivious. During the same three centuries in Western culture, the so-called distaff side was spinning its own thread. Similarly, blacks and Native Americans produced a body of literature on educational equality.

The very men presented as democratic exponents of equality in education were often the same people who discriminated against women. For example, Rousseau, one of the prime

advocates of enlightened rationality, wrote in Emile that the whole of education for women was relative to men "to make life sweet and agreeable to them." Among others, the male's biases are apparent: "The difference between man and woman is not so considerable that one man can therefore claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he." "All men are endowed with intuitive reason to grasp self-evident Truth." Locke's view, supposed to be strongly egalitarian, was: "All men alike have a sense with which they can perceive moral truths without benefit of intellectual capacity or training." The irony in Locke's statements is that intuition, itself, is historically associated with females, except through the apprehension of a male God.

Powell continues the lineage of male thinkers on equality, eventually crossing the Atlantic to consider Thomas Jefferson, a slave owner who said that unless bias or mistaken religious principles interfere, "every man is a competent judge and therefore it is difficult to impose upon mankind. . . ." It is ironic that Jefferson, a critical contributor to framing the Constitution, helped to develop a document that specifically pertained to men and eliminated women entirely. For close to 75 years, women fought for the right to vote, because the Constitution excluded women. After black male suffrage was achieved, some 50 years later women of all colors were finally allowed the essential right of a citizen. Following female suffrage, an amendment to the Constitution, now titled the Equal Rights Amendment, has been before Congress every year for



over a half century. As late as 1968, the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution was not intended to cover women.

For women to take seriously this lineage of thought by men is difficult because many never applied their ideas equally to women. Thus, Powell's assertion that the idea of equality was critically buttressed by some forms of utilitarianism or other philosophical thought leaves women cold. If I were to trace during the same centuries my own intellectual ancestors in educational equality, the lineage would be entirely different.

#### Historical Roots of Discrimination in Education

In the mid-1600s, Ann Hutchinson, the first woman to challenge the doctrine that no woman could have a voice in church affairs, held the "outrageous" idea that a woman could think for herself and express her thoughts publicly to others. Angry authorities, fearing, as men still fear, that the whole fabric of society (meaning their male hierarchical authority) would be threatened, destroyed her for proclaiming equality for herself and everyone else. Although pregnant at her first trial, she was forced to stand until it was clear she could no longer do so. She was not allowed to produce evidence in her own behalf, her judges bullied witnesses, and in her second trial for excommunication, pronounced her guilty because "her repentance is not in her countenance." Only one person publicly defended this woman who said, "I think the soul to be nothing but Light." Mary Dyer, her defender, was hanged twenty-two years later in Boston.



Despite the fact that women during the Revolutionary War ploughed land, tended stricken soldiers, forced open merchants' stores and took commodities which were overpriced, and collected \$7,000 for clothing for soldiers, they were rewarded by exclusion from the Constitution. Abigail Adams, in 1777, wrote to her husband pleading with him to be more "generous" with the ladies than his ancestors:

. . . all men would be tyrants if they could. If particular care and attention is not paid to the ladies, we are determined to foment rebellion. We will not hold ourselves bound by any laws in which we have no voice or representation.

No generosity was extended and the revolt of women has marked the American scene ever since. That rebellion was and still is, in large part, focused on education. Ten years before Mary Wollstonecraft published her Vindication of the Rights of Women (in 1782, in England), Judith Murray in an essay finally published in 1790 reflected on the unequal opportunities for women and men:

. . . from what source doth this superiority, in this determined faculty of soul (judgment) proceed? May we not trace its source in the difference of education and continued advantages? Will it be said that the judgment of a male two years old is more sage than of a female's of the same age? I believe the reverse is generally observed to be true. But from that period what partiality! How is the one exalted and the other depressed, by the contrary modes of education that are adopted! The one is taught to aspire, the other is early confined and limited.

Despite such reasoned and impassioned pleas for education, no change occurred. The few female seminaries followed Rousseau's detestable dictum:

The whole education of women ought to be relative to men. To please them, to be useful to them, to make themselves loved and honored by them, to educate them when young, to care for them when grown, to console them and to make life sweet and agreeable to them--these are the duties of women at all times, and what should be taught them from early infancy.

Thus, wealthy young women learned to play instruments, embroidery, and speak a smattering of French. But the majority of women were allowed to forego such "delicate" education and to labor instead fourteen hours a day in textile mills or clear land and create homes on the frontier. At the same time, black women continued to be packed in slave ships, giving birth to babies, as one owner observed, chained to corpses that the drunken overseers had not removed. Slave sales extolled the breeding qualities of black women, affording opportunity to owners to raise strong servants for their own use. Their "own use" was attested by some 588,000 mulattos according to the 1860 census.

Women, whether black or white, still spoke out despite no legal protection. They still insisted on the right to think, to write, to speak, to know. Hannah Crocker in 1818, observed in a conservative tract:

There can be no doubt that there is as much difference in the powers of each individual of the male sex as there is of the female; and if they received the same mode of education, their improvement would be fully equal.

Just one year later, Governor Clinton of New York received a proposal to the state legislature to improve female education. Written by Emma Willard, she advocated that all women, rich or poor, be educated; that teachers, increasingly

female, be educated; and that a large portion of the usual male curriculum be taught. Barred from higher education, she paid a male student to teach her as he learned. Self-educated in each new subject, she taught girls at the same time she herself learned. She wished to found a seminary where learning was possible for women without the terrible struggle she had faced to gain her own education. Because women were not allowed to speak in public, she could not even present her own proposal in person. Relying on men, the legislature voted to charter the Seminary, but, using a tactic common today, refused it a budget. Finally, she scraped together \$4,000, founding the Troy Female Seminary. Again, the "generosity" of men as a technique of repression, then as now, is more than apparent.

The first coeducational effort was the opening of Oberlin in 1833. Although the "elevation of the female character" was a purported aim, too much elevation was evidently unseemingly. Again, using a tactic still intact, a short course was open to women; not until 1837 would the first woman be allowed access to the longer men's course. If, as men stated, the female brain was smaller and incapable of the same intellectual stress, the logic of women students washing the men's clothing, caring for their rooms, serving them at meals, listening to their orations, and remaining silent in public groups--while attending to their own studies--could hardly qualify as a solution to their supposedly innate inferiority. Of course, economically, it was a very logical strategy and it, too, is still used by men today in higher education in the

employment of overly-qualified faculty and graduate student wives at low wages.

Just as Emma Willard had endured ostracism for her public audacity, Mary Lyon, founder of Mt. Holyoke, suffered the same fate. In 1834, she developed a plan incorporating a rigorous academic curriculum for girls of all economic classes. Ironically, she could not even attend the trustees meeting in which the location of the institution was decided. When the men, from whom the whole plan must "seem to emanate," did not collect enough money, Mary Lyon, traveling alone, raised most of the money not from religious or political or commercial men of power. Her records show the money came from small parlor gatherings, church meetings, sewing circles. One contribution was six cents. So much for the beneficence of the protective male of the species. Ms. Lyon wrote when censured for public appearances, "My heart is sick, my soul is pained with this empty gentility, this genteel nothingness. I am doing a great work, I cannot come down."

Although educated black women, such as Phyllis Wheatley, existed in the 1700s, she, like her uneducated sisters, ended her life in desperation. Originally sold as a slave and later educated to be a poet and Latirist who was accepted by British literary society, Ms. Wheatley was found, at the age of 31, dead from starvation with a newborn child in her arms. Yet black women held midnight schools for children in the South. One taught twelve children all she knew, then took another twelve, and another twelve, continuing this practice seven years

before being discovered. In the North, the worst tactics of men were directed against Prudence Crandall, who in 1833 opened in Connecticut a school for girls in which one black girl enrolled. When persuasion failed, rather than expelling the girl, she closed and then reopened again with black and white girls. Male legislators passed a law to forbid the teaching of students from other states. When this was not upheld, men broke windows, stoned children and teachers, dropped manure in the well, refused to sell groceries, and withheld medical services. Finally a mob destroyed the first floor of the school, while teachers defended students on the second floor.

In the South, the Grimke sisters fought slavery and Sarah tried to educate her maid at night behind locked doors. They were caught and forced to abandon education. Angelina Grimke wrote An Appeal to the Christian Women of the South and Sarah Grimke summed up the prevailing sentiment of men regarding female education at the time by quoting one masculine opinion: "Chemistry enough to keep the pot boiling and geography enough to know the location of different rooms in her house is sufficient learning for a woman." Such sexist attitudes kept young women out of high schools until after the Civil War when the opening of free high schools for girls in Boston and Philadelphia were treated as great triumphs for women.

Given the obstacles men placed in their way, any school for women was, indeed, a triumph. "Learned" men proclaimed that educating women would lead them to contract "brain fever, that their childbearing apparatus would be impaired, that

marriage and family would collapse, that the final extermination of the race would then occur. They argued that the subjects taught to men, whether literature or mathematics, were too hard for the inferior female mind. They pointed to the lack of geniuses produced and said, "Why bother to educate women at all?" (The obvious tautology in this reasoning seemed to escape the men's superior wit.) They also said, with a familiar phrase we have heard today, "Why educate them? They'll just get married anyway."

As women joined and created the Abolitionist movement, their inferior status became more painfully apparent and the need for education increasingly, urgently obvious. The suffragists in the Seneca Convention in 1848 wrote a strongly worded statement condemning the denial of education to women. The men's negative reactions escalated. The clergy vehemently attacked:

The appropriate duties and influences of women are clearly stated in the New Testament. . . . When she assumes the place and tone of a man as a public reformer. . . she yields the power which God has given her for her protection, and her character becomes unnatural.

The threat of physical violence was handily veiled: Protection from men, only if obedience is given. Even the male abolitionists asked the women to withdraw from the fight, but Angelina Grimke responded:

Why, my dear brothers can you not see the deep laid scheme of the clergy against us as lecturers? . . . . If we surrender the right to speak in public this year, we must surrender the right to petition next year, and the right to write the year after, and so on. What then can woman do for the slave, when

she herself is under the feet of man and shamed into silence?

While self-educated women used whatever education they had and all the courage they could muster to speak, to petition, to write, the working woman went on strike--the first without men in 1834. Then, as now, the unequal salaries were obvious: In 1836, the estimate of women's daily average earnings was less than thirty seven and one-half cents, with many earning a mere twenty-five cents a day. Newspaper accounts estimated in 1833 that seventy-five percent of Philadelphia's working women did not receive as much money for a week's work as men received in the same work for a single day of ten hours.

When Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell married in 1855, they read together a statement which protested and renounced laws which gave husbands:

1. The custody of the wife's person;
2. The exclusive control and guardianship of their children;
3. The sole ownership of the woman's personal property and of her real estate;
4. The product of her own industry;
5. Laws giving widowers larger and more permanent interest in the property of the deceased than widows received;
6. The whole system by which the legal existence of the wife was suspended during marriage.

In the Civil War, as in the Revolutionary War, women taught, entered government offices, and did heavy manual labor to keep homesteads going. The Sanitary Commission, although nominally led by men, owed its existence to thousands of anonymous women. Elizabeth Stanton, Susan Anthony, and Lucretia Mott spoke against slavery and for equal rights and

faced the roughest mobs of their lives. After all these efforts, women were rewarded with a constitutional amendment explicitly for the citizens. After decades of toil, black and white women were still legally non-persons, without the vote until the 1920s.

Despite no legal rights, women crusaded for them and demanded education, which was withheld from them by use of every technique imaginable. Astronomer Maria Mitchell, the first woman elected to the American Academy of Science, said, "I wish we could give to every woman who has a novel theory dear to her soul for the improvement of the world, a chance to work out her theory in real life." She deplored the preference of Vassar male presidents for male faculties, noting also the inequities in salaries between female and male professors.

In the professional schools, Harriet Hunt was denied admission to Harvard Medical School. Elizabeth Blackwell was finally allowed to study medicine at Geneva College against the unanimous opposition of the faculty, who made her entrance subject to the vote of students, specifying that one negative vote would exclude her. Thus, the faculty would not be accused of discrimination. The students voted for her because they saw great possibilities for entertainment. Once in the institution, she had to insist on her right to attend all classes, and, although she graduated at the top of her class, was advised that walking in the commencement procession was "unladylike."

Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, a licensed preacher and a graduate of Albion College, entered Boston University in 1875 and



was not given accommodations equivalent to male licensed preachers. Her main fear was starvation: she was found sitting at the bottom of the stairs too weak to go up to her room. The Women's Foreign Missionary Society gave her \$5.00 a week and on this she lived until she obtained her doctorate.

In the East, barred from entrance to colleges or professional schools, women formed separate institutions: Vassar opened in 1865, Smith and Wellesley in 1875, the "Harvard Annex" in 1879, and Bryn Mawr in 1885. Vassar had a full collegiate program and a preparatory program, since women students had such poor public school training. Smith, founded by a woman philanthropist, Sophia Smith, was the first to demand the same requirements as the best men's colleges.

Bryn Mawr was the first to establish a graduate program for women. President M. Carey Thomas, who received her doctorate at Zurich, rebuked Harvard's President Eliot for the sun spots on his brain. She opposed courses designed to make better mothers and wives. She took on such formidable opponents as Henry Adams and G. Stanley Hall, who claimed that women's education interfered with the sacred primitive rhythms that bound women to the deepest laws of the cosmos. Hall, an eminent psychologist, proposed a program organized around the monthly "sabbath" of menstruation and centered on dance as a form of worship. He also added schooling for morals.

To those who felt education would destroy the family Thomas countered with the belief that equal comrades in marriage who could respect each other were infinitely preferable

to the unequal arrangements of the past. Changing with each generation of students, she founded an experimental school for children in 1919 and a summer School for Workers in 1921 for factory women who could receive the same training as Bryn Mawr undergraduates. In 1935, she quoted from a prized alumna letter: "I have forgotten everything I learned at Bryn Mawr but I still see you standing in the chapel and telling us to believe in women."

In the Midwest and West, the trend toward coeducation was clear. Antioch, in 1852, followed Oberlin, allowing women students, and in 1858, Iowa became the first state university to admit women. But even tax-supported state institutions were difficult battlegrounds for women. The Regents' Report on the Admission of Females at the University of Michigan in 1858 said:

By many it is regarded as a doubtful experiment, by some as a very dangerous experiment . . . certain to be ruinous to the young ladies who should avail themselves of it. . . and disastrous to the Institution which should carry it out.

Ridicule, a favorite weapon of men, was used extensively when the first women students were finally admitted--twelve years later. Professor Haven (later President) wrote: "Not a member of either faculty approved it, but usually it was regarded as a rather serious joke on my part." Using a familiar tactic still in use today, he recommended that women go to Antioch or Oberlin. He further expressed the belief that women would not enter law, medicine, or theology and therefore should not be in a University. Finally, he reverted to an argument for a separate and unequal female seminary.

When Sarah Burger informed the Board of Regents that a class of twelve young ladies would present themselves for admission, the familiar parliamentary tactics prevailed. The letter was tabled. With applications before them, the issue was referred to a committee. Although the governor and legislature approved coeducation (on economic not moral grounds), President Tappan and the entire faculty talked of governmental interference and persuaded the Board to postpone a decision. The question was recommitteed to the same committee. By September, after Tappan had even hauled out the dismally familiar argument that educated women would become "mongrel, hermaphroditic monstrosities," the Board met and decided on such important matters as the purchase of twenty feet of cable for \$12.63 before they heard the Committee Report.

Points considered centered on whether women were persons, since all persons by state law had access to public educational institutions. Blackstone's legal position defined women as non-persons at marriage. Conceding that women could be barred as a distracting influence under the university's right to exclude "immoral" persons, they finally questioned whether women's education would be a misappropriation of funds.

The really critical tactic used and still broadly used today was the total exclusion of female opinions--even conservative Catherine Beecher or moderate Emma Willard or erudite Margaret Fuller. Modern equivalents of such exclusionary tactics are profusely evident to the women of today. The men, then as now, turned to other men, sure that little support for women would be found.

Predictably, President Woolsey of Yale was averse, seeing women in professions as simply subjecting themselves to ridicule. President Walker of Harvard relied on the great body of "enlightened" opinion--all negative in his own opinion--and questioned whether "we propose to educate females" for public or private life." Note, again, the complete exclusion of the "they" in such a momentous decision. Dr. Nott of Union College said the matter "had already been decided by the common consent of mankind." He was accurate in his use of the word man, but hardly scholarly in his negative conclusion.

President Horace Mann of Antioch said, ". . . I should rather forego the advantages than incur the dangers." In a final blow, President Finney of Oberlin was positive, if a wise, pious matron, a powerful religious influence on the mass of students, and a surrounding community that would uphold the university's regulations all existed. The recommendation, based exclusively on male judgment, was negative. Free love was even included in the final paragraph to discredit women's education by innuendo.

Despite citizen's petitions and a repeated application by Sarah Burger and three other women, the Regents appropriated money to distribute 2,000 copies of the negative report. All four women attended other colleges during the Civil War. Haven, in 1867, equivocated, although he was later to say he supported coeducation all along. (Again, a familiar tactic used today.) In the end, economics and determined pressure and the death of conservative agents forced the unwilling University to act



1.0



2.8



2.5



3.2



2.2



3.6



2.0



4.0



1.8



1.1



1.6



1.25



1.4



1.6

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS  
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a  
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART 1.0 2)

ethically. But even in 1869, the Regents engaged in parliamentary tactics, delaying the final decision to January 1870.

Once admitted, the women students were subjected to male faculty derogation and student deprecation. One faculty continued to address his class as gentlemen, calling female and male students, Mister. Another instructor, as recounted in the student Chronicle, made the following comment:

A dog had wandered into the classroom, and a couple of students rose to remove it. The professor stopped them. "That dog," he said, "is a resident of Michigan. Don't you know we now recognize the right of every resident of the state to enjoy the privileges afforded by the University?"

A distinguished professor of law considered the women students as a matter of entire indifference. The medical school fought the women students by stating that women were "during a large fraction of each month a quasi-invalid with mental and moral functions perturbed at such times." For suitable extra compensation, however, they would teach the two sexes in separate classes. The Regents relented, paying higher salaries and segregating medical classes. In 1871, Dean Sager of the Medical School said: "We take pleasure in adding that in the front rank of those who have successfully competed for the honors of the Institution the name of a member of the Class of Ladies." Amanda Sanford, a black woman and the first women physician graduated, walked through Commencement with Honors and with hooting and showering of abusive notes from the male students.

Despite such successes, the negative reactions to women's education continued through this century. In 1873, a

former Harvard medical professor, Edward H. Clarke, wrote Sex and Education or a Fair Chance for Girls, which was published in seventeen editions. Clarke was widely quoted even though his "evidence" rested on seven cases, including no women in coeducation, and one whose educational career was never noted. Miss A, while attending a female seminary, contracted St. Vitus' Dance from too much study. Miss D, at Vassar, had her stream of vital forces turned steadily to the brain and away from her ovaries. Miss F, for whom no educational experience was given, had to be placed in an insane asylum by, of course, the good Dr. Clarke. Despite the obvious inanity of his arguments, President M. Carey Thomas said that the women were haunted by the "clanging chains of that gloomy spectre," Dr. Edward H. Clarke's Sex in Education.<sup>1</sup>

When one compares this abbreviated history of education with that of Powell's, there are few interconnections. From the women's perspective, there was no "inexorable" progression from utilitarianism to naturalism to functionalism to pragmatism to instrumentalism. Because women and minorities were forcibly excluded from this progression of male thought, there is little reason to accept this itinerary as more than a series of models that were then and are now in serious need of substantial paradigm change. To define human nature and ethics while systematically excluding the lived experience of half of those described is somewhat problematic from a scholarly point of view.

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<sup>1</sup>Joan I. Roberts, "Creating a Facade of Change: Informal Mechanisms Used to Impede Changing the Status of Women" (Pittsburgh: KNOW, 1975).

Powell points to the use of Darwin and Marx in the depersonalization process associated with increasing technological change. Because Marx was primarily concerned with workers in the public marketplace, who were predominantly males, most women who worked in the home were excluded. Thus, the division between public and private worlds became more marked. It is Engels, not Marx, who derived a modified form of family evolution from Morgan's evolutionary classificatory kinship systems. Marx wrote very little on the family or on sex roles. Nevertheless, the legal rights of women in socialist countries were asserted some decades ago, while American women still fight for an amendment to the Constitution. From the woman's perspective, the depersonalization has less to do with Marx than with the sharp demarcation of the private and "female" world of the family from the public and "male" world of institutions.

Peculiarly, Powell does not deal with the revolution in physics associated with Einstein. The changes in physics with Einstein's relativity concept led to the demise of the traditional Newtonian, machine model of the cosmos, thus allowing for alternative conceptions of consciousness more congenial to women's own lived experience. The more recent explosion of knowledge in the biological sciences is not considered, yet the expansion of thinking and techniques in the natural sciences are very closely connected to changes in female life, sex roles, and family, and consequently to educational theory and equity.



Powell's concern with institutional indifference to individuals seems particularly important to women and minorities. However, on closer examination it appears to have exactly the opposite effects. When benefits are institutionally arranged for blacks, Chicanos, and the poor--note again the exclusion of women--"nothing is done for me as a person," "no personal response is called for," "just contempt to be treated like a thing." From the woman's point of view, civil rights laws and Affirmative Action programs call for a very personal response, since they are practically the only means for restructuring institutional arrangements that historically have been completely organized for m n. The question women and minorities ask is: Why didn't the individual person, as a rational, educated man, see the injustices in the system? The institutional arrangements were presumably supposed to create the fully and broadly educated man, but that same system produced men who did not or could not see and act on injustices. Why did such men wait for governmental institutions to intervene and force the products of humanistic education to see the inequity and inequality of their own institutional arrangements?

For different reasons, I quite agree with Powell that the previous philosophies have been "neither just nor practical." How could they be when they arose from institutional arrangements that rationalized the exclusion of women of all colors and of minority men? The system out of which the lineage of philosophical thought arose historically extended no justice to

women or minority men. Now these institutions, under pressure to be just, are decried as impersonal. What is the way out of this paradox? To Powell, we simply say "to hell with all categories such as race, ethnicity and gender (Note: women are now included) and other irrelevancies." Gender is hardly irrelevant to the pregnant teenager on welfare, trying to train for a secretarial position for which she will receive an inadequate wage to maintain herself and her child. Presumably, she and others of her gender will, however, be provided "what our will and resources permit us to provide." The question is: Whose will and whose resources? The answer is the will and resources of men who hold almost all the societal positions of power. Given the history of women, I am afraid that many women will not want to rely on the will and resources of men in power. We have done that for too long with too little results.

How would the depersonalized institution, without major structural changes, effectively deal with individuals? For economic reasons, mass processing of people will probably lead right back to categorization. Presumably a shift away from groups of discriminated persons collectively pressuring for their rights to individualization will stop everyone from "moralizing in abortive ways." But to the deprived, morality is what is crucial. Unfortunately, ethical theory as expressed in the male lineage of writers provides, according to Powell, no theory of obligation: "There is no way to demonstrate by reason that anyone owes anyone else." The distributive theory

of justice does not, according to Powell, compel us to acknowledge obligation. If this is the case, we can junk ethical theory and get back to the business of moral directives developed by cultures and explicated as value systems by anthropologists. Fortunately, people do develop systems of moral reciprocity regardless of philosophers who may not accept these as logical.

Powell concludes that we have the right to be treated as well as but not like everyone else. In a paragon of 19th century self-interest theory, we have the right to get all we are entitled to. But the poor don't want equality, they want more than they are entitled to--to be rich and powerful. Those who "crusade or seek after justice" simply want comfort. Minorities are "not morally superior, they're just hungry." This time, thankfully, Powell excludes women from this "abortive moralizing." "Moral hemophiliacs," presumably those who give of themselves to achieve something for somebody other than themselves, are really exhibiting abnormal, not ethical behavior. What we want as persons, not what we are obliged to do, is the issue for Powell.

It may, as Powell notes, be hard for philosophers to make the case that people deserve anything, but it is not hard to make the case from legal or social history that specific groups at particular points in time have been denied almost everything. The underlying assumption of the undeserving poor and the unprepared minority member grasping for more than they are entitled is obviously stereotypic. But when you intersect

sex with race and poverty, these statements become illogical. As noted earlier, women tend to be better prepared, as measured by tests and grades. Furthermore, they tend to work harder and longer. For example, the Chase Manhattan Bank gives 12.6 hours of labor a day for women in the child-rearing and bearing years. Recent research on women in the public sector indicates more hours of actual work than those put in by men during the same 8-hour day. With gender, any definition of equity or equality must incorporate both the underdeserving and the overdeserving. There are potential Miltons and Shakespeares among us, and they are most likely to be secretaries in educational institutions. That's where they end up. If the poor are "uninspired and uninspiring to work with," it is equally probable that faculty in higher education are uninspired and uninspiring. This conclusion can be justified by reference to Powell's pragmatic answer which is "to say to hell with all the accumulated injustices" of the stigmatized groups. The goal is to make rewards commensurate with individual abilities and efforts and to become as competent as circumstances permit. This "startling," "new" idea, coming from the accumulated wisdom of the past, is sure to maintain the status quo derived from the inequities of the past. It is in the best interests of those in power that stigmatized groups know nothing of their roots, their past. Without going back into the history of each group, the members do not know what they have missed and therefore cannot demand what they deserve. Because the institutions have carefully told them who they are

and should be, they have believed the nonsense, simply because they knew nothing of their past.

Returning to Powell's original concern with identifiable obstacles in the grid, these must come from the histories of people. If from histories, then one must classify groups in order to locate blockages. But at the same time, one must simultaneously categorize only by individual needs rather than by "irrelevancies" of race, ethnicity, and gender. The "social science-produced categories"--black, Spanish surname, low level of income--will be excluded, so we can get to individual opportunity through shares. Since most people are already in education and the curriculum is already meeting their needs, most of these shares will be minimally distributed. So much for the extensive debates of the 1960s on the inadequacies of schools and curricula! It's a new decade, so all the experimental efforts can be forgotten along with Black Studies, Women's Studies, or any of the other programs that look at injustices and their effect on categorized persons. While we are at it, we can also forget institutional changes, such as those required under Title IX in athletic facilities for women, because these are institutional changes, not individual needs. If one does not look at individuals as a group, one does not necessarily have to meet demands for equity in institutional structure.

With the allocation of shares to individuals, ironically one is very likely to find a number of people who have similar needs; thus, we return to categories in administrative

processing. How will needs be determined? By the instruments devised by those very social scientists who created artificial categories of people! The circularities are so obvious as to require no further comment. Economic balance may have to be achieved by not giving the greatest amount to those with the highest needs. Instead you may have to return to categories and distribute the same amounts to each. But of course these categories would be individual, not social groupings!

How have hard-headed programs, with no flexibility and high student commitment, worked? (Finally, enter women.) Pregnant students in Illinois did better intellectually. Emotionally? Who knows! Yet, what we do know from other research is that self-concept has a heavy impact on women's achievement. A major problem in the progress of any women's or minority group is to develop a concept as a member of the group that is sufficiently strong to allow the individual to enter into competitive or cooperative work with others. For example, the older housewife returning to college is often frightened, having taken no tests and no classes for years. To get the bright, older women back into education requires a process that enables her to gain self-respect, despite the denigration of females in the general population. With appropriate support, research indicates that older women produce better academic work more consistently than younger students in both traditional "women's" fields and in male-dominated professions.

Contrast this approach to Powell's model from Germany, where teachers, housewives, judges (note: women, although in stereotypic roles, are included) all take courses in English together. All work together successfully because they have a common purpose: learning English. Powell notes that there was no uneasiness. Why should there be? No one has challenged or changed the social categories. Outcomes are not equal to efforts. Rewards are not commensurate with work. The secretary continues to get an inordinately low salary, the housewife gets no money at all, and the judge gets his comparatively large professional recompense.

Returning to the United States, the costs of individualization are presumably not going to be too high. The G.I. Bill of Rights produced a profit in higher taxation rates from the thousands of men, who entered higher education. What

Powell forgets is the real, human costs of that experiment: The thousands of women working in decent jobs at reasonable salaries who were sent back home as a patriotic sacrifice so that the men could avail themselves of their Bill of Rights.

Clearly Powell confuses collective societal needs and individual needs. He has no analysis of the intersection between and among inequities, except to get rid of the categories and groups that have suffered selective damage. It seems obvious that the individual cannot be dealt with successfully outside the context of the social group from which they are derived. As a woman, my reaction to Powell's paper is that I'm Nobody and will remain Nobody if his pseudo-individualization ever becomes a reality.

Equity in Higher Education

Consider now the work of Stephen Adolphus, who is predominantly concerned with postsecondary education at the secondary level. Adolphus sees erratic democratization during the last 150 years of American history, from private education of the well born, especially those training for the ministry, to the establishment of publicly sponsored institutions. Quite clearly those training for the ministry and, I might add, all other professions were overwhelmingly men then and now. Only in the last ten years have women moved in any numbers into medicine and law. Adolphus traces the shifts from upper classes to the current incorporation of middle and to a lesser extent lower classes in higher education. This itinerary is again largely male. For example, the proportion of women from all classes peaked in the 1920s and declined until the mid-1950s, and then began to rise again. Adolphus, along with Powell, points to the G.I. Bill of Rights, to which he attributes the masses of new students from different classes. Without redundancy, I will again point out the fact that male students, not female students of any color or class, were the primary recipients. However, Adolphus believes that this legislation "insured a much broader economic spectrum from 1946 onward." Once again, I must point out that the G.I. Bill of Rights had the reverse effect on women, who left their jobs in order to be "feminine and patriotic" in the home.

According to Adolphus, the last two decades have been different. First, the National Education Defense Act provided



special awards for the talented few. Whether proportionately female and/or non-white is not specified. Evidently these awards did not affect poor girls; in the lowest socioeconomic class, 40 percent of those intellectually able to attend college never go to college. Excluding social class, of those in the highest intellectual quintile, 92 percent of men and 62 percent of women, and in the next highest quintile, 58 percent of men and 18 percent of women are admitted to liberal arts colleges. Second, "quotas" have been instituted. The term "quota" has never been accepted by government, feminist, or minority groups. Goals have been translated into quotas and used as an argument against goal-setting. Using the correct term, goals, it is assumed that broader representation is possible; however, underserved groups will be the poorest, oldest, and part-time students. Obviously, women are over-represented in the poverty population, are more likely to be older, returning students, and more inclined toward part-time study to accommodate to family needs.

To Adolphus, there is an inexorable movement of minorities into higher education. Note again no mention of women as a class intersecting with class and race. How does this unavoidable movement come about? Evidently from social circumstances, not from the efforts of the stigmatized, since the itinerar of their efforts is not described. During the last two decades, there is, according to Adolphus, an accumulation of surplus wealth in the nation, the greatest in the "history of man," allowing for postponement of work force

entry; second, there is a sizable investment in growth of higher education; and third, there is an escalation of credentialing and the need for tertiary training, resulting from increased technological capability. One can argue the reverse: First, postponement of entry into the work force was "caused" by high unemployment in the marketplace, not by the proper use of surplus wealth. For example, the highest rate of unemployment is among black teenagers and black females. Second, the investment in higher education was based on fallacious estimates that women would go on bearing three to five children as they did after World War II. The men in power did not predict the feminist movement; the women did not continue bearing children at the previous rate. Instead, they fought for abortion and birth control rights. The result is a period of declining enrollment and the collapse of many smaller institutions of higher learning. Third, escalation of credentialing is one way, as Green points out, to keep people out of professions: for example, those who are poor, non-white, and who have babies. Tertiary training created by technological shifts can be countered by the trend toward fewer jobs in a computerized age.

It is probably more important to look at Adolphus's emphasis on the strong, motivating force of the perceptions of the good life that higher education might bring. However, the mythological falsities, associated with these perceptions, have been amply documented in The Great School Legend, Caste, Class and Bureaucracy, The Great Training Robbery, and

innumerable other sources. In general, upward mobility in the United States is no greater than the rates found in other industrialized nations, including Japan. Furthermore, the distribution and control of wealth, despite increased educational levels in the whole populace, has not substantially changed the proportions in varied quintiles over the last half century. When education does influence social mobility, it is likely to result in small shifts from, for example, upper-lower to lower-middle classes. Finally, much of the research compares the relative positions of fathers and sons. Mothers and daughters are often assumed to achieve their social status as appendages to the males studied; thus, it is difficult to assess the specific effects of education on women of any color.

The perception of education as the means to achieve "the good life" and the subsequent reliance on educational systems to break sex, race, and class barriers has produced some changes, but these are minor when compared to the high hopes held by members of disenfranchised groups. Again, it is necessary to look at the intersection of stigma to achieve clarity, and it is in the family where the interconnections between race and sex caste systems are most easily observed. Endogamy is the principal means of sustaining a caste system. For example, research on the American soldier following the Second World War found that it eventually became acceptable to fight and die with a black man in integrated unity, but not to share a meal with him in the home. In the sex caste system,

women are objects of value, possessions that are not to be shared. "Would you want your daughter to marry one of them?" baldly states the essential sexism basic to the maintenance of racism. Once again, it is the intersection of discrimination found in the family that is critical. To espouse education as the principal means of achieving equality, as defined by mobility in relation to economic factors such as increased earnings, is an admirable but insufficient approach.

The median income reflects the intersection of race and sex, with white men, black men, white women, then black women receiving, in descending order, lower amounts of income. Within each group, regardless of cohort and age data, the differentials are sustained and for women have declined. Over the last twenty-five years, women's earning power, despite increased educational levels, has decreased; in 1955 women earned 63 percent of what men earned; in 1978, women earned 60 percent of what men earned. In short, men's earning power increased at a rate greater than the increase in women's earning power. The median income of a woman with a college degree is \$4,000 less than for a man with a high school diploma. Fewer than 15 percent of male workers earn less than \$15,000, while only 7 percent of female workers earn more than \$15,000. Among the most highly educated women, there is a decrease in salary differentials over the last ten years between male and female professors. In general, the woman Ph.D. does not make much more money than a male high school graduate. In short, when class is related to sex and race discrimination, the rewards

obtained from educational effort do not lead necessarily to "the good life," even as measured by dollars.

Adolphus points to a shift in the itinerary of equality in the recent adaptation in one state of the following: "Our society musth provide equality of educational opportunity which means that access shall be rendered as nearly as possible to all, regardless of race, religion, or national origin, regardless too of low economic status of poor educational preparation at earlier levels not within the control of individuals."

The public adoption of this statement as policy is a step forward in the itinerary of educational equality and a step backward for women as a class because of their exclusion. I repeat that the model of inequality arises out of the sex caste system to be subsequently used as a model from the family interaction to justify other forms of discrimination. And, I repeat that the interconnections among race, class, and gender are critical to establishing any conception of educational equality.

According to Adolphus, the next tep in the itinerary is to achieve proportional representation. How this is to be achieved on a 51-49 basis for women and men is uncertain, since they were not included in the original policy as formulated. I agree with Adolphus that the final vision is unexplicated. How could it be when sex discrimination against half the population is excluded? Again I agree with Adolphus that what is missing is a concept of justice that provides for all people.

But again I must point out that an adequate theory must encompass the whole population. A theory that excludes those who have been historically the recipients of discrimination in the basic human group over the longest period of time cannot be intellectually adequate.

Adolphus in the group discussion stressed the need to make more explicit a moral framework. In my estimation, the moral has been skirted. Traditionally, it has been the domain of women. So it may be hard for sophisticated men to talk about morality. Again, I agree with Adolphus. The attempts of others to exclude the moral, the just from definitions of educational equality will eventually fail. The disadvantaged groups will sooner or later insist on the inclusion of justice, because their reconceptualization of the prevailing thought systems will obviously force them to consider the immorality of those systems as applied to their histories.

Despite Adolphus's concern with the moral, he sees the system shifting to areas of stress placed upon it. In the discussion he stated that when it was important to increase numbers of non-white students, the system acted. When ~~unim-~~portant, the system did not act. "The paternalistic system responds to pressures, otherwise they don't care, and that's the trend right now. They don't care." Specifically, middle-level management are key figures. Adolphus rejects a utilitarian interpretation and defines equality as a universal moral problem. Ironically, his model excludes women, while his term "paternalistic" correctly characterizes those who control the

flow of money--those "who don't care."

Adolphus defines the qualities that education should produce. Of these, one is particularly important; "the capacity to live independently with servile dependence reduced to a tolerable minimum." Again, however, housewives can be excluded, because they do live in an economically dependent and sometimes servile manner. The nonconsensual dependency of groups of women is maximized because of the economic structuring of sex roles. Clearly, women of any color cannot achieve the autonomy Adolphus asserts to be an ideal educational outcome if their group is excluded from public policy statements.

Adolphus sees poverty and academic unpreparedness as principal barriers to the attainment of the positive qualities associated with education. Again, I must note the minority model, most commonly associated with the black movement during the last two decades. This model does not include the fact that "over preparedness" still does not lead to acceptance of women of various ethnicities. Furthermore, since the model has not usually included sex discrimination, it does injustice even to the non-white woman. Poverty is a woman's problem, which is exaggerated by racial identity.

The unemployment rate for adult women in 1978 was 6 percent, for minority women, 10.6 percent. In comparison, for adult men, it was 4.2 percent. Women constitute two-thirds of the individuals who earn only minimum wage, and account for more than 80 percent of the workers in eight of the lowest paying occupations. Quite obviously the numbers of black, Latino,

or Native American women in these occupations is high. Women head one out of every seven families, while nearly 40 percent of all black families are headed by women. Thirty percent of female-headed households live in poverty, while only 6 percent of male-headed households live in poverty. Further, 23 percent of female heads of households were unemployed in 1977. Of the A.F.D.C. population, 97 percent are women and children. These received an average monthly payment of \$78.05 per person. Even with sole responsibility for children, 40 percent of welfare recipients work outside the home. Finally, the increase between 1969 and 1976 in the number of families living in poverty is almost totally found in single female parent households.

It is to Adolphus's credit that he includes families in his analysis of three cases, who, even with public support, had a tough time in education because of poverty. First, a poor male in fashion design is unable to get the necessary materials needed in his coursework, nor engage in experiences needed to broaden his training. Second, a man from a poverty-stricken background who is studying music lacks money to obtain the individualized attention necessary for high achievement in his discipline. Finally, a woman, to Adolphus's credit, is presented, unfortunately under the title Rich Little Poor Girl. What this refers to is an adult Native American woman who has borne two children. In this example, the only one in all the papers reviewed, the intersection of discrimination is obvious, although it remains unstated and unexplicated. According to Adolphus, the woman went quickly through her programs. But a



non-white female with two children is never without problems and her problems are radically different from the male students presented, who were not single with sole support of two dependents. In this case, the Native American woman could not even find housing, nor meet the needs of her children; she entered the job market indebted and is currently unemployed. For the first time in all the papers, the intersection of race, sex, and class discrimination is presented. Unfortunately, only two of three are understood to be significant.

The problems this "girl" who went quickly through her education are those typical of many women. Lack of adequate support for dependents, problems imposed by the welfare bureaucracy, instability of welfare employment, lack of any cushion for economic adversity. The essential elements of sex discrimination are blatantly presented but never enunciated. The older returning woman student, the young woman student who becomes pregnant too soon, the divorced or separated woman returning to school--all these join the Native American woman. Yet none of these are seen or heard in the papers or first discussion on educational equality. Of the three cases Adolphus presents, the extras of education are not available to the two men, thus limiting the quality of their training. To the third person, survival of herself and her children is at stake. Still, nowhere in the paper is an explicit statement of sex discrimination, as it obviously intersects with race and class discrimination.

Adolphus assumes that all conditions affecting educational inequality need to be dealt with. If we seriously apply this statement, it should be clear that we would have to change the status of women in nearly all of the dimensions of social life, since they are excluded from the majority of public positions of power. Whether education can take on all the extra school factors is questionable and probably impossible until the systemic bases for discrimination in the general society are attacked simultaneously in relation to formal education. What is obvious for me is that Adolphus cannot include all conditions affecting educational inequality if he leaves out women as a group that is affected.

#### Institutional Efficiency and Educational Equity

Stephen Dresch, in his first paper, presents his proposed study of the economic bases of inequities in education. In his work Dresch shows more concern with women and male minority members and with the family. Dresch tries to incorporate the family through public policy in regard to laws relating to marriage, divorce, property ownership settlements, estates, taxation, and employment. In one sense, the family is probably the most inefficient economic institution in the nation because of redundancy of similar work performed in a non-collective manner by millions of women. In another sense, the family is probably the greatest profit-making institution because of the unpaid labor of those same millions of women. It is estimated that the housewife, if reimbursed for her work, would

receive a salary of between \$12,000 and \$14,000 annually.

Although Dresch acknowledges the family, he does not directly interrelate it to the institutional inefficiencies in the public world in which the role of public policy may be to contribute to educational inequality. Dresch points to the importance of indirect losses and burdens of institutional insufficiencies. For the first time in the project papers and discussion, Dresch explicitly states an interest in white and non-white and male and female differences in academic performance and educational attainments in relation to highly rationed educational opportunities in, for example, medicine and law. Unfortunately, these two occupations are not as critical to women and minorities today as engineering and many of the physical sciences. Because Dresch does not specifically deal with the sex-segregated marketplace across professions and occupations for white and non-white persons, there is an inherent inadequacy in his economic analysis. Although the filtering effects of professional groups are important, it is obvious that the majority of women and minorities are located in other occupational groups; thus, only a small portion of a large pattern is considered.

Dresch states that were market imperfections or institutional inefficiencies corrected, the fair allocations of resources would be achieved. Pointing to professional monopolies, he reconsiders the actual or potential conflict between equity and efficiency. To Dresch, the more fundamental institutional or market imperfections may account for systemic

differences in educational attainments across groups. It is peculiar that Dresch does not see the most obvious market-place imperfection--the massive sex-segregated occupational structure that cuts across all kinds of work.

Nevertheless, monopoly by suppliers of educational services, barriers and arbitrary prerequisites for entry, denial of access to credit, and insurance market failures--all these do, in my opinion, serve to sustain some portion of the broader sex-segregated marketplace. I think Dresch is far too optimistic in his assumption that a large proportion recognizes that there has been a generally inequitable treatment of particular groups. The basic socialization processes that lead to inequities are far more pervasive than Dresch realizes. Furthermore, the acceptance of the right of women to work in "male" occupations is also, in my estimation, far from a common characteristic of the thinking of the general populace.

Given the failure of Affirmative Action, it is difficult to assess the effects of a "system of rationing" since the system has never really been implemented. Nevertheless, the negative monopolistic characteristics of medicine, or plumbing for that matter, are important to recognize. Even more important is the collusive relation between government and professional monopolies. However, the rephrasing of inequitable educational treatment as economic institutional inefficiency does not logically add to Martel's itinerary conception, because neither conceptualization is sufficiently

inclusive of all contributing social systems.

Dresch quite correctly points to the historical evidence of very low economic return for women and minorities, and relates this to the very different incentives confronting these groups. In the discussion, Dresch clearly says, "We're talking about predominantly social control." If alternative educational choices are available, but economic benefits do not result, "What is the difference in whether or not there is an educational opportunity?" I agree with Dresch that educational attributes are secondary to the primary problem of the economic origins of differential outcomes. However, I again must point out that the sex segregation in the marketplace is more fundamental in the sense of total pervasiveness than specific professional monopolies. And again, the family must be adequately conceptualized if the intersections of public and private work places are to be adequately understood. No adequate policy on family and educational institutions can be elaborated on an inadequate economic analysis of the family.

Dresch's paper is practically the only one in which I feel that women as a group are being considered in any kind of systematic way. But their inclusion is neither specific nor precise. The term "women and minorities" is simply stated without an explicit statement of similarity or dissimilarity in economic and educational situations. Nor is the family or sex roles in relation to the family as an economic unit analyzed. When one looks at the economic facts, as indicated earlier in this paper, there is a very clear intersection of sex and race

discrimination. Dresch is accepting of the marketplace as it is, while asking, however, for a more equitable distribution of rewards for educational effort in order to establish equity and opportunity. Dresch is leaving the sex-segregated marketplace relatively intact, while attempting to change its characteristics in terms of the filter effects of professional groups. In contrast, McClellan in the next paper attempts to look at equal educational opportunity from the class struggle perspective.

Turning to Dresch's second paper on the efficient origins of social equity issues, three itineraries are postulated: the random walk, a model characterized by the absence of substantive logic, responding to pressure and fads; the structural substantive trip, based on the evolutionary process of cumulative development of the progress of ethics in which the moral imperatives are unchanging but subject to cultural conditions; and last, a model that posits societal adaptation to external forces. Presumably Dresch's own model relates to the third itinerary.

From the woman's point of view, the random walk is historically impossible to support. All evidence supports a systematic exclusion and derogation of women from economic, legal, and religious institutions over a 2000 year period of recorded history. The second itinerary is equally unacceptable to women; since the male thinkers, who presumably improved on progressive development of ethics, usually excluded women from their thought systems or derogated them when included, there is

little to be attributed to a "logic of progress" separate from political demands for justice.

The third itinerary is equally difficult. From the cross-cultural point of view, the role of women is not necessarily directly related to changes in the social environment--the physical, economic, or technological opportunities and constraints confronting the environment. There are simply too many cultural differences in forms of sex role subordination within similar geographical settings to accept the third model. This fact was early established by Margaret Mead in her tri-cultural analysis in the South Seas.

There is, from the women's point of view, a newly emerging conceptualization represented in such works as Evelyn Reed's book Woman's Evolution that postulates an entirely different conception of justice. Other writers conceive of physical differentials in strength and child-bearing capabilities as critical to the emergence of societal power and related rationalizations in the conceptions of "justice" that have emerged over time.

For these women scholars, the primary economic causation leaves untouched exclusion from male thought systems--the ontology, the epistemology, the cosmology--that define the nature of reality. These cannot easily be reduced to economic inefficiencies nor to simple materialistic explanations. The model based on economic or social exchange theory is ultimately useful only if one accepts a materialistic definition of the nature of ultimate social reality in which each individual is



separate from all others. In women's experience with child-bearing and rearing, the model of connectedness and sharing is probably more directly relevant. Quite systematically for centuries, women have "accepted" economic and social deficits and insufficiencies in their devotion to children and family. Essentially what is posited here is a model that is based on cultural systems of values that might radically depart from the economic analyses, while still incorporating the better models of reciprocity postulated by Dresch.

Equal Educational Opportunity: The  
Class Struggle Perspective

James McClellan attempts to look at educational equality or equity from the perspective of the class struggle. Ironically, there is nothing within this paper that recognizes that women existed at all in any form. The glaring inadequacies of the Marxist perspectives are obvious. I restate the facts: Marx wrote very little on family or on women. Engels based his work on Morgan's 19th century theory of the evolution of kinship and family, in which patriarchal monogamy is considered the highest form. The extensive critiques and revision by women scholars of socialist theories are lacking in the paper.

McClellan presents his case in a fictional correspondence from the Supreme Headquarters of NATO to the NATO Liaison Section in the Pentagon, in a long, rambling, almost incoherent letter from Commodore Byron Henry, who used to serve as assistant to the Supreme Commander in Paris. For women, McClellan's ironic fiction is even more frightening, since



women are almost completely dependent upon men in power, such as Commodore Henry. A second, perhaps unintended, implication is the stark portrayal of the "old boy's network." The father to son, the general avuncular tone is caught in the private communications. Third, McClellan's satire depicts the bureaucratization of society, with a central and largely secret male club in control. Fourth, it is the only paper that relates education to the international scene. As such, it represents again the complete exclusion of women, such as those involved in the Iranian women's uprising, the plight of raped Bangladesh women, the World Tribunal on Crimes Against Women, the repeated calls from the International Year of Women for education of the world's illiterate, who are predominantly female, the analyses by UNESCO on differential educational, international planning for boys or girls and women and men. Nor does the good Commodore Henry deal with the increasing social, political, and economic sex differentials in training and role sets arising out of contact with patriarchal colonialism.

Quite clearly, McClellan's satire is about men in power communicating with other men in power about men in relation to men. What the correspondence shows with startling clarity is the control certain men have over all of us. The purported secret document from Colonel Carleton considers a model of change, confirmed from events with internal and external events to generate alternative futures, and a set of contingency plans based on the data. The threat of nuclear holocaust is stated.

The C.I.A. classifies as an "unfriendly model" any conceptualization based on class struggle. According to Colonel Carleton the so-called liberal model is the least likely to be used in other parts of the world, so it is contained in specific circuits. Commodore Henry responds by noting computerized capabilities and processes; this is the first reference, even in satire, to major technological capabilities as means of control in the educational equity itinerary. He offers a "solemn toast of comradeship," one of course from which women would be excluded since they are not likely to be comrades in the old boy's network. The Commodore asks his friend to put his "intuitive" powers to work on what the scenario would be for M4B, the scenario for the 1979 working class in the year 2005. He postulates, first, that real capital investment in production is going to leave North America, until the American working "man" (Note: over 40 percent of the American working class is female) is competitive with the sources of profit for the owners of capitalism. In contrast, China is available with 500 million disciplined people who work for \$42 monthly average wage. The 500 billion dollars that are available by friendly corporations are unlikely to go to Canada or America. No, the money is likely to go to China or other sources where people will work for \$42 a month.

The shift from the Protestant work ethic to the throw-away culture has led Americans to throw away their enlightened 18th century Constitution (which never included women to begin with) and they (presumably men covered by the Constitution) have

entered bondage. For females, it is presumably double bondage, unless the E.R.A. has not passed by the year 2005; in which case females would lose what they never had. In the future, the American working class will suffer an unmistakable loss of affluence, while the military establishment will increase.

Clearly the scenario is male. For example, "his sons will soon be drafted to fight conventional wars under the umbrella of nuclear deterrents." Will the working class agree to weapons used against incipient rebellion or to education and repression? Equating the level of discipline of American workers to that obtained by the Nazis in World War II, McClellan in his satire is not predicting what American women workers will do.

He notes the "presentism" that is the concern with the current situation, which obviously pervades all the papers in the project. McClellan refers back to the Populist Revolt in 1893, the growth of labor unions in the 1930s, and in the process of looking back in history, he does not remember at all the New England mill girls' early unions, the early women garment workers organizations, nor does he recognize the revolt by women across classes that has characterized the American scene. Subsequently, he does not see the movement of women into education and not even into the paid labor force, nor does he see the unpaid work force, homemakers and mothers whose contributions are still not included in the gross national product. If not included there, of what economic significance is their work? No one can predict accurately what workers will do unless s/he differentiates what women do not and will do in the future from what men do.

What battle cry have all Populist and unionist people uttered? Equality. And this meant educational equality because that was the goal of equal opportunity for all in the popular consciousness. Now that banner is lost and replaced with educational opportunity. Referring back to the French Revolution, he states that egalite marched with liberte and fraternitie. He evidently does not realize that fraternity is male, and that following the storming of the Bastille, the bravest women fighters were shamefully reduced to unequal conditions, in which liberty was no longer an essential component of life. In short, after being used in the battle, they were returned to be abused in the stereotypic role at home.

Interestingly, he notes with accuracy the male model. If repression is found in other societies, repression must be used at home to counteract it abroad. Quite clearly, this male model pertained to women even in the French Revolution. The model is based on physical force: muscle as the measure of morality. However, he does not think that the American worker (meaning male again) can be trusted to use guns against an enemy carrying the banner of equality, while at the same time accepting lower wages in world-wide competition as a source of labor. The problem, of course, that he has not dealt with is the uneven advance of technology across cultures. Finally, he does not understand the critical role of women in revolution. Whether men rebel depends in part on whether their wives and mothers and lovers rebel. Female rebellion fosters and insures the revolt of the next generation. As long as he does not deal

with the solidarity of men, of women, of people of different colors, as these intersect with social classes, it is a very good question whether all these groups would throw their support to unions that have disallowed them into the ranks or thrown their original female leaders out of power or simply never bothered to elicit even their tangential support. Because there are several intersecting groups of disadvantaged, prediction is difficult and rebellion even more unpredictable.

He states that those in power have to make equality look silly to those on the bottom. (Of course, the millenia-old pattern for this tactic is most obvious in the trivialization and ridicule of women.) One way to do this is in the itinerary of educational opportunity, which can be programmed into the "M4B Program" and turned into something practical. At least at this point, women do exist in the comment, "your guys and gals can put into form"--meaning the results of the project.

Presumably the purpose of the project is to get rid of the nasty term equality and replace it with the insufficiencies or marketplace imperfections or individualized programs. In Martel's project, one maps a standard logical progression in equal employment opportunity in functional terms from group conflict to social class structure perspectives. The Commodore is essentially taking categories from traditional male thought and running through them without reference to women thinkers nor to whether women today will accept them as an adequate depiction of reality. For example, one young woman professor, in speaking of Marx, said, "He slammed the door in my face

fifty years ago. Why should I open it now?"

Whether from a non-socialist perspective, as indicated earlier in Powell's work, or from a socialist perspective in McClellan's satire, the biases in male thought are obvious, except perhaps to the writers. From the 18th century in Jefferson's conception, the Commonwealth had the obligation "to provide each boy with access to school and thus opportunity for education. . . ." But, of course, access to the village school does not guarantee education any more than access to the priest and the church, salvation. The problem is to translate access to actuality.

McClellan's comments on Augustine and Jefferson simply are contrasts between two systems of government, secular and sacred, which excluded women. In the former, Augustine's religious position on women, to put it mildly, was atrocious.

In Jefferson's secular view, women were hardly apparent, except in the slave quarters. Jefferson continues, "It is to the great advantage to the Commonwealth that every boy has both opportunity and motivation. If the child of every man has schools equal to those the rich man provides for his sons, then the nation as a whole benefits. In the struggle for fame and fortune, if each boy makes his best effort in an open free contest, who rises to the top will be the best qualified." Note: All of this assumes that anyone who is rising anywhere in the class structure is male. As a matter of fact, the loss to the nation of brain power and talent from among women of all colors is staggering when considered over only the last three centuries of American history.

To McClellan, a functional analysis means that educational access equals opportunity. (Presumably within the traditional male context.) The Commonwealth has achieved equality in the sense of the right of educational opportunity. This can be short-handed to an equal rights claim. Of course, this never was an actuality for women and minority men. From the functionalist viewpoint, the fight for the claim is still not over. Presumably individualism and functionalism are intertwined. Peculiarly the historical functional-structural analysis in anthropology has been severely criticized because of the difficult person-culture interconnections; thus, it is unclear how individualism and functionalism are necessarily interconnected.

The rhetoric of an unrestricted equal rights claim for all children and young adults has, in my estimation, never been achieved. Each individual's right to education has still not occurred within various curricula for girls, nor for minorities, nor within higher education. In New Jersey the legal battle for the right of one girl to take a shop class; in New York, the legal battle over bilingual education; and in many other areas, the equal claim to all aspects of education has been sex-segregated and minority-related.

Nevertheless, McClellan notes the shift from individual to collectivity because the individual right of each child extends to all children's educational opportunity. The second stage involves group conflict theory. Collectivities can be mapped according to different rates of school achievement,

which apparently inhere in the collectivity. Therefore, the right does not necessarily mean an equal chance of success in school. So equal opportunity as equal access to school now moves to equal educational opportunity as equal access to equal schooling. That moves from equal educational opportunity to equal access as measured by equal rates of achievement and attainment. Equal educational opportunity is then equated with equal access to equal treatment in the process of schooling.

But, as McClellan notes, in large collectives, the transition from input to output is guaranteed by statistical law. From a legalistic point of view, access to schooling has been construed to mean opportunity because it must mean something more than simply walking in the door of the school. The emigrants, for example, the crofters (males) had the chance to leave their squalid homes (in which were presumably squalid females and children). What induced the women to come?

Presumably the equal rights claims of their poorly paid crofter husbands. Presumably their husbands, fathers, and sons had a fighting chance, not a fair or equal chance to make it to the top. What of the girls' or women's chances?

McClellan returns to Jefferson's bill and notes that he saw squire's and tenant's sons getting the same kind of training. Again, we're talking about males entering the door and, once in the room, entering the process of education. So males moved from a fighting chance to an equal chance. Females did not necessarily move anywhere. Organized groups formed to insure equal access and equal treatment. Conflict theory then moves



to class theory in which a group of people can be brought to fight against itself. How do women's groups become quantified in this logic of procession? They cut across many conflict groups and all classes. Finally, for the first time in the paper, the divisions between men and women are mentioned. These divisions are not, however, intersected with race, emigrant status, or any other factor. They are simply listed as though each division in the ranks is equal to every other division.

Using the black model as an example, busing is a highly visible act that makes others feel that one group has special privileges. Organizing others to fight against special privilege, each group uses equality as the slogan to fight against the other, which is also using equality as its slogan. The outcome is conflict among the have nots. Again, McClellan forgets that women cut across all the boundaries of the social classes and of the racial and emigrant groups. Consequently, one effect of the women's movement has been to bring representatives together to consider the underlying and intersecting forms of domination that exist throughout society. When this happens, what happens to traditional interpretations of class struggle?

McClellan then says the mass media, the courts, and academic policies are used to maintain class conflict. If this is the case, all scholars within the N.I.E. project can be seen as being used to sustain the conflict between and among various groups. The academics themselves, then, come

to sustain the class struggle by engaging in analyses such as those presented in Martel's project.

The following pages of correspondence are reminiscences on the manner in which the old boys' system operates, particularly within multinational corporations that will eventually transfer excess capital to other parts of the globe: "Can it be our mission to force American workers to accept their impoverishment at the hands of international capital?" "How can we use the respect for fairness and equality that Americans feel as a weapon in capitalist domination of them?" I'm not at all sure that women feel that the male "respect" for fairness and equality has historically been directed toward them.

The Commodore reflects on the Second World War in which a man's loyalties were congruent with the welfare of the nation. But now there are incongruences. Now comes the key problem for men. There is great need to do something "to regain the camaraderie of a victorious fighting force." The answer is the overthrow of foreign domination of the monopolies imposed on America. The American First Party is postulated to stop the flow of American wealth abroad and to build a national government of all people with jobs for all, based on Lenin's words, "He who works not; neither shall he eat." What happens to women, children, and families in relation to marketplace work? We don't know. How will women become comrades in a victorious fighting force? Again, we don't know.

Women are finally included with men, who in the coming generation will never know the satisfaction of working hard for

socially worthwhile goals. The Commodore continues that "we" (all of whom are men) who are in business of modeling, gaming, simulating, tend to be instrumentalists. To women, the thought system is one of excessive objectivity running wild in out-of-control bureaucracies. These tough men will accept the social class model, because of the hard-headed realization that the other alternative is inevitable war. The new party will raise the "martial spirit of America" and now women will be included in this hard-headed, instrumental thought system: the government would include women. How women are supposed to join "victorious comrades" and "feel a martial spirit"--both outcomes of the male model--is never specified.

In McClellan's fictitious account, educational opportunity is simply a slogan used by power brokers to foster disunity among American men and women and among minorities. In place of this we get equality of service to all. We teach men and women for "slots" according to talent and training. Each child is a national "asset"; each has equal opportunity to serve--presumably the male-controlled and dominated state. Equal opportunity only has meaning in a political context. According to the Commodore, we should be looking for a leader (presumably male) and an organization (presumably male-dominated). How women and minorities are to be involved from their own perceptions of reality remains unstated. The chosen leader will come from the old boy's school to fight against the international banking class and multinational corporations. Next a toast to "the noble traditions of which we are the heirs--of

the comradeship we share in the struggle ahead--to victory."

The male model of dominance in conflict is more than apparent.

In his own words in the group discussion, McClellan stated that the idea of shares for fairness and the shift from equality to opportunity "for" is passive. There is a difference between intent as opposed to practice. Opportunity "to" is more critical. His example: Will the working class students in schools be given the opportunity to engage in revolution within the educational system? His answer is no. Such education will probably be transmitted outside the schools because the capitalistic system could not allow the opportunity "for" such discussion in the schools. To McClellan there must be person plus action plus cost. Otherwise the work presented in the project is "damned rhetoric." For different reason, I tend to agree with him. The tracing of all these arguments is the tracing of rhetoric. McClellan calls for an itinerary in the meaning of justice itself. In his estimation, the meaning of input to outcome must be dealt with conceptually as fairness and justness. The trip is of no consequence "unless justice is brought in on some level."

From his perspective, equity cannot be distributed in excess of profits. This means there are only three ways to go. If occupational structure has not changed, which it has not in past years, that route seems blocked. With increased numbers of students from the "baby boom" and increased unemployment, then increased technology is necessary as a second route. A third route is to make people happy in the roles they now have.

But capitalism is built on consumerism, which is based on dissatisfaction, making people want more than they now have. McClellan sees none of these as satisfactory, leaving only a change in the class structure itself.

The problem with McClellan's solution is that socialist experiments, whether in Sweden, Russia, or China, have not assured equality for women or minorities. As Simone deBeauvoir, after a lifetime of Communist affiliation in France, discovered, only women banding together with each other could insure the equal status of women within the male-erected and dominated political systems. Furthermore, the introduction of female interests into the production model of socialism requires the analysis of reproduction. Without a reconceptualization from this perspective, production is of no consequence. McClellan seems oblivious to the extensive efforts of women scholars to adapt the male thought system of Marx and Engels to women and children. Despite these problems, I tend to agree with McClellan's position that the issues of educational equity are broader: "We can't just talk about opportunities in school systems as such." Unfortunately, McClellan's work, as a fictitious example of male power brokerage, does exclude one-half of humanity, relying only on one dimension, material resources in a class structure.

#### Beyond "Equal" Educational Opportunity

I turn next to two papers that are primarily concerned with equity within the educational system. Neither of these calls for radical societal reform. According to Joseph Cronin,

beleaguered public school administrators are currently attempting to deal with issues such as racial segregation, sex discrimination, forced retirement of older employees, and litigation on an equitable system of financial aid to local schools. The bureaucratization of equality is obvious.

Under increasing demands for bureaucratic assurances, Cronin asks, "What comes next?" To avoid competing demands, he seeks alternatives to the term equality. To women and minority men, the implementation of current demands for equality are far from being met. There is a peculiar irony in the search for a term to replace that which has not been achieved. One cannot go "beyond" what has not occurred. Nevertheless, one can feel some sympathy for those caught in the bureaucratic tangle arising out of legislative and legal mandates on a system that did not move beyond the status quo of a stereotyped and segregated mentality.

Cronin turns away from equality and chooses availability and sufficiency of opportunity. Using these terms, he tries to subsume and to predict what new demands will be made in the 1980s. However, one can also interpret Cronin's shift to be predominantly concerned with the maintenance of a system under conditions of a population decline in those to be served. In Adolphus's terms, the system does not now care about women and minorities; they care about system survival. Temporarily setting aside this interpretation, Cronin conceives of availability of opportunity in relation to increasing numbers of adults in lifelong learning. Unfortunately, he does not

explicitly recognize that poor, particularly non-white women will probably not be helped unless they are specifically focused upon. Without proper attention to specific needs of particular populations, inequality will simple continue, regardless of shifts in terminology.

Sufficiency is related by Cronin to appropriate opportunity. Rejecting classes or groups of persons, Cronin turns to the problem of uniqueness. Given the failure of Affirmative Action legislation to substantially change institutional processes, women and minority men are very likely to see the terminological shift as simply a "cop-out." Ideally, Cronin's idea, that of individualized education plans and choices among educational options, is certainly not objectionable. Nor is Cronin's emphasis on the involvement of families, more specifically parents, unacceptable. Moreover, Cronin's concern with informal and formal education is laudatory. What is problematic is that consciousness of a common plight of a particular group is excluded. Without this emphasis, it is difficult to see how children or adults will achieve a new clarity in their decisions regarding individualization or institutional choices. If parents believe their little girls should marry and their little boys become doctors, the stereotyped system will not change. If poor parents and children do not understand the class structure, their choices are not necessarily going to involve professional careers.

Nevertheless, Cronin continues that multiple definitions of equality are needed. For example, the simple model of equal

expenditures would go out the window. From the perspective of the stigmatized, the model never really got firmly established in the room! Cronin turns to the Handicapped Education Act that incidentally recognizes categories of children and emphasizes individualized education plans. However, as in the other papers, the concern for handicapped individuals is not intersected with other forms of disadvantage; thus, the work toward equality for groups of classes in the previous decades is simply not apparent in the proposed model.

In a period of shrinking enrollment, Cronin looks for other unserved or underserved populations for professional educators, turning next to adults. Again, without explicitly recognizing that the largest population of underserved adults is women and particularly minority women, Cronin, nevertheless, uses the new legislation that mandates improved education levels for welfare recipients, the majority of whom are women with children. He evidently does not know the previous court challenges on the stereotypic training offered them. Furthermore, the central role of women in continuing education programs is also excluded. Yet, continuing education centers have often been instituted to serve returning women students. There are, however, examples of updating requirements for women in professional groups, such as nursing, education, and social work--all low-paying occupations.

Turning to underserved dropouts, Cronin speaks of alternative or special schools and centers, juvenile correction programs, and work-study programs. The intersection of



ethnicity and class with drop-outs is never stated, yet the poor, black, and female teenagers are disproportionately represented in drop-out and unemployment statistics. Additionally, the very negative consequences of "special" schools for non-conforming, black students in the New York City system has been amply documented in my research and in the work of a number of other scholars. Without an intersection of groups involved, there are simply no assurances that the pre-60s situation would not be reinstituted under the guise of a new terminology. If choice is to be real, it must be made in relationship to real choices of groups of people who have been consistently deprived.

Yet another underserved population is composed of older Americans, who can be helped to prepare for retirement and provided with information and consumer protection. Again, Cronin does note the disproportionate numbers of women of all ethnicities who survive men into old age, but he does not deal appropriately with "the stronger sex." What these highly impoverished women need is money and protection from criminals. Many of the women are traditional homemakers who never retire from their jobs; consequently, education for retirement is problematic. The absence of intersecting specificity allows the real needs to go unstated. What the women need is the education provided by the woman who founded Grey Panthers-- how to demand the rights they should have after years of substantial contributions to the society that honors their contribution with neglect in old age.

Having established groups to be served, Cronin turns to appropriate opportunities. Almost everyone can agree with his belief that individualization has been a common term but uncommon reality in educational institutions. How the "groupness" tendency should be counteracted when all institutions are demanding, as he states earlier, efficient bureaucrats who follow instructions and directives is unclear. Equally unclear is how young women are educated into "team spirit and collective discipline." Some of the hardest fights over Title IX have been related to providing sufficient funds for women's athletic teams.

The alternative to "groupness" is I.E.P. (Individualized Educational Plan). Based on handicaps of students, it provides a diagnosis with a written, agreed-upon prescription of placement and services. Just how one reaches an individual prescription for sex-role stereotyping or racial prejudice is left unstated. In my article on dual discrimination, the interaction of sex role and handicapping disabilities led to the following findings:

Both disabled women and men face special difficulties, but the sexual caste system adds an extra burden of discriminatory attitudes on the disabled woman. A woman with a disability has compounded problems. In fact, womanhood has been considered a primary disability (Super, 1957). It is obvious that the interrelationships between sex roles and disabilities are critical to any theoretical, therapeutic, or institutional understanding of disabled persons.

One might expect, from simple common sense, that the leading tests used to train professionals in the several areas of disability would reflect the ways in which disabling conditions are differently distributed and experienced by women and men. One might further expect that writings on the rehabilitation of disabled

persons would present the very different adjustment problems inherent in male and female cultures, both private and public. Yet few if any texts, either theoretical or practical, deal comprehensively with such factors. An examination of the most commonly used texts is a discouraging excursion into the non-existent world of women. Even those sources which purport to be complete reviews of the best research studies, such as Physical Disability and Behavior (McDaniel, 1969), assumed at best a neutered universe. In all of the texts reviewed, one can scarcely find references in appendices to sex roles. More glaringly apparent is the absence of chapters or even sections that present such material. Even in chapters entitled "The Implications of Social Psychological Research for the Handicapped" there is an absence of references related to sex. The limited discussions that are available too often reflect the traditional biases.

If there is any real concern for both female and male clients, one could further assume substantial analyses of the distribution of financial resources, of the quantity and quality of professional personnel available, of the types of institutions which exist for females and males experiencing varied difficulties. Such analyses ought to be readily available for predictive and planning purposes, if not for ethical considerations of equitable care. However, reports available even for local areas do not present findings with sufficient detail to show the social implications for girls and boys or women and men (Wisconsin Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, 1971).

On the national level the social contexts, as defined by sex roles, are lacking in such statistical documents reporting on social insurance, welfare services and vocational rehabilitation as the 1972 Statistical Abstracts of the United States. In Disability in the United States: A Compendium of Data on Prevalence and Programs (Riley and Nagi, 1970), produced at the Ohio State University College of Medicine, statistical indices are again lacking. This thorough set of sixty tables presents all forms of disability, personnel, compensation, and institutional programs. Yet only nine of the tables include sex or race and even fewer specifically pertain to children. Tables dealing with husbands and wives often lump both together, making separate analysis impossible. Finally, no tables deal directly with socioeconomic status, unless one can derive implications from lists of educational levels and occupations.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Joan I. Roberts, "Duel Discrimination: The Interaction between Sex Roles and Disabilities." American Archives of Rehabilitation Therapy, Summer 1977.

If group membership and disability are not intersected, how can individualized plans for handicapped students be realistically developed?

What is clear is that prescriptions for the underserved populations of talented and creative children can be established without great difficulty. But again, with no intersecting analysis of groups, Cronin is unable to deal with the fact that serving bright female students, without addressing the stereotypes associated with their group, will lead to the continued brain drain of substantial numbers of young women who are capable of undergraduate and graduate study, but who are never channeled into the proper use of their intellectual capacities. Of what value are role models for gifted students if the role models do not break the traditional expectations for males and females of all colors?

What is the future of educational choice? Reviving the voucher and modified voucher systems, Cronin states that the enrollment in varied schools and in two or more educational settings should provide diversity of options with individualization and increased choices. He replaces equal educational opportunity with the opportunity to become unique and individual. Just how this uniqueness and individuality are going to occur without radical changes in the prevailing thought systems remains a question.

The Logic of Political Arguments for  
Equal Educational Opportunity

In a purposely neutered, color-free, ethnic-absent exposition, Thomas Green attempts to elucidate the form or structure of political argument, expressly excluding the content of the arguments. He assumes that there is a similarity in appeal to the same principles, that all are different versions of the same issues, and that the form of the argument remains the same. If these assumptions are correct, then Green's problem is to make explicit the common principles and forms of reasoning underlying all political arguments.

Green's basic principle of equal educational opportunity is that every argument is one that is aimed at determining the acceptability of some distribution or some means of determining the manner in which an acceptable distribution is achieved. The thing to be distributed may change from access to resources to benefits to opportunities. The categories of justice and injustice do not apply since we accept some differences and do not consider all differences unjust. However, examples of inequality usually imply injustice, so we can modify the principle to one of distributive justice. It is difficult to see how a principle of logic can be modified by simple reference to evidence. Presumably, the original principle should be capable of extension to postulates that are all derivable from the original proposition. The implication of injustice from evidence is not a logical derivative from the general principle.

A more basic problem underlying the argument is the assumption that a system of logic and the general principles

derived from it can be culture-free. The question to be posed is: Whose definitions of just and unjust within what historical framework? What are the cultural bases of the argument? Within the Pope's framework of logic, is it not unjust to exclude females from priesthood or positions of leadership within the Catholic Church? There is always a value system in which logic exists. From the vantage point of the sociology of knowledge, no thought system is free from intrusions of the thinker's social circumstances. If a logical principle is stated, but justice is a derived implication from social definitions of specific situations, the likelihood of cultural interpretations is substantially increased.

From the perspective of some women and some minority men, the goal of educational equality is the alteration of the prevailing thought systems. In the case of women, the excessive rationality and "objectivity" to the exclusion of intuition and emotionality are critical not just because the former have been attributed to men and the latter to women and used as a basis for exclusion of them from education, but because the depersonalization of human nature and of what it means to be human is incongruent with their lived experience. There is a basic distinction between this view of equality and that which is espoused by Green when he posits that the human interest we seek to express in reference to the principle of distribution is to reach a state of affairs that "makes it impossible to predict the placement of any individual in the distribution except on what we commonly acknowledge to be

educationally relevant attributes at that person."

Immediately we are again out of "pure" logic and into cultural values involved in the definition of what exactly is "educationally relevant." Presumably there is no injustice if the existential injustice of unequal abilities which can be proved. No compensation for differential training would be necessary. Again, we return to the question of what abilities are valued and what means of testing them are used. The literature on black intelligence and female intelligence is replete with "evidence" of inferiority. In the case of female intelligence, the "scientific" arguments of the 1800s start with smaller brain weight, move to anatomical differentials, then in the 1900s to hormonal differences, and currently to split brain hemispheric function. Non-white intelligence is intersected with each of these arguments in different ways over the last 150 years. What then constitutes "proof" of ability outside the male thought system from which the inequality of education originally arose and was subsequently sustained? What guarantee is extended to females and to minority males that educational relevant variables are indeed relevant? What guarantees are there that different conceptions of reality will come to be incorporated into the current thought system? What happens to the possibility of paradigm change resulting from pluralistic interpretations of what it means to be human?

Presumably, all group factors such as class, sex, or geographical location are not educationally relevant. Only individual capacities are relevant. That this represents an



extreme division between formal and informal education is immediately obvious. One cannot logically exclude the cultural circumstances--the group membership of persons--as being irrelevant. What one can do is intersect all the factors of human life in such a way as to make possible the careful delineation of educational needs derived from all facets of a person's life.

Green does have to admit that social class and ethnicity (note the exclusion of gender) may be relevant to curriculum and instruction. The obvious answer is yes. He is caught in the trap of individual versus group relevancies. Once some group characteristics are relevant, it is hard to make the case that all of social life is not relevant in some way to education. The trap closes down when we find that the principle of equal educational opportunity is not a principle of educational effectiveness. How logically do we distinguish the individual from the curriculum from the instruction from the institution? Again, the distinction between individual and group does not stand close scrutiny.

Green says that our concern is that results and resources should be distributed in a predictable way to some attributes of persons but in a random way in respect to other attributes. Clearly the problem is that the person is arbitrarily extricated from the social setting. Thus, it becomes difficult to put the person back into the social setting of even the educational institution. How is the curriculum, the instruction, the effectiveness of the educational system to be divorced



from the results that are to be distributed?

Predictions from both socially and individually relevant categories allow relevant educational attributes and practices. Thus, we cannot move to the next principle that "benefits of education should be distributed unequally to persons in accordance with the unequal distribution of their educationally relevant attributes." The assumption of a normal curve distribution on a linear dimension of intelligence or that which is the most critical educationally relevant variable is presumably basic to the distribution among large numbers of students. Yet Guilford distinguishes over 120 forms of intellectual functioning and any other psychologist of any repute would discount the linearity and singularity of current test procedures. Intelligence, presumably the key educationally relevant attribute, is thus field-configured and multiply-organized.

Green continues that "our moral conscience ordinarily tells us where equality is achieved. . . ." Thus, no vindication is presumably necessary. The whole history of women, the poor, and minorities tells us quite the opposite--only under conditions of extreme political pressure from the "irrelevant" social groups has any change in social systems come about. According to Green, inequality must be defended since equality is ordinarily detected by moral conscience. That this is not the case is obvious from any history of the species--histories which have excluded women and minorities entirely.

The heart of the argument is how to defend inequality. Green has turned the problem upside down, but he must now specify what inequalities are justified. This, as previously noted, is impossible, given the dichotomization of individuals and groups. The additional and more difficult problem is: Who is to defend? The answer? Those in power to do so. The result? Probable continued exclusion of those unjustly treated.

When those in power fill in the values, or as Green puts it, write the numbers on a blank check, the question will be: What do we permit to be educationally relevant attributes of persons? The underlying question is: Who is or are we? What value-laden group will permit what definitions for whom? Because the large majority of faculties in schools of education are white men, because over 90 percent of state and local superintendents of education are white men, because the majority of school principals are white men, it is fairly easy to answer whose thought system and whose values will be basic to definitions of any kind.

Therefore, Green's next question has a ring of pathos. If the exercise of choice is a relevant attribute, how can we create conditions of free choice? For women and minority men, it is difficult to understand how any free choice would be left to them; how any alterations of the value system, thought structures and human paradigms could be attached. After all, the check book is not in their hands.

Inequalities arising from free choice are presumably acceptable. The age-old problem of cultural or societal

determination versus free choice is thus resolved. Inequalities arising from different abilities in different persons are also presumably acceptable. The problem in these conclusions from the general principle has already been noted. Additionally, these formulations do not add anything to the nurturance of abilities through a pluralism of values. Clearly we must not only go beyond the principle but reconsider its validity.

One cannot determine from policy debates among the enfranchised what and how equity issues are translated into other issues. What one can see is that power is not easily given up when those in power "attempt to give cash value for action." Presumably, one can rank order the strength of the arguments from state interest, aggregate of individual interests, social good, and advantages of educational benefits themselves. Presumably, the argument for the interest of the state is strong. Ironically, several women's groups entered into a suit against the Federal government for lack of enforcement of civil rights legislation. It is hard to see how the interests of the state can be a powerful political argument if it requires any substantial change in the state. The question is, is it to their advantage to change?

To Green the argument of the aggregate of individual interests is hard to advance because more people have the same education. Quite obviously this is not quantitatively accurate at the university level. Less obviously, it is qualitatively inaccurate at many educational levels. Numbers of years as a

quantitative index is insufficient and inaccurate.

Only if one accepts the quantitative measure of goal attainment at the lower levels of public education can one accept the idea that goals in the earlier part of this century have been attained. Additionally, goals are usually never fully attained under an imperfect system. Furthermore, goals constantly shift in open systems; therefore, it is difficult to accept the linear movement of goals to functions.

The assumption that "no one is interested in equal education but in better than equal education and usually education that is better than anyone else's" is an argument from self-interest theory of the previous two centuries. The current writing of women scholars does not reflect this orientation. If anything, it suggests a qualitative revision of exactly this non-communal approach. In my estimation, the self-interest theory is only acceptable if one further accepts Green's assumption that the "only persons who can be mustered as a constituency in favor of equal education opportunity consists of those who see themselves as disadvantaged or those who are secure in their advantage." So much for moral conscience alerting us to inequality.

According to Green, the constituent groups have become smaller over the last fifteen years. To the contrary, the constituent groups have become larger. The entire issue of equality for half the educational population as represented in the women's movement emerged during the last fifteen years. Only if one excludes the activities of thousands of women and

follows the black model can this statement be made. The individual aggregate argument did not give way because of declining size in constituencies. It gave way because the system did not respond effectively; thus, people were forced into legal and legislative actions under the state interest approach.

If the argument of social benefits as remote from individual interests is true, it is hard to understand how delayed gratification among students has ever been achieved by any group, male or female of any color. The argument of educational benefits, such as wisdom and other good qualities, has, according to Green, little political clout. Ironically, it is wisdom, not intelligence, that is most sorely needed as an educationally relevant attribute in the world today. I must agree with Green that the present value system has objectified wisdom out of the vocabulary of psychologists, educators, and other social scientists. The seasoned and reasoned use of intellect in a sage manner is really what a number of women scholars have been discussing when they attempt to reconstruct the male conception of reality. If we assume that educational equity will have no impact on the conceptions of reality, then Green's distributive principle makes some sense. On the other hand, if we assume that educational equity will contribute to alterations in the paradigm of what it is to be human, then political arguments relating to both social and educational benefits may in the long run be exceptionally powerful.

There is no "irreversible progress" in the itinerary of educational equality. In fact, the shifts postulated arise predominantly from the white man's reaction to and conceptualization of black culture within the United States. Further, the presumed next step that makes "irrelevant" "race, social class, sex, geographical, and I suppose religion" is highly unlikely to occur. Green probably "supposes" religion because it so clearly represents a distinctive world view. As a critical case of an alternative world view or thought system, religion is clearly hard to make irrelevant. Similarly, but less strikingly obvious to the naive observer, the world views of all other groupings, although less overt, are, on examination, quite obvious. One cannot wipe out the effects of different sex role, family, regional, and cultural traditions. One can take them into account in any theoretical discussion in a systematic and balanced manner. Freedom of choice of the individual cannot be construed as separate from the cultural conditions of any group of human beings.

Green's conclusion that it would be "more humane and more desirable to make the world safe for illiterates than to make the whole world literate" is simply sad. Women as a group represent the largest number of the world's illiterates. The simple fact is that the majority of women of all colors, creeds, and cultures are illiterate. As a member of this group, I cannot feel anything but sadness with the conclusion to which Green's analysis has led him. It is literally and figuratively a sorry comment on the morality of the systems men have created for all of us.

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### Some Concluding Thoughts

I have taken the hard path through the conceptions of educational equality presented by my peers. The easiest route would have been a short 20-page document that stated in a very simplified fashion the alternative conceptions arising from the emerging non-traditional women thinkers. Some of their thinking is apparent in my commentaries on the papers and tapes of the first discussion. Much of it remains to be explicated. This explication is in process and will continue for years to come. What is central to the thinking of women scholars is the reconceptualization of thought systems arising out of the total domination by males of all social systems.

The "Queen Bee," who glories in her singular preeminence among men and who distinguishes herself from her denigrated sisters, is no longer acceptable. The "male impersonator," who takes on the characteristic role behaviors of the men with whom she works, is no longer acceptable. To women, a major theoretical concern in relation to equality and education is the question of assimilation as contrasted with integration. The results of Affirmative Action, an integration model, seem to have led to token assimilation of a few women and minority men who will not rock the boat, and who will therefore not make any intellectual changes in the prevailing paradigm of human reality. In my comments, I have tried to avoid this token role. It is not easy or comfortable to scrutinize the work of my peers, yet to me it seems the only truthful path if I am to avoid the trap of token croaking to an admiring bog.

The world as McClellan's scenario clearly points out is in danger of nuclear holocaust. Some women thinkers are acutely aware of a heavy responsibility to bring a new version and a new vision of human reality to the traditional male conceptions. This cannot be done if male thinkers continue to exclude females in their analyses. This exclusion leads them to omit the alternative thought systems being developed by the best of female thinkers, thus sustaining, in my estimation, the perilous circumstances of our current situation.

Gordon in the taped discussion of the first session traced the shifts of thinking in the early 1970s among members of government bodies such as the Equal Opportunity Commission. What should have been stated is that these shifts became necessary as a substantial number of one half of the populace pressed the issues of sex discrimination. The previous and predominantly black model of educational equality was simply insufficient when the conceptions of injustice were extended from a smaller group to half the population. Furthermore, the intersection of various forms of discrimination became more obvious, again sorely taxing the adequacy of previous models of educational equality. What is striking to me is the complete absence of this obvious historical dilemma. When the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, sex was included by a Southern legislator as a joke and as a way to stop passage of the legislation. By 1970 the large number of complaints filed by women were unexpected and still treated by some in a superficial fashion. By 1975 the thousands of women's complaints and



subsequent investigations revealed a consistent pattern of discrimination in educational institutions across the nation.

In my estimation, this historical upheaval is one of the major reasons that the project under Martel's direction was needed and funded. Nowhere is there an explicit recognition of the simple historical facts of the last fifteen years. Yet, these facts are clearly shaking the fundamental conceptions of justice.

We have before us a choice. The short-range path can be detailed and followed in still another faddish reaction, or the long-range road can be mapped out with scholarly and ethical reflection. Clearly, I am taking the position that changes in terminology will allow only a short-sighted shift that is primarily rhetorical, leading to no substantial long-term change. I believe that we should demand that current laws be enforced. While implementation is the immediate administrative responsibility, the long-range itinerary should be given considered thought that can lead to a reconceptualization of what it means to be human and to be enculturated in the human cultures of the world. This cannot be done unless we incorporate into a new paradigm the thinking of those who have been excluded from the prevailing conceptions of reality.

In short, the ontology, the epistemology, and the cosmology of human existence are basic to any conception of equality in any social system. Unless we deal with the necessary changes in being, knowing, and explaining the reasons for our place in the universe, justice cannot be adequately

reconceptualized in the educational system or in any other system. This may seem a utopian approach, but given the drift of world events and the tremendous advances in technological capabilities for good or evil, it seems to me that it is the only practical and politically astute way to move along the road to equality or survival.

## POSTSCRIPT

Whether or not it contributes substantively to our understanding of educational equity theory, the Itinerary thesis does provide a useful framework in which to explore the evolution of the concept "Equal Educational Opportunity." Knowing the genesis of the concept gives us a more comprehensive base from which to study the equity theory debate.

Within the framework of the Itinerary thesis, the authors of this manuscript develop their own views of the problem of Equity Theory. As a result of gathering such a diverse, dynamic and reflective group of scholars, a great deal of energy and thought was invested in this project. However, the consensus of this assemblage is that only a first step has been taken toward a clearer grasp of the conceptual entanglement associated with equity theory. By no means has the final word been written in these pages. What emerges here is the view that within the educational system, educational opportunity can be distributed equitably--opportunities which might vary with respect to the differing conditions required to verify the presence or absence of opportunity. Research in the verification of conditions of opportunity and which opportunities are effective is an integral part of this position.

On the other hand, it is suggested by some contributors that the burden of inequity rests outside the educational system, as in the instance of economic conditions, of class conflict, or of the male-model family structure. Justified as these perspectives might seem, there remains the practical question of what can be done within the educational system, by itself, to narrow the gap of inequities.

In this regard, research and policy analysis should be directed at determining what is effective; what works for different people at both ends of the fringe, for the handicapped and the gifted, as well as those in between.

Perhaps new directions for research in the management of educational opportunities will enable us to support policy which encourages the spread of equal educational opportunities, while maintaining values of diversity, pluralism, social justice and, indeed, freedom of choice.

LDM